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Note from the Editor in Chief

Dear readers, authors and associates!

We are happy to publish the first issue of *Govor* in 2019. The issue includes various rhetorical topics; argumentation, rhetorical pedagogy or rhetorical stylistics. It was our desire to publish the excellent rhetorical papers in 2019 as an appropriate way to mark the tenth anniversary since the departure of professor Ivo Škarić (2009–2019), the rhetorical flywheel of our Department ever since the 1970-ies. His efforts have grown into a string of rhetorical courses within B.A. and M.A programs at our Faculty, but also at other Faculties at the University of Zagreb. Ivo Škarić was the creator of the School of Rhetoric for talented high-school students. It was organized 30 times during his life and 10 times after his death. The organizers were Phonetics Section of the Croatian Philological Association and Ministry of Science and Education. Professor Škarić's associates, professors of rhetoric, teachers, mentors and students, spread the word about rhetoric across Croatia. It is their merit that we remember our professor at the international conference on rhetoric *Days of Ivo Škarić*. The conference is a biannual meeting point of Croatian and international rhetorical scholars.

Initially, Davor Nikolić, the Chair of the Organizing Committee 2016, was working on the review process. However, because of his numerous duties, the process was delayed. Therefore, the Editorial Board took over the organization of the review process, communication with the authors, editing, proof-reading and all the other tasks in the process of journal publication. We can also proudly say that *Govor*'s national ranking is still A1, meaning one of the best scientific journals in Croatia. We thank our colleague Davor Nikolić for his initial efforts. I would like to thank our secretaries Diana Tomić and Ana Vidović Zorić who have handled the entire review process so that the final result is in front of you. I would also like to thank other associates for their cooperation and help, our numerous reviewers, Jordan Bićanić for graphic design, and our outstanding proof-readers. The result of their efforts is the online publication in 2019 on the platform *Hrčak* and because of the financial support of Ministry of Science and Education which is also traditional, the issue will be

printed. It should also be noted that the number of submitted rhetorical and stylistic papers was pretty high, however, not all of them had two (out of three) positive reviews, and some papers are still in the review process.

This issue includes two papers by keynote speakers from the third international conference on rhetoric *Days of Ivo Škarić* which took place in Postira, birthplace of professor emeritus Ivo Škarić, from 20th to 23rd April 2016. The first paper is an original research paper written by Christopher W. Tindale (*More artful methods: Techniques of narrative in argumentation*), the second paper is a review paper written by Krešimir Bagić (*Anagram – A very short introduction*). Zvonimir Glavaš gave an intriguing talk *The tropes of post-Marxism* which is, in a more extensive version, being published as an original research paper *Catachrestic politics: On the tropes of post-Marxism*. Petra Aczél, an outstanding expert in various areas of rhetoric i.e. history of rhetoric or rhetorical pedagogy, has participated in the work of previous conferences and was the keynote speaker at the fourth conference which took place in 2018. The topic of her keynote was *The potential of a new rhetoric*. Since educational reforms are important in both Hungary and Croatia, the author gives a contribution on rhetorical pedagogy with the paper *Teaching rhetoric: A proposal to renew rhetorical education in Hungarian and Central European contexts*.

This year ends in a positive atmosphere of closing the second issue in 2019, which will be published online and in press on time.

Zagreb, December 12, 2019

Gordana Varošaneć-Škarić
Editor in Chief

Riječ urednice

Cijenjeni čitatelji, autori, suradnici!

Sretni smo što je ovaj prvi broj *Govora* za 2019. posvećen retoričkim temama, bilo u surječju argumentacije, poučavanja retorike ili retoričke stilistike. Želja nam je da objavljivanjem vrsnih radova u surječju retorike na primjeren način obilježimo desetgodišnjicu od kad nas je napustio Ivo Škarić (2009–2019), zamašnjak retorike na Odsjeku za fonetiku još od 70-tih godina 20. stoljeća, koja se do danas razgranala u nisku predmeta na preddiplomskom i diplomskom studiju fonetike, na cijelom fakultetu i na brojnim drugim fakultetima. Podsjetimo, Ivo Škarić idejni je tvorac govorničke škole za darovite srednjoškolce, koja se održala čak 30 puta za njegova života i deset puta nakon njegove smrti, u organizaciji Odjela za fonetiku Hrvatskoga filološkog društva i Ministarstva znanosti i obrazovanja Republike Hrvatske. Njegovi suradnici, izvoditelji govorničkog programa, nastavnici i mentori fonetičari, učenici govorničke škole, dalje su širili sjeme retorike diljem Hrvatske, a upravo su oni zaslužni što se sjećamo profesora na međunarodnoj konferenciji "Dani Ive Škarića" u bijenalnim susretima hrvatskih i inozemnih stručnjaka koji se bave retorikom iz različitih aspekata.

Početno je predsjednik Organizacijskog odbora treće konferencije Davor Nikolić imao zadatak brinuti oko slanja i prikupljanja recenzija za radove koji su izlagani na njoj, no taj je postupak zbog njegove prezaposlenosti kasnio. Stoga je uredništvo u potpunosti preuzelo brigu o daljnjem vođenju recenzentskog postupka i komuniciranju s autorima za pristigle radove, što uključuje slanje recenziranih radova autorima na doradu, pregled (*proof-reading*) i sve ostale organizacijske poslove koji prate rad u časopisu koji je, s ponosom možemo reći, i ove 2019. ponovno kategoriziran kao A1 časopis. Kolegi Nikoliću svakako zahvaljujemo na početnim mukama, a ovom prigodom zahvaljujem osobito glavnoj tajnici časopisa *Govor* Diani Tomić i izvršnoj tajnici Ani Vidović Zorić, koje su iznijele najviše tereta da dođemo do ovako kvalitetnih radova u ovome broju. Uz njih, zahvaljujem na dobroj suradnji i drugim pogonskim kotačima u ovom procesu, brojnim recenzentima, našim lektorima, potom Jordanu Bičaniću na grafičkom uređenju i našoj dugogodišnjoj vrsnoj korektorici gospođi Marici Živko. Svi su oni zaslužni što će brojevi za 2019. izaći i kalendarski u 2019. na platformi *Hrčak*, a zahvaljujući financijskoj potpori MZO-a RH, koje nas redovito prati, i u tiskanim primjercima. Treba reći da je za broj

1/2019 pristiglo trostruko radova iz područja retorike te stilistike koji su prihvaćeni u recenzentski postupak, ali nažalost, nisu svi imali najmanje dvije pozitivne recenzije (od tri), a neki autori nisu, do zaključivanja ovog broja, poslali popravljen ili doraden rad nakon recenzentskog postupka. Tako u ovome broju objavljujemo dva rada autora koji su bili pozvani predavači na trećoj međunarodnoj konferenciji iz retorike "Dani Ive Škarića", koja se održala od 20. do 23. travnja 2016. u rodnom mjestu profesora emeritusa Ive Škarića, u Postirima na otoku Braču. Prvi je originalni znanstveni rad Christophera W. Tindalea *More artful methods: Techniques of narrative in argumentation*, a drugi, pregledni rad Krešimira Bagića *Anagram – vrlo kratak uvod*. Na istoj je konferenciji Zvonimir Glavaš održao intrigantno izlaganje *The tropes of post-Marxism*, a razrađeno objavljujemo kao znanstveni rad *Katahretičnost politike ili o tropima postmarksizma*. Petra Aczél, vrsna stručnjakinja iz različitih područja retorike, primjerice povijesti retorike i poučavanja retorike, redovito je aktivno sudjelovala na konferencijama, a na četvrtoj je bila i pozvani predavač (*keynote speaker*) s temom *The potential of a new rhetoric*. Kako je kurikulna reforma u školama važna u Mađarskoj, kao i u Hrvatskoj, u ovom broju autorica daje znanstveni doprinos upravo temi poučavanja retorike u radu *Teaching rhetoric: A proposal to renew rhetorical education in Hungarian and Central European contexts*.

Ovu godinu završavamo u pozitivnom ozračju završnog oblikovanja i drugog broja za 2019., koji će osvanuti na vrijeme u digitalno dostupnom mediju te u tiskanom obliku.

U Zagrebu 12. prosinca 2019.

Gordana Varošaneć-Škarić
Glavna urednica časopisa *Govor*

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More artful methods: Techniques of narrative in argumentation

Summary

The title, and inspiration, for this talk is drawn from a confession of Daniel Dennett at the start of one of his books, in which he writes that in order to get people to think seriously about ideas he cannot use formal argument, because people will not be swayed by that. He has to use "more artful methods"; he has to "tell a story." The contrast between formal argument and story as methods of persuasion is suggestive and worth exploring. But in shifting attention on to the narrative as Dennett does, some interesting questions are encouraged: What is the persuasive nature of narrative? And how do narratives address audiences argumentatively? To provide responses to these questions, I take up some cases of narratives that have been used to persuasive effect. I then place these analyses within a larger project that has been occupying me: describing the nature and power of the cognitive environments in which we interact. This in turn allows me to discuss various devices with both narrative and argumentative import, like allusions and memes, the second of which was adopted by Dennett.

Key words: argumentation, cognitive environments, narratives, stories

1. INTRODUCTION

Who can resist a good story? Our cultures abound in them, are ground in them, and values are found in them. We use them to entertain, to teach, and to illustrate. And we use them to persuade, as Daniel Dennett does in *Darwin's dangerous idea*, or as argumentation theorist Igor Žagar does in arguing for the scalar effect of *topoi*, as he grounds his account in a story from Ducrot.¹

In spite of it being only a recent target for the incisive analyses of argumentation theorists, the treatment of narratives as arguments has a storied, if overlooked, history in Western philosophy. Aristotle reminds us that the human being is, by nature, an imitative animal. And part of the proof of this is the pleasure we take from telling stories (*Poetics* 1448b4-8). As such a fundamental aspect of our being, we should expect that this tendency will manifest itself in a full range of human activities, including arguing. But even before Aristotle, and in spite of his general dismissal of poetry, Plato adopted the strategy of pressing a case by presenting both an argument and then a story,² as if he was concerned to impact the widest possible audience.

From a different perspective the interest in narrative as an alternative to argument has been raised by such contemporary thinkers as Daniel Dennett and Jorge Luis Borges. Borges, for example, echoing Emerson, insists that "arguments convince nobody. They convince nobody because they are presented as arguments. Then we look at them, we weigh them, we turn them over, and we decide against them" (Borges, 2000, p. 31). There is likely an element of exaggeration in this remark, since if arguments convinced *nobody* they would be unlikely to receive the attention (scholarly and otherwise) that they do. But a weaker claim that might be attributed to Borges here is that a certain type of argument lacks persuasive power. The traditional formal argument, for example, may have great pedagogical value but would rarely carry the day in a debate.

¹ Žagar (2008) grounds his account on Ducrot's story of the policeman, who adjusts his judgement according to the *topos* on which he depends.

² This may be a strategy he borrowed from Protagoras, since there is a particularly forceful example in the dialogue named after that sophist where both an argument and then a story/myth is related. But we see Plato himself adopting such a strategy among his panoply of rhetorical devices, as when he witnesses the processes after death and returns to tell the tale, a story that complements the arguments for adopting the role of the just person.

In *Darwin's dangerous idea* (1995), Dennett writes:

I have learned that arguments, no matter how watertight, often fall on deaf ears. I am myself the author of arguments that I consider rigorous and unanswerable but that are often not so much rebutted or even dismissed as simply ignored. I am not complaining about injustice – we all must ignore arguments, and no doubt we all ignore arguments that history will tell us we should have taken seriously. Rather, I want to play a more direct role in changing what is ignorable by whom. I want to get thinkers in other disciplines to take evolutionary thinking seriously, to show them how they have been underestimating it, and to show them why they have been listening to the wrong sirens. For this, I have to use more artful methods. I have to tell a story. You don't want to be swayed by a story? Well, I *know* you won't be swayed by a formal argument; you won't even *listen* to a formal argument for my conclusion, so I start where I have to start (Dennett, 1995, p. 12).

Admittedly, Dennett is talking here about technical philosophical arguments which may, on the best day, command only a limited audience. But more interesting, I believe, is the dichotomous thinking at work here: argument *or* story, but not both. Left aside is the argumentative power of the story itself.

In this paper I am interested in this power. More particularly, I want to ask what is the "value-added" component of narrative argument? Why do arguers adopt the strategy of resorting to narratives and what do they expect to accomplish by doing so? This is the kind of question that has been addressed, if only implicitly but certainly successfully, by those working on visual argumentation. It amounts to being able to show that there is something left should one attempt to "reduce" a visual or narrative argument to its propositional "core." And that "something" has force such that the argument would not be as effective – would not be *the* argument – without it.

2. NARRATIVE ARGUMENT

Let me first deal with the preliminary question of whether there are narrative arguments. What would such involve?

Of course, there are different definitions of *argument*, but generally, as an activity, it is the attempt to bring an audience to consider or accept, or act on some claim or proposal. And it is, importantly, a reason-giving activity. This means that arguments, as artefacts or products, must contain some components that constitute

the claim or proposal and some components that constitute the reasons. These dual requirements actually allow a lot of leeway, to which I will return below. They do not, for example, limit us to collections of propositions which we could then determine to be true or false.

Consider, as an example, the following discourse from the Chinese scholar and sage Mencius (1999):

Probably in the ancient times there were people who did not bury their dead parents. When a parent died, he or she was thrown into a gully. Then one day when the son passed there, the dead body was being eaten by foxes and sucked by flies and gnats. A cold sweat exuded from the brows of the son, who looked away, unable to bear the sight. The sweat was not exuded for others to see, but was an expression of his inmost heart. Probably he went home to fetch basket and spade for the burial. It was really right for him to do so. So it is reasonable that all filial sons and benevolent men should bury the remains of their parents. [1999, p. 125].

Mencius clearly puts forward a claim or proposal: it is reasonable that all filial sons and benevolent men should bury the remains of their parents. It even has a conclusion indicator – so – that informal logicians are fond of identifying. And there is premise material here in the account of the son's experience and actions. The entire argument here is a story – a story with a moral that commands action. Mencius argues that it is reasonable that "all filial sons and benevolent men should bury the remains of their parents," and his "evidence" for this conclusion is a speculative story about how such a practice would probably have come about. There is no attempt to suggest a "truth" to this account. It depends for its force on what is probable. To test such "evidence," an audience has to measure what is suggested against their experience of likelihoods and determine whether the likelihood is strong in this case. In fact, we can see how such stories would then proliferate in legal reasoning, where a jury is asked to imagine the likely order of events that have led to the occurrence that is under scrutiny by the court. Aristotle's invocation that stories should express what follows necessarily or according to probability suggests that experience has a certain logical coherence. This is a feature of the most compelling stories we tell. It gives them plausibility, and such plausibility is a central criterion for "good" narrative arguments (Olmos, 2013). In Gil Plumer's (2011) terms this plausibility is a "realistic believability," where the fictive gains real world credence. Given this, we can assign such arguments a place in

the growing accounts of argumentation schemes, where it fits as an "argument from example" (Olmos, 2014, p. 191).

Mencius' story, moreover, is more than a simple description of probable events: it evokes pathos. The cold sweat that the son experiences, which was an expression of his emotional reaction, conveys a sense of horror and thereby captures something of the shared values of arguer and audience. Now the audience is invited not just to match the coherence of the account with their experience but also to feel what the fictitious son felt.

3. CRITICAL OBJECTIONS

Early accounts of narrative or *narratio* are understood in terms of a setting out of the facts (Olmos, 2013), and more generally, a recounting of a "concrete event" is deemed important for there to be a narrative at all (Olmos, 2014, p. 202). This certainly differs from the fictive telling of a story like the one provided by Mencius that tries to draw an audience in through some lesson learned or an illustrated claim. But as Kvernbekk (2003) points out, there is no generally agreed view of narratives in the vast literature on narrative theory. So we must stipulate the kinds of limitations that are engaged when we explore narratives and arguments. We do want to include the fictional story, for example, even the longer "story" of the novel (Plumer, 2015). But we also want to include the narrative reports of the historian and the thought experiment of the philosopher (or argumentation theorist, as per Ducrot). Indeed, narratives are devices used across the social and natural sciences, comparable in this respect to arguments. Perhaps it is too early in our analyses to be definitive about the meaning of "narrative" here.³

Each of the very different uses of narration, though, falls prey to the kinds of barriers that have been erected by argumentation theorists to prevent the treatment of narratives as arguments or at least to police the situation with strict conditions that would have to be met before a narrative qualifies. Essentially, these conditions reduce to demands that narratives fit the structure of arguments in order to qualify as argumentative. That is, they must have a claim and supporting premises.

³ A good working understanding of narration, and one consistent with the view Kvernbekk expounds, is provided by van den Hoven (2015): "a mental scheme in terms of which we 'understand' an act as caused by something that went before and leading to something that will follow" (2015, p. 120).

We find this prescription, for example, in the treatment offered by Kvernbekk in her paper "Narratives as informal arguments" (2003) and in what Govier and Ayers (2012) describe as the "core" of an argument.

Drawing from Salmon (1984), Kvernbekk defines "argument" as "a group of statements standing in relation to each other. Among the basic terms are conclusion, premise, (causal) inference and evidence" (Kvernbekk, 2003, p. 1). In her judgment, a core issue in deciding whether narratives can be construed as arguments is the nature of the relation between premises and conclusion. In particular, she sees theorists offering distinctions between theoretical and practical arguments, with different criteria suggested for each. For example: are reasons offered as justifications for how we act, or are reasons offered for what we believe? (2003, p. 5).

Kvernbekk allows that like arguments, narratives have conclusions, but she challenges the idea that they will have a similar premise-conclusion relation: "it hardly seems likely that the premise-conclusion relation found in narratives is similar to that found in informal arguments, although this of course depends on what one takes an informal argument to be" (2003, p. 8). This is because of the way she understands narratives as products configured in hindsight: "In a narrative, the conclusion is known for a fact. It exists as something that happened before we can tell a story about it" (Kvernbekk, 2003, p. 8). Arguments, she insists, use premises to take an audience to a conclusion that is not yet known or held, they provide justification for a claim. But narratives have conclusions that are already known to be true and do not require justifying or warranting. She concludes: "*If* the point of arguments is to show that knowing the premises warrants knowing the conclusion, and *if* this justificatory relationship of premises to conclusion is at the heart of the very definition of an argument, *then* I conclude that narratives are not arguments, formal or informal" (Kvernbekk, 2003, p. 8). Much here depends on her understanding of narratives, in particular, in linking them with hindsight. One of the few things that "virtually all narrativists" (2003, p. 6) agree about is that the establishing of plots take place in hindsight. The narrator constructs the narrative with knowledge of the end result or closure of the plot. There are two things we might note about this: (i) it offers us a very narrow view of narrative, one that we should not acquiesce to if we want to appreciate the range of ways narratives might work as arguments. She seems to narrow the discourse of interest to the relation of facts, fictional or otherwise. The thought

experiment, for example, would appear to be a use of narrative that falls outside of this. (ii) Secondly, even if the narrator knows the outcome, the same would not necessarily hold for the audience. The justification is still required to bring them to see what the narrator has already seen. That's why so much testimonial evidence is narrative in nature. And the "result" at stake may not be a straightforward fact, as we saw with Mencius' recommendation and justification of an action. The latter certainly suggests that narratives may have specific value in practical arguments.⁴

This is also relevant when we turn to the analysis provided by Govier and Ayers (2012), since they are particularly interested in parables, which are typically thought to convey a message. They are not dismissive of the roles that narratives can play in argumentation. "Some narratives," for example, "play important rhetorical roles in contexts where arguments are offered, adding interest and vividness" (2012, p. 162), and stories about an individual case are often useful. But they question whether we can extract from a narrative an argument that expresses the point of the narrative, as supported by the events recounted (n. 2). Their principal means of exploring this issue is to ask whether parables provide good reasons for what they advocate. The stress on good reasons is important for them, because the danger is that we might otherwise be persuaded on the basis of "vividness and appeal" (2012, p. 163).

They view narratives in a way similar to Kvernbekk: narratives involve a series of events with a beginning, middle, and end, and which may relate the experiences of the narrator. Should that be the case, we would again be looking at a discourse constructed from a point of closure. They can be fictional or non-fictional. A parable is short and simple, and relates events that are familiar or accessible to the audience.

These definitions are useful; that of "argument" is crucial: "The point of an argument is not to tell a story that goes in some direction to a resolution but rather to *provide reasons* to support a claim that is in question" (Govier & Ayers, 2012, p. 165). Claims are made to offer reasons for further claims, premises and conclusions. This is the logical core of an argument, some components of which could be implicit.⁵

⁴ Kvernbekk does allow in her conclusion that narratives can be used to portray various reasoning processes, but remains sceptical as to whether narratives can provide reasons for their conclusions (because she sees them as explanatory rather than justificatory).

⁵ But not *all* of them. They do not allow that all arguments could be expressed visually or through other non-verbal means.

From a logical point of view, certain concerns arise, and the first of these has to do with the scope of the conclusion. Many of the narratives involved in parables are personal, or involve individual examples. If the conclusion then generalizes from such an instance, there is the possibility of a fallacy of hasty conclusion (where a conclusion is drawn on the basis of insufficient evidence). And if the narrative is to represent further cases (as by analogy), we should ask how representative it is.

This second conclusion may be due to the strict requirements that they impose on their arguments. In each case, they convert them into propositional form, identifying premises and conclusions. And these propositional forms invariably reflect known argument structures. What this illustrates is the problem familiar to proponents of visual arguments: the tendency, insistence even, to require that if something is to count as an argument it must be possible to frame it in, or "reduce" it to, propositions. And those propositions can then be tested for logical cogency in terms of their internal relations. If we are to resist this tendency, we need to widen our understanding of argument, claiming for narratives what has been claimed for visuals.⁶ For example, recall that Govier and Ayers place emphasis on the argument's core. In identifying a core, they also suggest that there are non-core elements, and these they provide in a footnote: emotional indicators, counter-considerations, and also jokes or illustrative anecdotes (2012, p. 166, n. 9). In fact, the footnote includes among the non-core items "attempts to rebut actual and potential objections to the premises, conclusion, or line of reasoning." Such a remark evokes Ralph Johnson's (2000) dialectical tier where such objections are considered and rebutted. But it is to be noted that while his dialectical tier could be set against the illative core of an argument (and thus be considered non-core), he still considers it an essential part of the argument and extends his considerations of cogency to it. Albeit the suggestion there might be that he is adding dialectical criteria to the logical core. But the distinction between such "parts" of an argument can be hard to maintain (Tindale, 2002), and the suggestion that there can be criteria beyond the logical involved in the evaluation of arguments is enough to encourage the consideration of other non-logical criteria. Once such a consideration is allowed, the decision of what is core and what is non-core is open to debate.

⁶ I am not suggesting that narratives and visuals work in the same ways, only that they share non-traditional features that recommend a certain similarity of treatment.

As long as traditional core criteria dominate accounts such as those of Kvernbekk and Govier & Ayers, then the analyst can demand of the text, "what are the premises?", and in the absence of a suitable response, reject the candidate. The problem is similar to the treatment of images as arguments. The difference, of course, lies in the discourse-basis of the narrative and the different genres involved. But this just serves to identify the frustration experienced when trying to account for narratives in terms of the genre of argumentation. Because if we do identify the premises and the claim they support, then we have indeed an argument. But what is left of the narrative? It has been absorbed in the argument (one genre consumed by the other). Or, more to the point, what is left that is of importance for the narrative to contribute in evaluating the strength of the discourse? What much of this suggests is that whether narratives can work as arguments will depend very much on how we construe "argument."

Georges Roque (2015) challenges what a number of proponents of visual arguments have come to call "linguistic imperialism." Given that the standard way of expressing arguments has been verbally, we should not be surprised if an assumption has emerged that that is the *only*, or the *primary*, or the *normal* way of expressing arguments. As Roque conveys this, "verbal language would be the paradigm for understanding and analyzing the whole universe of meaning" (2015, p. 181). The whole business is complicated further by the associated assumption that the language of thought is propositional.

From the point of view of informal logic, the case of J. Anthony Blair (which Roque reviews) is instructive. Roque had taken his working definition of "argument" from Johnson and Blair (2006),⁷ so his account is rooted in an informal logic perspective. In one of his first ventures into the question of visual argument, Blair (1996) observes that a visual argument would have to be non-propositional if it were to be a radically different kind of argument (if it is not different, then it can be "reduced to propositions and assessed that way"). But an argument is always a propositional entity, so the visual is either propositional or not an argument (cited in Roque, 2015, p. 179). This is clearly the kind of assumption about arguments that drives the discussions of Kvernbekk and Govier & Ayers. But in a later paper (Blair, 2004), he revises this position, now allowing that some visual images could figure in

⁷ That is, "a claim, together with one or more sets of reasons offered by someone to support that claim" (Johnson & Blair, 2006, p. 10).

arguments. The reasoning that leads to this change of perspective is related to the use of arguments. We do not just use arguments to assert truths; we also use them to change an audience's attitudes or behaviour. But such things (attitudes and so forth) do not have a truth value. And so it would follow that not all verbal arguments are propositional (unless we want to say that advocacy arguments and other arguments promoting actions are not arguments at all).

This is a position on which Roque (2015) builds. He adds two further considerations. (i) Can propositions capture all the cognitive processes images imply? (2015, p. 180). The literature is still being amassed that addresses this question. But there are sufficient results so far available to suggest that propositions cannot fully account for the cognitive material that images supply. (ii) Not all sentences express propositions. There are important differences between them, and one of those differences relates to the amount of interpretation and reconstruction of meaning that propositions require. There is a treacherous process involved in going from sentence to proposition:

Most of the time, we need a triple process of translation: first, it is necessary to convert words into a sentence, second, the sentence into a proposition, and finally we need to structure the propositions into an argument. So, it would be inaccurate to consider the translation process as unique to images, since there is a comparable translation that takes place with words. (Roque, 2015, pp. 182–183).

The upshot of Roque's discussion is to, minimally, bring verbal arguments and visual arguments onto a level playing field. Neither has any prior claim to superior status such that one sets the standards by which the other should be identified and assessed.

Why should all this concern us since our interest is in narratives? Roque's subsequent examinations of two cases (and there are many comparable cases to be found in the visual argumentation literature) serve to show how images, like words with their associated meanings, have their lives in what I will shortly call the cognitive environment. In fact, his first example of a hand expressing the victory sign, with the other digits missing, illustrates how important it is to have an active audience assigning meaning through interpretation and reconstructing what they see as an argument. That is, the success of the "argument" depends on the role of the audience assigning appropriate meanings and drawing on the resources available to do so.

So several points might be transferred from Roque's arguments for visual argument to the current consideration of narratives. First, it must be observed that the general expansion of the idea of "argument" to include the non-verbal opens the notion of argument itself to further expansion. Furthermore, the observation that not all arguments can be reduced to the propositional undermines several of the conclusions drawn by people like Kvernbekk and Govier. But it should also be apparent that Roque's more specific conclusions about visual arguments are also transferable here. When he asks whether propositions capture all the cognitive processes images imply, we are invited to substitute narratives for images and ask whether anything is left behind in the analyses of Govier and Ayers. And when Roque observes that not all sentences express propositions, and thus are not to be assessed in terms of their truth-value, we are invited to consider whether narratives are being used to achieve other ends than truth, as in cases of advocacy.

4. THE CONCEPT OF ARGUMENT

Informal logicians themselves are aware that the transition from earlier conceptions of argument has not been complete or without problems. Johnson (2014), for example, notes that the "informal logic textbooks offer the reader an anemic conception of argument, one which does not differ markedly from that which appears (when it does appear) in other standard introductory logic textbooks, such as Copi; nor indeed from those on the FDL tradition" (2014, p. 79).

The focus, then, is still primarily on the product, and the concept is still largely a static one. What matters are the propositions in the form of premises and conclusions. As I note in the earlier sections of this paper, there are reasons to be concerned about this. How can the visual, for example, be an argument on the traditional model or even the informal logic model? Both "reduce" arguments to propositions. This brings us back to the question raised by Roque whether propositions are all there are as arguments. Is the propositional the "paradigm" case that anything (visual, narrative, and so forth) that purports to be an argument must reflect in some way? All this invites a typically philosophical investigation of the core versus the non-core, which would see the one perhaps displaced by the other. But we do not have to go so far; we can simply question the prejudicial nature of such a division that appears to exclude *in advance* anything that does not fit a definition of

argument that reaches back through the informal logic accounts into the traditional models that informal logic had professed to replace.

This more dynamic view of "argument" (in contrast to the static view noted above) is closely related to that which can be extracted from Aristotle. Adopting a rhetorical perspective on argumentation has always involved the recognition that an argument's purpose and not just its structure must be part of its definition. By that I mean, we have been used to defining an argument as a series of statements (minimally two), at least one of which (the premise) provided support for another (the conclusion), *and* it has the goal of persuading an audience. Bringing the audience into the conceptual field marks the engagement with rhetoric and the rich collection of ideas available from that tradition. But as we have seen, there is still a tendency to separate out the "structural" part of the definition and treat arguments in the static way, as mere products. This effectively tears the product from the process in which it was produced and pins it down for review and assessment, like a butterfly on a display board – colorful, perhaps, but also lifeless. When the argument is then analyzed it is so on its own terms and without sufficient regard for the situation that produced it, along with the participants involved in that situation. Treating arguments in this detached, static way amounts to a failure to recognize the dynamic nature of what is involved.

Stephen Toulmin hinted at what was at stake when he wrote: "An argument is like an organism" (1958, p. 87). In saying this he meant that it has parts, an integrated structure. Toulmin's statement further recalls the Aristotle of the *Poetics* describing the work of art like an organism, with head, body and tail. But, importantly, Aristotle also judged it to be like an animal because it was alive, another animated thing among animated things (1450b). The *Poetics*, with its demand for probable and necessary sequences in plots, evinces reasonableness here at the heart of the poetic – a moving train of logic. A plot recalls the nature of the syllogism when we learn that "if any part is displaced or deleted, the whole plot is disturbed and dislocated" (1451a).⁸ But if the poetic has a movement, so too must logic itself: logic has a life, and its structures have internal movement. This sense needs to be transported to the study of argumentation. An argument is alive; it is a message (which would include images) of activated potential. To recall some particularly important Aristotelian terms that capture the

⁸ Grube (1958) translation.

way he conceived natural and social objects, an argument is a potentiality (*dunamis*) and two actualities (*energeia*).

The relationship between these terms is complicated. Aristotle used it famously in *De Anima*, or 'On the soul', (1984a) as a way to capture the interactions of the parts of a human being (body and soul): a soul is the first actuality (activation) of a body that has life potentially. Then, the second actuality is any expression of that initial activation. For example, an eye (a "body") has the potential for sight (the first actuality) but may be asleep. When the eye is actively seeing it expresses the second actuality.

Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, especially in its third book, encouraged us to think of the ways in which rhetoric and arguments "activate" what is potential in the audience. What he called "bringing-before-the-eyes" was a way in which ideas are made present by being activated in an audience so that they attend to them and act upon them. This encourages us to adopt the language of potentiality and actuality for the processes in argumentation that are captured in the nature of "argument," viewed now as something dynamic. In argumentation, the first actuality is achieved in the movement within an argument from the premises to the conclusion (while there is not yet any uptake, any adoption (literally) of the claim involved). This internal movement already indicates the way in which an argument is alive with action, dynamic on its own terms. There is a movement from premises to conclusion that the mind follows, or, in Pinto's terms, is invited to follow.⁹ This is the level of inferencing, of the illative core. Secondly, there is a movement toward the audience that has already been anticipated in the internal movements of the "core", insofar as the components have been chosen with the audience in mind. A further actuality corresponds to what arises in the audience, the one that adopts ideas in the process of "uptake." This uptake is a complicated matter that depends on many variables, including the arguer's skill at recognizing the audience and the means of persuasion available for that audience. But among the strategies that encourages this second actuality or uptake is the use of narrative. How this might work will be considered in subsequent sections of the paper.

On the terms explained here, we might view an argument as both an organization *and* a dissemination, since it collects ideas and then moves them internally from

⁹ Consider further how the tools of informal logic include diagramming methods in which arrows point from premises to conclusion. This assumes the metaphor of movement; it captures the directional nature of reasoning.

premises to conclusion, and then externally to an audience. And it has features that facilitate both of these movements. Or at least the arguer has access to such features, many of which are to be found in the wealth of ideas available in the rhetorical tradition.

The static sense of argument sees arguments as products with no essential connection to the argumentative situation from which they arose. They are inert pieces of discourse, connected statements that can be judged "good" or "bad" merely in terms of their structures. (This is clearly the case with the traditional model and still the case generally with informal logic models). By contrast, a dynamic sense of argument sees arguments as social events, personalized by those engaged in them. They are alive with meaning and movement, and should only be judged "good" or "bad" in light of consideration of the entire argumentative situation (including the participants).

5. STRATEGIES OF NARRATIVE ARGUMENT

How, then, does narrative argument work as a type of dynamic argument (or feature of rhetorical argumentation)? I want to consider several strategies which provide something of an answer to that question, beginning with allusion. But first it is important to observe that narratives, unlike other stimulants of the imagination, lend themselves particularly to Aristotle's bringing-before-the-eyes (*pro ommaton poiein*).¹⁰ This, as noted, is one of the principal ways by which we see *energeia* (actualization) operating in the *Rhetoric*, "for things should be seen as being done rather than as going to be done" (*Rhet.* III.10.6). It is an important contributor to our understanding of "presence" as a rhetorical idea, and captures a range of "activations" that good argumentation can achieve.

As Aristotle introduces this type of visual conceptualization,¹¹ he offers the following explanation: "To say that a good man is 'foursquare' is a metaphor, for both

¹⁰ Or perhaps not. At this point, while this seems to me likely to be the case, I remain agnostic on the matter. My subject is narrative and I limit the discussion to this. But consider the wider range of cases that Scarry (1999) considers in exploring how poets and writers create ideas in the mind.

¹¹ What it does not create is visual vividness. George Kennedy observes (2007, p. 117) that *energeia* should be distinguished from *enargeia*, which means "clearness" or "distinctiveness." This may strike us as odd because it comes in spite of the prevalence of visual imagery throughout the *Rhetoric*. Quintilian's later association of "bringing-before-the-eyes" with *enargeia* encourages confusion on the relation: "I am complaining that a man has been murdered. Shall I not bring before my eyes all the circumstances that

are 'complete'; but it does not signify activity [*energeia*]." On the other hand, the phrase "having his prime of life in full bloom" is *energeia*, as is "you, like a free-ranging animal" (III.11.2). Something comes alive for the hearer through being actualized in such a way.

This visualization encourages attentiveness and provokes, as we later discover in the discussion of arrangement or *taxis*, receptivity [*eumatheia*]. If they are not attentive, hearers will not be receptive, "because the subject is unimportant, means nothing to them *personally*" (III.14.7, emphasis mine). Implicitly here is a concern for more than just large types of audiences with their various compositions that he had discussed in earlier books. Now, the subject must be brought alive for each member of an audience, and that involves making it important to each one personally in order for reception to occur. There is a large difference between a concept being active in the mind and visual vividness, and the two etymologies are distinct. But one would be forgiven for thinking Aristotle also had in mind the senses attributed to *enargeia*. That "bringing-before-the-eyes" should involve some kind of *phantasia* (imagination) is suggested by its perceptual nature. The audience *sees* something and *learns* from this. Thus, we have a cognitive effect arising from a perceptual cause. In Quintilian's example of *enargeia* the subject brings this on himself (mentioned in footnote 11). In the atmosphere of the *Rhetoric*, *energeia* is one of the means of persuasion that a speaker employs to move an audience. Still, there is no doubt that the quality of the mental experiences that arguers can invoke, and their accurate correspondence to perceptual experience, is important, as well as the "felt experience" of the audiences involved (Scarry, 1999, p. 42). This deserves further attention.

In fact, the phrase translated as bringing-before-the-eyes can be a misnomer because while the "eyes" before which ideas are brought are the internal eyes of the mind, the experience itself is broader, engaging the entire affective system in which cognition is inseparable from emotion. I am reminded here also of what Michael Burke (2011) has called "disportation," in describing the kind of affective change that takes place in a reader (2011, p. 232). This deeper sense of cognition is why the idea of the cognitive environment needed to be expanded to include emotion and value (Tindale, 2016). This gives us a much fuller sense of how audiences are engaged by "presence." And it is into this that our discussion of narratives must fit.

it is reasonable to imagine must have occurred in such a connection? Shall I not see the assassin burst suddenly from his hiding place, the victim tremble, cry for help, beg for mercy, or turn to run? Shall I not see the fatal blow delivered and the stricken body fall?" (Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 6.2.31-2).

5.1. Allusion

Consider the following extracts from Isocrates' *Antidosis*. He is defending himself at trial by telling a story about himself, one that details facts about his life and demonstrates his character:

Isocrates is accused of being able to 'make weaker speeches stronger' [2000, p. 15]; he expects to have difficulty due to his old age and inexperience in such contests [2000, p. 26]; he says, 'I lived my past life without anyone accusing me of violence or injustice during either the oligarchy or the democracy' [2000, p. 27]; he is charged with corrupting the young by teaching them to speak well [2000, p. 30]; but, he observes, if he has harmed others, surely they would take the opportunity to accuse him [2000, p. 33, p. 92, p. 240]; it has been claimed that Isocrates is the cleverest of all men [2000, p. 35]; in spite of the charges against him, Isocrates suggests he should receive thanks for his contributions rather than punishment [2000, pp. 60–61]; in fact, he should receive greater thanks than those fed in the Prytaneum [2000, p. 95]; he observes that others beg and bring their children before the court, 'but I do not think anything of this kind is appropriate to a man of my age' [2000, p. 321].

No one who has read Plato's *Apology* can fail to be struck by the parallels between the remarks and events related by Socrates in that work and expressed by Isocrates here in his own trial speech. The *Antidosis* was written around 356 (and, it might be noted, was unsuccessful; Isocrates lost his case). But the question to explore here regards the "echoes" that we hear of another famous ancient text. Plato's *Apology* is generally held to have been written early in his career, and soon after Socrates' death in 399.¹² If it was written in the next decade at the latest, that would have it precede the *Antidosis* by several decades, ample time for it to find its place in the literature of the times and be familiar to educated audiences. Both works fit the genre of the trial speech, and it is possible they "refer" to an ur-text that forms the foundations of both.¹³ But it is more likely that one alludes to the other. That such allusion is deliberate seems uncontroversial.

We should, then, consider how the argumentative use of allusion was intended to meet Isocrates' purposes. While the case involves what is essentially analogical reasoning, we have something far subtler than just an argument from analogy at work here. This is story-telling of the autobiographical kind. Through the use of allusion

¹² See, for example, Kahn (1996, p. 6).

¹³ If so Gorgias' *Palamedes* would be a candidate (see Tindale, 2010, pp. 122–125).

Isocrates is able to evoke similarities between himself and Socrates, to draw the association in the minds of his audience. In this way, it serves as a potentially effective strategy of rhetorical argumentation. When we ask our question, 'How is the argumentation *experienced* by its audience?' we can imagine the appropriate activation in the audience, a consciousness arises as the connection is made and the relationship seen with the mind's eye. In placing such onus on the ability of the audience to make the connection, allusion has an effectiveness missing from more "removed" discourses and not captured in the static argument that might be extracted. Isocrates is not saying "here's my model of the philosopher; there's Plato's model." He tells a story that attaches his position to a life, a powerful life that has been forcefully depicted and defended in Plato's text. And Isocrates draws that force into his own case. Furthermore, the allusion argument invites the audience to complete the reasoning, to become complicit in the development of the argument towards its conclusion. The audience adds the missing elements; adds the connection, and as such Isocrates' conclusion is their conclusion as much as it is his. They have drawn it for themselves, and if this is done unconsciously, the allusion has been even more effective. But given the currency of Plato's text among educated audiences of the day, it is unlikely the allusions would have been missed. Isocrates' strategy would have been open and clear, and people left to decide for themselves, who between Plato and Isocrates is the fitting heir to Socrates.

5.2. Modification

Linda Hutcheon argues that "irony happens because what could be called 'discursive communities' already exist and provide the context for both the deployment and attribution of irony" (1994, p. 18). What she observes about irony holds equally for allusion, insofar as both depend on an audience's background and grasp of context. And what she calls "discursive communities" has affinities with the idea of cognitive environments that I have developed elsewhere (Tindale, 2015, 2016). These discursive communities are defined "by the complex configuration of shared knowledge, beliefs, values, and communicative strategies" (Hutcheon, 1994, p. 91), and she even provides a direct reference to Sperber and Wilson's concept of the cognitive environment, which she sees as a broader category of discursive community (1994, p. 96). Just as these communities provide the shared background that allows judgments about irony, so they supply the same for allusion. It is a cognitive environment that makes allusion (along with other similar devices) possible. They

arise by virtue of and in relation to such environments, and it is through those environments that we can measure their success when they are employed argumentatively.

Wilson and Sperber (2012) describe the cognitive environment as the "audience's mental landscape" (2012, p. 87). There is much to exploit in this physical metaphor. It has its earliest suggestion in the Aristotelian *topos*, a space the meaning of which is disputed, but which is clearly a shared space that arguers are able to draw on in identifying their opening premises. It is the assumption of commonality that is important here. Arguers can *expect* certain ideas to be available, certain values to be accessible. This is a better thing than common knowledge itself, because it involves what is available in the epistemic field of an audience, rather than what individuals actually know in common. A strategy like allusion depends on this expectation for its success.

A popular analogue for understanding cognitive environments is that of the visual environments that we share. Our visual fields teem with potential information that we do not process at any particular time, but that someone who shares that visual field (or who is aware of its contents) could expect us to "see." Knowing that it is there, dormant but accessible, allows someone to employ various devices to make it present to us, to foreground this or that object and facilitate its apprehension. By such means our understanding of what is around us is modified.

Similarly, cognitive environments are modifiable through argumentation. Arguers strive to make present, to actualize, what is there potentially, to make connections between ideas and beliefs that result in further insights, or to move us to action by simply adding to our cognitive environments or weakening some attachment we had to an idea there. As Wilson and Sperber observe, adding a new piece of information to a cognitive environment will modify it, "but it can equally well be modified by a diffuse increase in the saliency or plausibility of a whole range of assumptions, yielding what will be subjectively experienced as an *impression*" (2012, p. 87). Here, of course, a range of rhetorical effects could be adopted. In fact, the notion of cognitive environments provides insight into the cognitive nature of rhetoric and how it can operate in persuasion.

Like other ways in which the cognitive environment is modified, narratives create presence. Consider how Barack Obama uses narratives as components of two of his speeches. He does it in 'A More Perfect Union' (2008), the argument/speech he delivered after the "racist" controversy that surrounded some of the remarks of his

pastor, Jeremiah Wright, and he does it later at Grant Park (2008) on the night of his first election as President.

Let me begin with the first of these. During his initial campaign for the US presidency Barack Obama was almost undermined by comments made by his former pastor, comments deemed racist. Obama had successfully avoided issues of race throughout his campaign. But Wright's comments forced him to address them, and he did so in a speech in Philadelphia on March 18, 2008. To my mind, this speech was largely an example of how to handle Guilt by Association argumentation. He then used an extended argument by analogy to show that the concerns of disaffected blacks were also shared by disaffected whites, that at root the things Wright complained about were felt across a broad swath of American society. But at the close of his speech he told a story:

There is a young, twenty-three-year old white woman named Ashley Baia who organized for our campaign in Florence, South Carolina. She had been working to organize a mostly African-American community since the beginning of this campaign, and one day she was at a roundtable discussion where everyone went around telling their story and why they were there.

And Ashley said that when she was nine years old, her mother got cancer. And because she had to miss days of work, she was let go and lost her health care. They had to file for bankruptcy, and that's when Ashley decided that she had to do something to help her mom.

She knew that food was one of their most expensive costs, and so Ashley convinced her mother that what she really liked and really wanted to eat more than anything else was mustard and relish sandwiches. Because that was the cheapest way to eat.

She did this for a year until her mom got better, and she told everyone at the roundtable that the reason she joined our campaign was so that she could help the millions of other children in the country who want and need to help their parents too.

Now Ashley might have made a different choice. Perhaps somebody told her along the way that the source of her mother's problems were blacks who were on welfare and too lazy to work, or Hispanics who were coming into the country illegally. But she didn't. She sought out allies in her fight against injustice.

Anyway, Ashley finishes her story and then goes around the room and asks everyone else why they're supporting the campaign. They all have different stories and reasons. Many bring up a specific issue. And finally they come to this elderly black man who's been

sitting there quietly the entire time. And Ashley asks him why he's there. And he does not bring up a specific issue. He does not say health care or the economy. He does not say education or the war. He does not say that he was there because of Barack Obama. He simply says to everyone in the room, 'I am here because of Ashley.'

'I'm here because of Ashley.' By itself, that single moment of recognition between that young white girl and that old black man is not enough. It is not enough to give health care to the sick, or jobs to the jobless, or education to our children.

But it is where we start. (<http://obamaspeeches.com/099-Announcement-For-President-Springfield-Illinois-Obama-Speech.htm>).

Here we have a story within a story. Obama tells Ashley's story in which Ashley tells her story. But Obama's story is more than her story, it includes its impact on those present and culminates in the recognition between the elderly black man and the young white woman. They have a common interest in fighting injustice, and insofar as Obama has presented his campaign as a fight against injustice, their common interest supports his campaign. To the counter argument to guilt by association and the argument from analogy, Obama adds a narrative argument. It doesn't stand alone but supplements the argument by analogy (the argument that shows an analogous set of concerns for poor blacks and poor whites). It does this by personalizing the argument, by situating it in real, identifiable lives. The claims about poor blacks and whites are not left on the abstract level, they are given presence and immediacy in Ashley's story. As theorists as diverse in their opinions of narratives as Paula Olmos and Trudy Govier observe, representation is an important aspect or achievement of narratives (whether by analogy, symbolism, or, in this case, instantiation), and Ashley's story has power because it is representative. We could attempt a reduction to premise/conclusion form, but I think we must agree that something is lost in doing so. I will return to this.

Just under eight months later, Obama is standing at the podium in Grant Park, Chicago celebrating his victory. He gives a speech that addresses multiple audiences: those who supported him, those who didn't, those who watch from beyond American shores, and so forth. He had something for each of them, expressed through a continued argument for union. But again toward the end of the speech he reverted to a story, that of Ann Nixon Cooper.

This election had many firsts and many stories that will be told for generations. But one that's on my mind tonight is about a woman who cast her ballot in Atlanta. She's a lot like the millions of others who stood in line to make their voice heard in this election except for one thing – Ann Nixon Cooper is 106 years old.

She was born just a generation past slavery; a time when there were no cars on the road or planes in the sky; when someone like her couldn't vote for two reasons – because she was a woman and because of the color of her skin.

And tonight, I think about all that she's seen throughout her century in America – the heartache and the hope; the struggle and the progress; the times we were told that we can't, and the people who pressed on with that American creed: Yes we can.

At a time when women's voices were silenced and their hopes dismissed, she lived to see them stand up and speak out and reach for the ballot. Yes we can.

When there was despair in the dust bowl and depression across the land, she saw a nation conquer fear itself with a New Deal, new jobs and a new sense of common purpose. Yes we can.

When the bombs fell on our harbor and tyranny threatened the world, she was there to witness a generation rise to greatness and a democracy was saved. Yes we can.

She was there for the buses in Montgomery, the hoses in Birmingham, a bridge in Selma, and a preacher from Atlanta who told a people that 'We Shall Overcome.' Yes we can.

A man touched down on the moon, a wall came down in Berlin, a world was connected by our own science and imagination. And this year, in this election, she touched her finger to a screen, and cast her vote, because after 106 years in America, through the best of times and the darkest of hours, she knows how America can change. Yes we can.

America, we have come so far. We have seen so much. But there is so much more to do. So tonight, let us ask ourselves – if our children should live to see the next century; if my daughters should be so lucky to live as long as Ann Nixon Cooper, what change will they see? What progress will we have made? (<http://obamaspeeches.com/E11-Barack-Obama-Election-Night-Victory-Speech-Grant-Park-Illinois-November-4-2008.htm>).

Here we have a clear "representation" narrative. Ann Nixon Cooper's story is America's story. Obama is able to look at the accomplishments of the United States not from some abstract stance, some "bird's-eye" (or god's-eye) view, but through the eyes of someone who experienced it. Thus, the story is "felt" by those who hear it, we can imagine what it was like to be Ann Nixon Cooper. The narrative is epideictic in

nature, and it culminates in the call for progressive change, and an invitation to share in those changes.

Afterthought or climax, what role do these narratives play? These narratives supplement the other strategies of the argumentation¹⁴ by bringing something alive in the mind. In the Grant Park speech, the story of Ann Nixon Cooper parallels that of an America she represents. Massive social events are brought down to the personal (and manageable) perspective of one life, whose experiences are shareable. In the case of Ashley Baia, the story personalizes the point of recognition between races, which Obama believes is vital for movement beyond the current impasse.

On Kvernbekk's (2003) terms, Obama's examples are not arguments per se: "it hardly seems likely that the premise-conclusion relation found in narratives is similar to that found in informal arguments" (2003, p. 8). Indeed, such an argument is largely implicit. Premise: Ann Nixon Cooper has seen a series of remarkable progressive events in her life. Premise: Her experience parallels/represents America's experience. Conclusion: America has come a long (progressive) way. Kvernbekk might argue that Obama's complex audience *knew* America had come a long way. So this would be explanation more than argument. But if indeed his audiences knew that, the knowledge was implicit in their cognitive environment. And what the Ann Nixon Cooper story does is make it present; it activates it so that it can be attended to and its implications pondered. And of course, as Kvernbekk also allows, her assertion about the dissimilarity between premise/conclusion relations in narratives and arguments "depends on what one takes an informal argument to be" (2003, p. 8). The more dynamic nature of argument is apparent in both of Obama's narratives.

As I suggested at the end of section 4, we need to view arguments as social events, personalized by those engaged in them. The Obama "narratives" vividly illustrate my point. Those examples illustrate the dynamic sense of argument insofar as they are alive with meaning and movement, and should only be judged "good" or "bad" in light of consideration of the entire argumentative situation, which is complex in each of the cases involved. They both retain the internal movement characteristic of all arguments, exhibiting relevant relations between the ideas, whether we see these narratives as examples of analogy or representation. But their value lies in the dissemination of those ideas to the appropriate audiences.

¹⁴ With respect to images, Roque (2015) had suggested they could operate as "visual flags," "parallel argument", or "joint argument" (p. 187). None of these really captures the way narratives operate within argumentation, but the idea of "parallel argument" might serve best to convey what is involved.

In each case, the stories are not recalling what is already there, as in allusion; but they are adding to what is currently available. What is the argumentative force of such a strategy, and could it be achieved (or better achieved) in any other way? In the Grant Park story, probably not. They may have the force of reinforcement, or of persuasion itself. They are insightful, and they add to the cognitive resources that members of an audience have to think through an issue and come to their own decisions regarding it.

6. CONCLUSION: DENNETT'S MEMES

There is much more to be said about narrative argument. In many ways the conversation is just beginning and promises to be as rich and fruitful as that which sketched out the nature of visual argument and then filled in the details. Narratives, as some of my examples would indicate, are often a part of analogical reasoning, for example. Especially the kind of *a priori* analogies explored by Govier (1999). The connections between philosophers' thought experiments and analogical reasoning deserve serious attention from the perspective of the narratives involved, since it does seem that in such cases analogy picks up where theory has reached its limits (Bartha, 2010, 320ff.). Another avenue of research that I have begun to touch on here, and that brings the nature of the cognitive environment fully into focus, is the ways in which narratives in arguments act as memes.

So let me close by returning to one of the sources from which I drew at the start: Dennett's "story." Dennett's story in his 1995 book (as in other works) is the story of the meme, that gene-correlate that replicates itself in human minds (as well as in noncerebral forms), or as Dennett refers to them: "meme nests" (1995, p. 349). As with genes, what is copied and transmitted by these new replicators is information. Darwin's dangerous idea is explained as a meme with all the force of that idea. Memetic theory, while still controversial, offers a range of fascinating ideas that should prove attractive to rhetoricians and argumentation theorists. In the context of his book, Dennett describes it as a "through and through Darwinian vision of a mind" (1995, p. 368).

Mememes possess the central characteristics of any selective evolutionary theory: variation, replication, and fitness. Some are conceived and, for a number of reasons, never replicate, perhaps because the mind in which they arose forgets them. Other mememes have enviable durability. The opening bars of a song like the Lennon and

McCartney tune "Yesterday" are clearly a meme, replicating in isolation from the rest of the song, but retaining much of their origin. That you, reader, have just recalled those opening bars demonstrates the existence and the power of the meme to replicate across minds. In general, Dennett understands memes to be "any culturally based replicators" (Dennett, 2006, p. 345), and these would include narratives that live within and across cognitive environments.¹⁵

Memes convey information, and Dennett uses the metaphor of the "infosphere" (in contrast to the biosphere medium in which genes move) in ways that capture some of what I conceive to be involved in cognitive environments.

He closes the work that had begun with the rejection of argument and the adoption of narrative with the following meme:

A meme that occurs in many guises in the world's folklore is the tale of the initially terrifying friend mistaken for an enemy. 'Beauty and the Beast' is one of the best-known species of this story. Balancing it is 'The Wolf in Sheep's Clothing.' Now, which meme do you want to use to express your judgment of Darwinism? Is it truly a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing? Then reject it and fight on, ever more vigilant against the seductions of Darwin's idea, which is truly dangerous. Or does Darwin's idea turn out to be, in the end, just what we need in our attempt to preserve and explain values we cherish? I have completed my case for the defense: the Beast is, in fact, a friend of Beauty, and indeed quite beautiful in its own right. You be the judge (Dennett, 2006, p. 521).

This invitational closing statement marries the narrative with the argumentative. It draws on traditional and new rhetorical devices in the metaphor and the meme. Most importantly, however, it illustrates how cognitive environments (or infospheres) are modifiable. Specifically, Dennett modifies our ideas about Darwinian theory using a popular narrative-meme to suggest the beauty in Darwin's idea.

More artful methods of argumentation facilitate persuasion by personalizing the message, bringing immediacy and vivacity to the experience of being an audience for certain arguments. Some narratives clearly qualify in this respect, and how they achieve what they achieve has been the goal of this paper. If my argument has not, so far, been successful, I will need to resort to a story.

¹⁵ Strictly speaking, a narrative communicated for the first time acts as a meme if it is replicated in a second mind. But I am interested here in the *general* memetic nature of some narratives and hence of those that have replicated many times and have cultural currency, like the 'beauty and the beast' story.

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Umješnije metode: narativne tehnike u argumentaciji

Sažetak

Naslov i inspiraciju za ovaj rad pronašao sam u radu Daniela Dennetta koji na početku jedne svoje knjige govori o tome da se ne može pomoću formalnih argumenata navesti ljude da ozbiljno razmišljaju o određenim temama jer se to u većini slučajeva neće dogoditi. Treba koristiti metode koje su "vještije", odnosno, "treba ispričati priču". Potrebno je istražiti razliku između formalne argumentacije i pričanja priče kao metode uvjeravanja. Ako se pažnja preusmjeri na narativ, kao što Dennett predlaže, otvaraju se zanimljiva pitanja: Što je persuzivno u narativu? Kako se narativ argumentativno obraća publici? Da bi se odgovorilo na ta pitanja, analizirani su primjeri narativa za koje se zna da postižu učinak uvjeravanja. Analizirani su u sklopu šireg konteksta koji se istražuje, a to je kognitivno okruženje, njegove karakteristike i utjecaj, što otvara mogućnost analize različitih postupaka koji imaju i narativna i argumentativna obilježja, poput aluzija ili memova, kojima se bavi i sam Dennett.

Ključne riječi: argumentacija, kognitivna okruženja, narativi, priče

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Hrvatska

Anagram – vrlo kratak uvod

Sažetak

Povijest anagramiranja proteže se od antike do danas. Ona povezuje vrlo različita područja, iskustva i diskurze – od magijskih obreda, religijskih tekstova, kriptografije i prirodnih znanosti do pjesništva, jezične i književne teorije, društvenih igara i enigmatike. Anagram potkopava stabilnost diskurza te potiče na nova propitivanja prirode komunikacije.

Kada govore o podrijetlu anagrama, proučavatelji odreda spominju grčkog pjesnika Likofrona iz Halkide i kabalu. Brojne su podvrste i pojavni likovi anagrama. Ipak, najučestaliji su i najpopularniji anagram osobnog imena i anagram kakva uvriježena izraza ili rečenice. Anagramiranje imena može imati kriptičnu funkciju, a može se realizirati i kao pohvala ili pokuda. Anagramiranje uvriježena izraza pruža različite mogućnosti stilskog i značenjskog repliciranja.

Noviju povijest anagrama i njegov recentni status u retorici, semiotici, jezičnoj i književnoj teoriji nedvojbeno je obilježio Ferdinand de Saussure. Ženevski je mislilac tri godine (1906–1909) opsesivno čitao saturnijsku, homersku i vedsku poeziju vjerujući da se u njoj na razini teksta zakonito ponavljaju anagramirana imena glavnih junaka, božanstava, autora i sl. Saussure je pretpostavljao da u tim tekstovima postoji dodatni znakovni sustav, neovisan o autorovoj volji, koji poetski diskurz pretvara u mjesto zagonetnog širenja vlastitog imena po slogovima i stihovima pjesme. Saussureovo je istraživanje anagrama potaknulo rasprave o prirodi znaka, linearnosti označitelja i logocentrizmu; k tome, interpretirano je kao pandan Bahtinovu govoru o dijalogičnosti te kao važna karika koncepta intertekstualnosti i suvremenih teorija čitanja.

Ovaj vrlo kratak uvod u anagram nudi osnovne informacije o povijesti i praksi anagramiranja, izdvaja karakteristične primjere te upozorava na mjesto tog postupka u recentnim diskurzima.

Ključne riječi: anagram, kabala, logocentrizam, slovo, znak

Snaga slova, iako ju zanemarujemo, može biti iznimna. I može uzvratiti udarac. Ispod napisanoga kriju se riječi i iskazi koji se s napisanim poigravaju, koji ga nedoslovno udvajaju, potvrđuju, ironiziraju ili osporavaju. Ta se snaga krije u anagramu, figuri koju se može odrediti kao riječ, izraz ili rečenicu nastalu premještanjem slova koje druge riječi, izraza ili rečenice¹. Ili kako je to formulirao još Luka Zima: "Ovamo računamo taj slučaj, kad se po dvie i više rieči sastoje iz istih slova ali u promienjenom redu." (1880: 288)

U hrvatskoj su filologiji korišteni još neki nazivi za tu pojavu. Pavao Ritter Vitezović u svome rječniku *Lexicon Latino-Illyricum* (o. 1700) anagram naziva *jednakoslovje*, *pravoslovje* i *jednakoslovina*, inzistirajući očigledno na tome da je u pitanju "'jednaki' zapis (već zapisanoga)" jer se dvaput "rabe istovjetna slova (...), ali dakako u neistovjetnu poretku" (Marotti, 2014: 119). Komentirajući Vitezovićevu rješenje Bojan Marotti ustvrđuje da bi se naziv anagram mogao prevesti i kao *inopis* (2014: 118). Napokon, riječ *premetaljka* uvriježila se kao sinonim za anagram, osobito u enigmatskim krugovima.

U gotovo dvoipolstisućljetnoj povijesti anagram se javljao u pjesništvu, magijskim obredima, misticizmu, religijskim tekstovima, kriptografiji, znanosti, društvenim igrama, enigmatici i sl.

1. POČECI ANAGRAMIRANJA

O njegovu porijeklu te o tome tko je bio prvi anagramist postoje različite pretpostavke. Izvjesno je jedino da su taj postupak, u kojemu se susreću elegancija i teorija jezika, ezoterija i razbibriga, izmislili i prakticirali stari Grci. Prema jednoj apokrifnoj priči, znakovito je premetanje slova povezano već s grčkom mitologijom. Nepoznat je netko, naime, anagramski opisao sudbinu titana Atlasa koji se pobunio protiv Zeusa i zbog toga bio osuđen na nošenje nebeskog svoda na plećima. Dotični je neznanac ime *ATLAS* pretvorio u *TALAS*, tj. u riječ kojoj se može pripisati značenje 'onaj koji mnogo trpi'. Taj je dovitljivi anagram navodno bio poznat i Homeru. (Usp.: Šantek, 1975: 10)

Prema drugoj pretpostavci prvenstvo bi se moglo pripisati znamenitom filozofu i matematičaru Pitagori (570–495. pr. n. e.), koji je anagramirao svoje filozofske stavove i uvjerenja ne bi li ih učinio što privlačnijima i poznatijima. Kako nisu

¹ Ova je rasprava nastala razvijanjem leksikografskog članka o anagramu u *Rječniku stilskih figura*. (Bagić, 2012: 36–42)

sačuvani, Pitagorini su anagrami još uvijek nepotvrđeno (time i fikcionalno) ishodište samog postupka.

Najčešće se ipak prvim anagramistom smatra grčki pjesnik i filolog Likofron iz Halkide (o. 320–280. pr. n. e.), autor tragedija, satirskih drama i teorijskog spisa *O komediji*. On je u vrlo učenom i aluzijama krcatom spjevu *Aleksandra* anagramirao imena egipatskog kralja Ptolomeja II. Filadelfa i njegove sestre i žene Arsinoje:

Πτολεμαῖος → ἀπὸ μέλιτος

PTOLEMAIOS → APO MELITOS (od meda)

Ἄρσινόη → Ἥρας ἴον

ARSINOE → HERAS ION (Herina ljubica).

Komentatori tog spjeva odreda ističu da je Likofronov jezik zahtjevan, taman, gdje gdje i teško razumljiv te pretpostavljaju da ga je strast prema neprozirnom govoru na kraju odvela i do anagrama (npr.: Marotti, 2014; Šantek, 1975).

Iz prebogate povijesti anagramiranja u ovom će uvodu biti rečeno ponešto o kabalističkoj praksi, o zlatnom razdoblju anagrama, o njegovim pojavnim oblicima u književnosti, o Saussureovu proučavanju anagrama te o enigmatskom statusu tog postupka.

2. ANAGRAMSKI MISTICIZAM

Ideja premetanja slova jedna je od utemeljiteljskih gesta različitih koncepata savršenog jezika i osebnih kombinatorika koje su smišljali njezini pobornici. Srednji je vijek bio vrijeme u kojem su cvjetali različiti kultovi i ezoterija. Priču o anagramu u tom je razdoblju obilježila kabala, oblik židovskog misticizma koji se temelji na ideji stvaranja svijeta posredstvom jezika. Ona se može promatrati kao način interpretacije svetog teksta – Tore. Pojedini su kabalisti smatrali da je Tora, izvorno napisana "u obliku crne vatre na bijeloj vatri" (Eco, 2004: 33), stajala Bogu na raspolaganju kao niz nepovezanih slova koja su se zbog Adamova grijeha oblikovala u poznatu priču; u suprotnom, priča bi bila drukčija.

Zbog toga svitak Tore ne sadrži nijedan samoglasnik, nikakvu interpunkciju i nikakav naglasak, jer Tora je izvorno tvorila tek gomilu nesređenih slova. Nakon dolaska Mesije, Bog će ukloniti sadašnju kombinaciju slova ili će nas naučiti čitati sadašnjost teksta prema nekom drugom rasporedu. (Eco, 2004: 33–34)

Kabalist tekstu Tore "pristupa kao svojevrsnom simboličkom aparatu koji (...) govori o tim mističnim i metafizičkim realnostima i koji zbog toga valja čitati prepoznavajući u njemu četiri smisla (doslovni, alegorijsko-filozofski, hermeneutički i mistički)". (Eco, 2004: 34) Želeći proniknuti u tekst vječne Tore, kabalist postojeći tekst iskušava pomoću tri postupka atomizacije: notarikon, gematrija i temura. *Notarikonu* je naziv izveden iz latinske riječi *notarius* – bilježnik, pisac ili prema Divkoviću (1997) *brzopisac*. Dva su oblika tog postupka. U prvom slučaju na djelu je logika akrostiha – početno slovo riječi u rečenici uzima se kao inicijal ili abrevijacija koje druge riječi, što omogućuje kreiranje nove rečenice. U drugom slučaju analitička je logika upravo suprotna: umjesto širenja događa se sažimanje postojećeg teksta – početna, završna ili srednja slova u riječima neke rečenice uzimaju se kao materijal od kojeg se sastavlja nova riječ ili riječi.

Naziv *gematrija* stoljenica je pojmova *geometria* i *gramma-metria*. Gematrija je metoda biblijske egzegeze koja se zasniva na vjerovanju da se svakom slovu hebrejskog alfabeta može pridružiti brojana vrijednost, što je preduvjet potrage za parovima riječi s istim numeričkim identitetima koji onda postaju predmet mističkih i magijskih fabulacija. Iste brojčane vrijednosti imaju primjerice arkandjel Metatron i Božanstvo (313), Mojsijeva zmija i Mesija (358) ili pak riječi *akhad* – sjedinjenje, i *ahebah* – ljubav (13). Smatra se da se tako združene riječi međusobno prepleću, da su "dva različita vida jednog te istog pojma" (Lux, 1982: 33) te da "otvaraju nove horizonte razumijevanja teksta" (Chalom Leubmen, prema FreeMan, 2007).

Napokon, treći postupak, *temura*, zapravo je umijeće anagramiranja koje se shvaća kao postupak kojim je Bog stvarao svijet. Prema određenim pravilima zamjenjuje se postojeće slovo u riječi slovom koje mu u alfabetu prethodi ili koje slijedi iza njega te se tako oblikuje posve nova riječ. "Kabalist sebi za temurah može dopustiti beskonačne resurse, jer ona ne predstavlja samo tehniku čitanja, nego i sam postupak kojim je Bog stvarao svijet." (Eco, 2004: 36)

Kabalističku je kombinatoriku u 13. stoljeću do neslućenih granica razvio Abraham Abulafia *Kabalom imena*. Riječ je o tzv. ekstatičnoj kabali, dapače kabali koju je moguće tretirati svojevrsnom mistikom jezika. Vjerujući da svako slovo ima značenje, dapače da je svako slovo jedno od božanskih imena, rastavljao je Toru na slova, vjerujući da će – na kraju vremena – biti dešifriran savršeni sveti jezik iz kojeg su izvedeni svi postojeći nesavršeni jezici. K tome, kabalistički su mistici isticali beskonačni smisao božanskog diskurza. Roland Goetschel to ovako sažima:

Ako je Tora izraz Boga, u njoj se nužno zrcali beskonačnost, te ona teoretski ima beskonačno značenje. Svjedočimo, dakle, apsolutnoj polisemiji, ili, točnije, polisemiji Apsolutnog, čija je logična posljedica opravdanost mnoštva tumačenja – u krajnjem slučaju, govorit će se o 600.000 interpretacija Tore, što odgovara broju Izraelaca koji su svjedočili sinajskom bogojavljenju. (Goetschel, 2010: 107)

Na početku 18. stoljeća kabalistička je praksa dobila neočekivana saveznika. Protestantski teolog Celspirius objavljuje raspravu *De Anagrammatismo* (1713) u kojoj samog Boga vidi kao oca anagramiranja, a anagram kao prirodno stanje jezika i svijeta: "A da se Govor ne može uspostaviti bez Premetanja, poučava svakodnevno iskustvo: budući da govor ili besjeda nije ništa drugo nego različit prijemet slova. (...) Nadalje, zbog toga će razloga biti da je sam Bog tvorac Premetanja." (prema Marotti, 2014: 134)

Ideja je nedvojbeno u suglasju s kabalističkim postavkama. I za Celspiriusa i za kabaliste anagram je puno više od igre riječima. On je ključ izravnog kontakta i mističnog sjedinjenja s Bogom, ali i ključ razumijevanja zbilje i istinske egzistencije. Budući da se zbilja može shvatiti kao anagramirani tekst, "*biti* znači zapravo 'biti anagramiran'" a spoznati "taj tekst, koji nije drugo negoli 'anagram', znači razotkriti 'prvopis' te 'premetaljke'." (Marotti, 2014: 135). Tumač se u tom slučaju kreće između Boga i teksta.

3. ANAGRAMSKI MANIRIZAM

Retorički potencijal anagrama kao stilske figure ponajviše dolazi do izražaja u 17. st., koje se u najrazvijenijim europskim zemljama nerijetko označava i kao zlatni vijek anagrama. Uz to što "jezično-brojčano-grafička kombinatorika doživljava vrhunac" te "naročito u Srednjoj Europi, postaje jednom od legitimnih metoda znanstvene spoznaje" (Stepanić, 2015: 161), premetanje slova prometnulo se u pravu modu koju jednako strasno prakticiraju i podržavaju učenici ljudi, pisci, aristokrati i vlastodršci.

Imajući na umu ludički i zabavni karakter većine tadašnjih anagrama, proširenost same prakse, događaje i prigode koji su se anagramski obilježavali, može se tvrditi da je to doba anagramskog manirizma. Anagramira se puno, urotnički podtekst traži se posvuda, kreiraju se kompleksne strukture, dapače, anagram dospijeva i na scenu. Najčešće su se anagramirala osobna imena i uvriježeni izrazi, nazivi ili rečenice. Anagramiranje imena ostvaruje se kao pohvala ili pokuda. Kada je riječ o diskurzu pohvale, obično su u pitanju imena vladara, ljubljenih osoba, bogova, svetaca i sl.

Kako bih ilustrirao popularnost anagrama u 17. st. navest ću šest kapitalnih slučajeva koji u povjesnici tog postupka zaslužuju zapažena mjesta.

a) Thomas Billon

Francuski je kralj Luj XIII. imao dvorskog anagramista. Tu je službu u dva navrata (1624–1631; 1642–1647) obnašao Thomas Billon, inače odvjetnik u parlamentu Aixa. Zadaća mu je bila stvaranje anagramskih proročanstava te zabavnih i mističnih anagrama od slova osobnih imena, što je uključivalo oblikovanje brojnih atraktivnih premetaljki od Lujeva imena na francuskom i latinskom jeziku. Među ostalim, vjenčanje Luja XIII. s Anom od Austrije Billon je 'posvetio' s gotovo 200 pohvalnica sastavljenih od slova njihovih imena. Drugom je pak zgodom od vladareva imena sastavio 500 anagrama. Počeo je sa sljedećima:

LOVYS TRESIESME DE BOURBON ROY DE FRANCE ET DE NAVARRE.
 O ROY BENIN, O Ayme DES BONS, DIEV TE FACE DVRER SVR LA TERRE.
 VIVE CE BON ROY, LE BRAS DESTRE DE DIEV A RAFERMI SON TRÔNE.
 (Billon, 1617: 3)

Kralj mu je na koncu zahvalio dodijelivši mu mirovinu od impozantnih 1 200 francuskih livri.

b) Pierre le Loyer

Jedinstveno je anagramsko iskustvo Francuza Pierrea le Loyera, demonologa, pravnika i čovjeka istančana ukusa za poeziju. On je opsesivno čitao Homerovu *Odiseju*, uvjeren da se u njoj krije mjesto koje anagramski sažima njegovu biografiju. Loyer je tražio, tražio i na kraju se prepoznao u 184. stihu XI. pjevanja Homerova spjeva:

Σὸν δ' οὐ πῶ τις ἔχει καλὸν γέρας, ἀλλὰ ἔκηλος

/Son de ou po tis Ekei kalon geras al Arexelos/

→ Petros Loerios, Andeenos, Gallos Ulein (prema Bayle, 1734: 723)

(*Pierre le Loyer, iz /pokr./ Anjou, Gal /rođen u mjestu/ Huille*).

Loyerov je anagram Homerova stiha nepotpun. Tri su slova ostala neiskorištena – A, X i K. No činjenica da su upravo ta slova preostala, pothvat čini još uzbudljivijim. Naime, u grčkom alfabetu A ima brojčanu vrijednost 1 000, X 600, a K 20. Ukratko, brojčane vrijednosti triju slova daju zbroj 1 620, a Loyer je upravo 1620. godine anagramirao Homerov stih. Iznenađujući anagram i zapanjujući kronogram pribavili su mistični smisao ovoj storiji.

c) Astronomski anagram

Postupak anagramiranja svojedobno je u znanosti bio način čuvanja nove spoznaje, tj. imao je kriptološku funkciju. Istraživač bi šifrirao svoju spoznaju, kupujući si vrijeme za dodatne pokuse i provjere. Kada bi se posve uvjerio u njezinu ispravnost, razrješavao bi anagram i svijetu objavljuvao svoje otkriće. Na početku 17. st. talijanski znanstvenik Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) uočio je da Saturn s obje strane ima dotad nepoznate dodatke. Pronalazak je najprije sročio u šifru:

SMAISMRMILMEPOETALEUMIBUNENUGTTAUIRAS.

Da je koji dokoni drznik pokušao razriješiti taj 37-slovčani anagram, suočio bi se s milijardama potencijalnih kombinacija. Takav se drznik, naravno, nije pojavio. Međutim, Galileijev prijatelj, njemački astronom Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) pokušao je iz zabave proniknuti u njegovu tajnu. Pretpostavljajući tip mogućeg otkrića, kreirao je sljedeću latinsku rečenicu:

SALVE UMBISTINEUM GEMINATUM MARTIA PAROLES.

(Zdravo blizanci, potomci Marsa.)

Kepler je pretpostavio da je Galilei otkrio dva Marsova satelita. Kada je Galilei ponudio rješenje anagrama, svijet je bio suočen sa sljedećim otkrićem:

ALTISSIMUM PLANETAM TERGEMINUM OBSERVAVI.

(Najgornji sam planet vidio trostruk.)

On je, zbog nesavršenosti svog teleskopa, vidio 'dodatke' planetu, a ne prsten oko Saturna. Prsten će, s preciznijim teleskopom, pedesetak godina kasnije otkriti Nizozemac C. Huygens (1629–1695). Zanimljivo je da je i on pronalazak najprije uobličio u šifru da bi tek tri godine poslije objavio njezino razrješnje².

d) Giovanni Battista Agnese

Godine 1664. Giovanni Battista Agnese, svećenik sa Sardinije, u Rimu objavljuje knjigu *Decacrostichis*, u kojoj latinski početak molitve *Zdravo Marijo* anagramira točno 310 puta. Nizanje anagrama autor kompozicijski motivira i dinamizira upotrebom akrostiha. Do broja 310 Agnese je došao jednostavnim računicom: rečenica koju anagramira (*Ave Maria, gratia plena, Dominus tecum*) sadrži ukupno 31 slovo. Ona se deset puta akrostiški ponavlja na vertikali teksta, pri čemu se iza svakog slova akrostiha krije jedna njezina anagramska inačica.

² Opširniju storiju o opisanom astronomskom anagramu donosi Dragović (2002).

e) Daniel Ernst Jabłoński

Potkraj 17. st. njemački teolog Daniel Ernst Jabłoński (1660–1741), rektor protestantske gimnazije u poljskom gradu Leszno, priredio je u čast Stanisława Leszczyńskog "školsku svečanost koju je završio baletom i brojnim vježbama. Trinaest učenika odjenuo je u odore rimskih vojnika, a oni su u rukama držali štitove. Na svakom štitu bilo je napisano po jedno veliko zlatno slovo. Početni položaj bio je:

DOMUS LESCINIA (Kuća Leščinskog)

a nakon svake vježbe raspored učenika bio je drugačiji (...). Nakon druge vježbe slova su dala:

ADES INCOLUMIS (Tu si živ i zdrav)

nakon treće

OMNIS ES LUCIDA (Sva si sjajna),

a zatim:

LUCIDA SIS OMEN (Sjajna budi znamenja)

MANE SIDUS LOCI (Ostani zvijezdo mjesta)

SIS COLUMNA DEI (Budi stupom božjim)

I, SCANDE SOLIUM (Idi, stupi na prijestolje!)

Ovi anagrami su tim vredniji što se posljednje proroštvo zadnje poruke ispunilo jer je Stanisław kasnije zasjeo na poljsko prijestolje." (Šantek, 1975: 13)

f) Pavao Ritter Vitezović

Napokon u 17. st. oglasio se i najznačajniji hrvatski anagramist Pavao Ritter Vitezović (1652–1713). Taj je jezikoslovac, povjesničar i pjesnik objavio velik broj anagrama na latinskom jeziku u dvjema knjigama tiskanima u Beču: *Anagrammaton liber primus sive Lauras auxiliatoribus Ungariae* (1687) i *Anagrammaton sive Laurus auxiliatoribus Ungariae liber secundus* (1689). Vitezović u tim svescima anagram realizira u okviru kratke pjesme koja hvali sve zemlje koje podupiru borbu protiv Turaka. Prije samih stihova grafički su izdvojeni i verzalom ispisani polazni pojam i njegove anagramske inačice da bi u pjesmi svi sudionici te igre iznova bili grafostilistički istaknuti – kurzivom. Gorana Stepanić ovako opisuje strukturu tih razvijenih i retorički razrađenih lirskih prigodnica:

U Rittera anagram redovito dolazi kao trodijelni pjesnički oblik koji se sastoji od zadanog pojma (*programma*), njegova premetnutog oblika (*anagramma*) i stihovanog tumačenja novonastalog pojma, najčešće epigrama u elegijskim distisima u kojem se obvezno rabe riječi iz anagrama, bilo kao gotovi stihovi i fraze, bilo u dijelovima. (Stepanić, 2016: 335)

Naš pjesnik, primjerice, iz latiniziranog imena Bosne – *Bosnia* – izvodi tri usklične rečenice: *O bonis! O banis! Si bona!*, a u imenu *Istria* prepoznaje izraze *Iratis* i *Sat ira*. Poslije dviju spomenutih Pavao Ritter Vitezović objavio je još osam zbirki anagrama. Njegov opus obuhvaća više od tisuću tih mikrotekstova. Vitezovićevi su anagrami bili vrlo popularni, gdje se kaže da su doživjeli svjetski ugled, što god to značilo u kontekstu ondašnjeg svijeta.³

Vjerujem da su navedene storije naznačile glavne smjerove i kontekste porabe anagrama u 17. stoljeću, ali i udarile temelje njegovu korištenju u vremenu poslije, zapravo sve do danas. Iako su ondašnji anagrami najčešće bili prigodničarski, pohvalni, maniristični, pa i tautologični, njihova je iznimna brojnost i prisutnost uputila na glavna obilježja tog retoričkog postupka. Među ostalim, tada je postalo bjelodano da preoblikovanje imena ili izraza nikad nije puka igra. Njime se dovodi u pitanje potpis, identitet, čvrsto mjesto, smisao. Čitatelj knjige, primjerice, sitnom intervencijom lako može destabilizirati i ime autora i naslov knjige koju drži u rukama. Uostalom, tijekom povijesti mnogi su umjetnici strogo dijelili svoje pisanje od građanske osobe. Razlozi su bili različiti: skrivanje, ludizam, moda, pojavljivanje izvan svoje struke i sl. Posežući za pseudonimima, pojedini su ih autori oblikovali tako što su anagramirali vlastita imena. To su u 16. st. učinili Aretino i Rabelais, u 17. Molière, a u novije doba Nabokov i Jim Morrison:

Pietro Aretino	→ <i>Partenio Etiro</i>
François Rabelais	→ <i>Alcofribas Nasier (NOSONJA)</i>
Molière	→ <i>Élomire</i>
Vladimir Nabokov	→ <i>Vivian Darkbloom</i>
Jim Morrison	→ <i>Mr Mojo Risin.</i>

³ O Vitezovićevim latinskim anagramima, o njihovim enigmatskim potencijalima, uopće o retoričkim obilježjima njegovih prigodnica više u: Jurišić, 1995; Marotti, 2014; Peleh, 1973 i Stepanić, 2016.

Već u 19. st. neki su hrvatski pisci koristili anagramirane pseudonime svojih imena. Tako je mladi Ante Starčević književne radove i članke objavljivao pod pseudonimom A. V. Rastevčić (primjerice, 1845. u Gajevoj *Danici horvatskoj, slavonskoj i dalmatinskoj* tiskana mu je pjesma "Dva sunca" i članak "Nešto o pirnih običaja u Lici", a 1846. u *Zori Dalmatinskoj* objavljene su mu pjesme "Ličanin" i "Podertini Solina"). Vladimir Nazor je pak crtice iz istarskog života "Krv nije voda" objavio pod pseudonimom Mirvlad Zorna (*Mladi Istranin*, 1923).

Polemički intoniran anagram izrazito je ekspresivno, kadšto razorno stilsko sredstvo. Kada je ekscentrični Salvador Dalí napustio nadrealistički pokret, njegov vođa André Breton poigrao se slovima njegova imena i prezimena da bi cinično prokazao slikarevu pohlepnost prema novcu:

Avida dollars (← Salvador Dalí).

Dobar će se poznavatelj nadrealističkog pokreta na tragu tog anagrama moći prisjetiti nadrealističkih poetičkih postulata, raznorodnosti same skupine, Dalíjeve pozicije u njoj i odnosa među viđenijim nadrealistima. Uz malo imaginacije moći će u Bretonovu anagramu naći uporište za stav da Dalí nikad nije bio istinski nadrealist nego osoba koja se predstavljala kao nadrealist, umjetnik koji se rukovodi logikom novca itd.

4. ANAGRAM U KNJIŽEVNOSTI

Velika je tema u priči o anagramu njegova uloga i sudbina u literaturi. Budući da je riječ o postupku koji jezik suočava sa samim sobom, o postupku koji ispod postojeće poruke raskriva poruke koje ih mijenjaju ili osporavaju, pisci su otpočetak povlašteni sudionici te igre – od Likofrona nadalje.

Ipak, čini se da su u toj priči prisutniji pisci nego njihovi tekstovi, pjesnička imaginacija nego poezija. Iako se u starijim razdobljima, osobito u baroku, može govoriti o anagramu kao žanrovski konvencionaliziranom (obično kratkom stihovanom) tekstu, iako njegova artificijelnost i enigmatičnost postaje osobito privlačna avangardistima i ludičkim poetičkim konceptima poput Oulipoa, anagram se u književnosti ipak pojavljuje kao lokalni postupak, kao stilska figura unutar teksta.

Zadaća mu je ukrasiti diskurz, upozoriti na autorovu spisateljsku eleganciju, oštroumnost i dosjetljivost. U pjesništvu anagram u pravilu sudjeluje u zvukovnim igrama iskaza. U korpusu novijega hrvatskog pjesništva zanimljiv je slučaj treće strofe Slamnigove pjesme *O monografiji*:

– Za kormilom si slikan na "Arslanu"
 (čvrst tok i čvrstu vožnju voli *pisac*).
 Tvome je mjestu u tvome romanu
 i ordinata znata i *apscisa*.

Apscisa je u Slamnigovim stihovima anagram *pisca*. Povezivanje matematičkog pojma i naziva za osobu uz koju se vezuje nepredvidljiva kreativnost podupire osnovnu intenciju pjesme: ruganje oskudnom mentalnom sklopu autora monografija, koji sve zaključke o djelu izvode iz životopisa pisca.

U konkretnom i vizualnom pjesništvu anagram se nerijetko promeće u tvorbeno i smisaono uporište teksta. Zvonimir Balog (1932–2014) u pjesmi "Popis autora u ovoj knjizi" poigrao se s idejom samog pisanja poezije, postojanjem instance lirskog subjekta koja nije spojiva s građanskom osobom autora i koja se od teksta do teksta mijenja. On je jednostavno vrtoglavoj igri anagramiranja podvrgnuo vlastito ime i prezime i tu igru predočio kao artefakt:

POPIS AUTORA U OVOJ KNJIZI

ZVONIMIR BALOG	VZRRIMINO OLAGB
ZVONIMIR GOLBA	NIMIRZVO LOGBA
ZVONIMIR BAGOL	OVZRRIMIN ABGOL
MINIZVOR LABOG	IMIRZVON OLGAB
ROVIZNIM GOBLA	NOVZRRIMI BAGLO
RIMINVOZ ABLOG	IRZVONIM GLOBA
ONZVIMIR GOBAL	VOZNIMIR ABLOG
RIMIVZNO GABOL	RIMINVOZ BOLGA
RIVOZNIM BOGLA	ZINIVROM BALGO
MINIZOVIR ALGOB	MIROVNIZ AGLOB
VOZNIRIM BLOGA	ZINOVRRIM ALBOG
RONIMIZV LOBAG	RIMOVZIN OBLAG
RINIMZVO ALOGB	INZVIMIR GALBO
OVZMINIR OGBAL	VIZONMIR BOGAL
VONIMIRZ LAGBO	RIMINOVZ GOLAB
ZRRIMINOV OGLAB	BANIMIR ZVOLOG
ONIMIRZV GBALO	

Pjesnik je tekst izgradio od 33 premetaljke svog imena i prezimena, pri čemu se u 32 slučaja premetanje događa zasebno unutar imena te zasebno unutar prezimena, a tek u zadnjem slučaju (BANIMIR ZVOLOG) počinju se kombinirati slova imena sa slovima prezimena. Lako se složiti s Vuletićevom konstatacijom da je "navedeni primjer potpunog anagramiranja mnogo bliži igri nego li stvarnom kreativnom povezivanju riječi anagramskim postupcima" te da smo suočeni s gestualnim tekstom kojemu je "sadržaj anagramski postupak" (Vuletić, 1988: 147).

Kada je riječ o književnicima i anagramu, nije zgregega napomenuti kako ga oni nerijetko prakticiraju iz enigmatske perspektive, tj. kao intrigantnu razbibrigu lišenu želje za oblikovanjem estetskih verbalnih unikata. Poput Vitezovića, koji je ispisivao latinske anagramske prigodnice, pojedini su pjesnici pisali anagramske zagonetke – najčešće kratke stihovane tekstove koji skrivaju kakav izraz ili ime. Stihovane enigmatske anagrame sastavljali su, među ostalim, Petar Preradović, Ivan Trnski, Ivan Barac, Ivan Goran Kovačić, Grigor Vitez, Ratko Zvrko i Pajo Kanižaj. U stihovima bi bili tipografski istaknuti izrazi koje treba anagramirati kako bi se riješila zagonetka.⁴

5. ANAGRAMSKA TEORIJA PJSNIČKOG JEZIKA

Proučavanje anagrama u 20. je stoljeću dobilo novu, neslućenu dimenziju. Taj je retorički postupak odjednom postao mogući ključ za razumijevanje funkcioniranja pjesničkog diskurza i jezika uopće.

⁴ U ilustraciju navodim dva anagrama koji svjedoče o tome kako enigmatska imaginacija zamjenjuje lirsku inspiraciju, tj. kako pjesnici poetsku tehniku rabe u zagonetačke svrhe. U distihu Ivana Gorana Kovačića

Gusar jedan koturat se stao
Te afričkog *nosoroga* dao.

kurzivirane riječi (*gusar*, *nosorog*) treba razriješiti tako da se otkriju njihovi sinonimi pri čemu je jedan anagram drugog (*pirat*, *tapir*). Ratko Zvrko pak u dijalektalnoj pjesmi verzalom ispisuje izraz koji valja anagramirati (DO SPLITA) te spacionira izraz (**jedan mīsec**) upućujući čitatelja na rješenje zagonetke (*listopad*):

Jučer Jožek iz Šestina
Splićanina Duju pita:
Prosim lepo, gospon Duje,
Kulik ima put DO SPLITA?
Splićanin mu odgovara:
– Ako greš do naši strana,
Jemaš hodit do mog mista
Cili **jedan mīsec** dana.

Za to je najzaslužniji Ferdinand de Saussure, utemeljitelj strukturalizma, jezikoslovac koji je lingvistici priskrbio epitet egzaktne znanosti i discipline. On se, naime, između 1906. i 1909. posvetio proučavanju anagrama. Opsesivno je čitao homersku i vedsku poeziju, latinske saturnijske stihove i starogermanske tekstove *Pjesmu o Hildenbrandu* i *Sagu o Nibelunzima*, toliko opsesivno da su njegovi kolege o toj strasti govorili kao o Saussureovu ludilu (*la folie de Saussure*). O njegovu bavljenju anagramima svjedoči gotovo 15 000 stranica rukopisnih bilježaka. U ženevskoj sveučilišnoj knjižnici u osam kutija čuvaju se Saussureove bilježnice – 26 o vedskoj poeziji, 17 o saturnijskim stihovima, 24 o Homeru, 19 o Vergiliju itd.

U tim je tekstovima tražio i nalazio anagramirana imena bogova i heroja, što ga je navelo na ideju da oni posjeduju dodatni znakovni sustav. Anagram Saussureu nije doslovna manipulacija grafemima (on bi rekao fonemima) jedne riječi, nego postupak kojim se ispod pojavnog teksta pojavljuje mikrotekst (najčešće vlastito ime) koji ga sažima i podupire. Sastavnice tog imena nalazio je u jednom ili više stihova, izdvajao ih, pokušavao proniknuti u logiku kojom se pojavljuju, pratio opetovanje istog imena u nastavku teksta. Važno je kazati da Saussure pjesničkim anagramima ne pripisuje urotničko značenje, takvo koje bi bilo usmjereno protiv značenja pojavnoga teksta; naprotiv, njegovi anagrami "ističu ono o čemu se u tekstu već raspravlja" (Culler, 1980: 131).

Karakter Saussureova istraživanja dobro ilustrira njegova analiza jednog arhaičnog saturnijskog stiha (vjerojatno iz 396. pr. Kr.), zapravo dijela odgovora koji je Rimljanima na kraju dugotrajne opsade drevnog etruskog grada Veji uputila delfijska proročica Pitija:

DONOM AMPLOM VICTOR AD MEA TEMPLA PORTATO

(Neka pobjednik u moje hramove donese bogat dar).

Saussure u svakom polustihu tog saturnijskog stiha nalazi foneme imena boga Apolona:

DONOM AMPLOM VICTOR

A P L O O

AD MEA TEMPLA PORTATO

A P L O O

Naravno, osvijestivši tu činjenicu, on je sklon vjerovati da opetovanjem Apolonova imena upravlja pravilo, a ne slučaj, dapače da se iza tog pravila kriju važne stvari o prirodi te poezije, možda poezije uopće, možda čak i o prirodi samog jezika. Slično je pomislio i kada je u trinaest početnih stihova Lukrecijeva epa *De rerum*

natura / O prirodi, koji prizivaju Veneru, otkrio tri anagrama grčkog imena te boginje: Afroditu. Takvi su ga pronalasci istodobno magnetski privlačili i zbunjivali – često se pitao nisu li oni ipak rezultat imaginacije, ne pronalazi li ono što traži samo zato što to uporno traži. O razmjerima njegove istraživačke opsesije svjedoči pismo koje je 1970. sasvim slučajno našla gospođa Meillet, supruga Saussureova učenika Antoineta Meilleta, u jednoj knjizi u knjižnici svog muža. U tom pismu, datiranom 12. studenog 1906. godine, Saussure piše Meilletu da vrijeme provodi u Rimu 'kopajući' po saturnijskim stihovima i moli ga za prijateljsku uslugu da "pročita bilješke o *Anagramu u homerskim pjesmama*" koje je među inim "načinio u toku istraživanja o saturnijskom stihu", preporučuje se njegovoj diskreciji zbog toga što je "gotovo nemoguće da netko s takvom idejom zna je li žrtva iluzije, ima li nešto točno u temelju te ideje ili je ona samo polovično ispravna". (prema Jakobson, 1971: 16) Dapače, Saussure poručuje Meilletu: "Posvuda tražeći nekoga tko bi mogao procijeniti moju hipotezu, odavno vidim samo vas (...) Ne skrivam da ću Vam, pristanete li, sa sljedećem pismom poslati dvanaest ili petnaest bilježnica s bilješkama." (prema Jakobson, 1971: 16)

Ženevski je profesor bio pasionirani ljubitelj terminologije i stalno je težio što većoj preciznosti. Stoga ne čudi što je istražujući stare pjesničke tekstove neprestano doradaivao i mijenjao terminologiju kojom je opisivao svoje uvide. Anagram se uvriježio kao krovni pojam za pojave koje je Saussure označavao nazivima *tema*, *tematska riječ*, *tipska riječ*, *anagram*, *anafonija*, *paragram*, *hipogram*, *antigram* i sl.⁵ U jednom trenutku naziv anagram odlučuje rabiti za slučajeve kada se na malom prostoru (u jednoj ili dvije riječi) pojave sve sastavnice tematske riječi; kada se isto ponavljanje dogodi na većem prostoru rabi naziv paragram. Hipogram je pak pojava u staroj latinskoj poeziji kojom se ističe ime ili tematska riječ tako što ih se ponavlja slogovima pojedinih riječi u stihu. Stoga bi se, smatra Starobinski, pjesnički diskurz mogao promatrati kao "drugi način postojanja imena: razvijena varijacija koja pronicljivu čitatelju dopušta da uoči evidentnu (premda raspršenu) prisutnost temeljnih fonema" (1971: 33).

Kao što nikad nije objavio svoj lingvistički nauk (učinili su to njegovi studenti), tako i o Saussureovu interesu za anagrame svjedoče samo njegove bilješke. Njih je šezdesetak godina poslije temeljito proučio i interpretirao upravo spomenuti Jean Starobinski u knjizi *Les mots sous les mots (Riječi pod riječima)*, (1971). Pojedini mislioci

⁵ O Saussureovoj terminologiji, ali i o mjestu, genezi i karakteru istraživanja anagrama u njegovu opusu instruktivno su među inim pisali Arrivé, 2009; Bekavac, 2014; Culler, 1980; Starobinski, 1971 i Testenoire, 2012.

u kasnom otkriću de Saussureove ludorije prepoznaju naličje lingvistike 20. stoljeća. Jean Baudrillard cinično primjećuje da je njegove anagramske hipoteze čitava lingvistika brižljivo prešutjela jer se jedino tako mogla zasnovati kao znanost i osigurati si monopol.

Roman Jakobson smatra da se Saussureova teorija i analiza zvukovnih igara, osobito anagrama, može ubrojiti u njegova najsmjelija i najlucidnija otkrića, posve uz bok njegovoj općoj teoriji jezika, da su "studije o anagramima u najmanju ruku bile 'pisane za čitatelja' i od strane svog autora motrene kao 'dijelovi' knjige u nastajanju" za razliku od jezične teorije koju je skicirao s mukom "sve više odbacujući ideju o objavljivanju tečaja" (1971: 21). Jakobson upozorava na temeljnu sosirovsku aporiju: "Pjesnički anagram dovodi u pitanje dva 'temeljna zakona ljudskoga govora', koja je proklamirao Saussure, onaj o proizvoljnoj vezi označitelja i označenoga i onaj o linearnosti označitelja. Sredstva pjesničkoga jezika mogu nas izvesti izvan linearnog poretka." (1971: 23)

Anagramska koncepcija pjesničkog jezika otvara, dakle, prostor govoru o motiviranosti jezičnog znaka te o specijalnom oblikovanju poruke. Ta je koncepcija potaknula nekolicinu istaknutih teoretičara poput J. Derridaa, J. Kristeve, M. Riffaterrea, J. Cullera ili M. Arrivéa da u Saussureovu radu na anagramima prepoznaju skretanje od znaka prema slovu, tj. prekid s logocentričnom koncepcijom značenja. "Realnost znakova više ne treba tražiti u označenom, koje je neuhvatljivo i nepovratno, nego u oznaci, a naročito u materijalnim tragovima pisanog jezika koji se mogu aktivno i nesputano interpretirati." (Culler, 1980: 134)

Anagram je jedan od onih pojmova (uz primjerice palimpsest ili dvostruko kodiranje) koji sugeriraju da je u svakom tekstu latentno prisutan strani tekst. Sosirovski shvaćen, anagram u interpretacijama i adaptacijama Kristeve i Riffaterrea postaje važno uporište govora o fenomenu intertekstualnosti. Kristeva se pritom odlučuje za pojam paragram, naglašavajući da je književni tekst dvostruk, da je zapravo riječ o mreži veza koja obuhvaća sve tekstove s kojima je pisac mogao imati doticaj; Riffaterre pak izabire pojam hipogram podrazumijevajući pod njim cijelu riječ koja funkcionira kao matrica iz koje nastaje čitav tekst.

Renate Lachman u svom konceptu intertekstualnosti pretpostavlja da su u manifestnom tekstu signali reference uređeni tako da su čitljive dvije vrste intertekstualnih struktura – kontaminacija i anagram. Kontaminacija je rezultat selekcije i montažnog kombiniranja "pojedinačnih elemenata iz različitih referentnih tekstova (ili tekstualnih strategija koje pripadaju različitim poetikama)" što uzrokuje

gubljenje izvornog referentnog okvira pojedinog elementa i nastanak heterogenih spojeva (Lachman, 2009: 109). Anagram pak čine elementi raspoređeni po manifestnom tekstu; "Anagramska signalizacija stvara zagonetnu strukturu, koja se dekodira kombinovanim i u svim pravcima usmerenim čitanjem." (Lachman, 2009: 109)

* * *

U recentnim diskurzima anagram je u funkciji igre i zabave. Najčešće se pojavljuje u enigmatici (križaljka, *scrabble*), kvizovima (*Brojke i slova*) i na internetu gdje postoje programi koji u trenutku izlistavaju anagrame zadane riječi, i to na različitim jezicima. Prigodno ga se naziva *premetaljka*, *kviskov kod* i sl. Različita enigmatska udruženja organiziraju nagradne natječeaje u smišljanju anagrama na slobodne i zadane teme. Pritom nastaju jednostavni anagrami pojedinih riječi ili pak anagrami složenih naziva ili rečenica. Jednostavni u polazišnoj riječi nalaze drugu riječ, izraz ili čak kraću rečenicu:

tunika (← unikat)

pun stila (← suptilan)

Ajde, komarci! (← demokracija)

Ti, ona, mrak. (← romantika)

Najzahtjevniji i najosebujniji su anagrami razvedenih izraza i rečenica. Splitski je enigmatski klub 2008. godine raspisao natječaj za premetaljku frazema: *Nogomet – najvažnija sporedna stvar na svijetu*. Između osamdesetak prispijelih, pobijedio je prijedlog:

Jednostavan i živ sport, nevjerojatna mu snaga! (Z. Radisavljević)

Uza nj, grafemski sastav frazema potaknuo je oblikovanje anagramske pohvale nogometu, kritike domaćeg prvenstva, čak i autoreferencijalni iskaz:

Ovaj jedinstven sport uragan je snažna motiva! (B. Nazansky)

Prvenstvo nam je užasno jadno, antiigra je stav! (D. Galić)

Žiri, ne spavaj! Tu je nov dostojanstven anagram! (S. Bovan)

Što kazati na kraju? Možda samo to da naizgled rubni diskurzivni fenomen poput anagrama može biti pouzdan lakmus funkcioniranja i razvoja komunikacije, jezika i jezikom osmišljena svijeta. Samo treba prodrijeti do teksta njegova svjedočenja.

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Anagram – A very short introduction

Summary

The history of forming anagrams spans from antiquity to the present time. It connects different areas, experiences and discourses – magical rites, religious texts, cryptography and science on one hand and poetry, language, literary theory, social games, and enigmatography on the other. Anagram undermines the stability of discourse and introduces a new perspective on the nature of communication.

The scholars always link Greek poet Lycophron of Halkida and Kabbalah with the origin of anagrams. Lycophron (3rd century BC) formed anagrams by using the names of the Egyptian king Ptolemy II and his sister Arsinoe I in his poem *Alexandra*. Kabbalah, however, uses anagram as an idea of creating the world by means of language. Kabbalist who tries to understand the text of the eternal Torah, disintegrates the existing text into letters and recombines them anew, believing that by doing so a perfect sacred language, from which all the existing imperfect languages are derived, will eventually be decoded.

There are many subcategories and occurrences of anagrams, but the most frequent and popular ones are those of personal name, expression or sentence being anagrammatized. Anagrammatization of names often has a cryptic function, and can be used as praise or criticism. Forming anagrams out of popular expressions provides various opportunities for stylistic and semantic replication. In the past, anagrams were often used in science and literature. Researchers have used them as a good way to keep scientific discoveries. Anagrammatization allowed them to use additional research, before the final disclosure, and safely confirm their discovery without fear that somebody else will reveal it before them. In literature anagram usually appears within the text. Its task is to embellish the discourse, draw attention to the writer's elegance of style, ingenuity and wit. It is particularly common in the visual and avant-garde poetry.

Ferdinand de Saussure undoubtedly marked the recent history and the position of anagrams in rhetoric, semiotics, linguistic and literary theory. The Geneva thinker obsessively read Saturnian, Homeric and Vedic poetry for three years (1906–1909), believing that the names of the heroes, gods, authors, and the like will appear regularly anagrammatized. De

Saussure speculated that those texts contain additional sign system, independent of the author's will, that transforms a poetic discourse into a place of mysterious extension of one's own name via syllables and lyrics of the song. One hundred forty-one notebooks, filled with notes about anagrams, testify of his fascination. Saussure's folly' (*la folie de Saussure*), which represents a strong departure from the theory of language introduced in his *Course in general linguistics*, was the subject of numerous treatises (Starobinski, Jakobson, Derrida, Kristeva, Riffaterre, Culler, etc.). Among other things, de Saussure's research of anagrams prompted discussions about the nature of sign, the linearity of the signifier and the logocentrism. Moreover, it was interpreted as a counterpart of Bakhtin's dialogic, and as an important link between the concept of intertextuality and contemporary theories of reading.

This very brief introduction into anagram offers some basic information on the history and practice of anagram forming, singles out typical examples and describes the role this procedure has in contemporary discourses.

Key words: anagram, Kabbalah, logocentrism, letter, sign

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Teaching rhetoric: A proposal to renew rhetorical education in Hungarian and Central European contexts

Summary

Rhetorical education faces significant challenges of the virtual knowledge society. Classroom-teaching in skill-development still seems inevitable, however, the face-to-face experience has to gain more momentum and improve quality. It is especially important in Central European contexts where the history of teaching rhetoric has not been without fractures after World War II. The present paper is an approach that conceptualizes new aims of teaching rhetoric and suggests ways to reform the educational program of rhetoric at the secondary level.

It sets off from the assumption that rhetoric should no longer be conceived and taught of as a toolkit to formulate texts, but rather as a behaviour and sensitivity to human affairs. Thus, rhetorical education should facilitate not so much the production of speeches but the birth of the rhetorical citizen. The education serving this aim does not eliminate the classical roots of rhetorical literacy. On the contrary, it exploits the dynamic capacities of the two-millennia-old faculty.

The paper introduces a detailed, three-phased educational process with which rhetorical sensitivity can be bred in the classroom, while improving rhetoric as a subject matter itself.

Key words: rhetorical sensitivity, rhetorical citizen, critical thinking, creativity, debate

"Yet we seem to have lost faith in our publics' ability to exercise competent judgment. We live at a time when the types of problems confronting a technologically complex and culturally diverse society seem to outstrip the average citizen's capacity to comprehend them, much less to arrive at an informed opinion on their resolution."

Gerard A. Hauser (1999, p. 279)

1. INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, the nearly two-and-a-half-millennia history and disciplinary adaptiveness of rhetorical theory and practice does not seem to be an advantage with added value. The faculty is "accused" of being sentimental for the culture of rationality, manipulative for democracy, and trite for creativity (Bender & Wellbery, 1990). Alternatives, such as stylistics, discourse analysis, pragmatics, and communication research utilize rhetorical knowledge in their own jargons, while they criticize the age-old faculty (Aczél, 2015b). Rhetoric has been squeezed in among the practical means of speech production and is awaiting, rather dustily, to be rediscovered somewhere between the teaching of presentation techniques and manipulation. The aim of rhetorical education is the production of speech and the creation of the text artifact, which can be recited and read through appropriate exercises (although the limited time frame of classes often prevents practising them).

According to the currently effective National Core Curriculum of Hungary (2012), the content elements of rhetoric defined for grades 9 to 12 (ages between 16–18 years) are related to text analysis, style, and argumentation. Key content elements include the structural units and genres of speech and types of arguments – students should be able to apply as well as identify these elements. (The first draft of the new National Core Curriculum (August, 2018) that is presently open for public discussion mentions "rhetoric" only two times in contexts of poetics, text, and genre while argumentation and debate is referred to as an overarching communicative skill in the document).

Therefore, the outcome of rhetorical education is mostly a ready-made text that can be (or should be) prepared by following predetermined procedures. In speech preparation emphasis tends to be on construction and expression rather than argumentation – students usually fail to learn the latter (Major, 2011).

Rhetorical education in Hungary reflects the process of reduction that started with Petrus Ramus in the sixteenth century (Genette, 1970), and first bereaved

rhetoric knowledge of invention and arrangement (the very steps that enhance cognitive and critical skills), narrowing its leeway predominantly to the linguistic and aesthetic repository of elocution, then it also condemned the effect of expression as dubious and dangerous, ultimately identifying rhetoric as "ancient stylistics" (Guiraud, 1963, p. 23), or a toolkit of linguistic operations (Dubois, Edeline, Klinkenberg, Minguet, Pire, & Trinon, 1970). The emergence of an artifact- and operation-centred education with a structuralist, belletristic, neo-rhetorical basis was necessary but ineffectual. To put it more sharply, it did not prove to be an indispensable and likeable practice for either the teacher or the student.

While I am drafting this judgment, I have to mention, with unconditional praise, the Hungarian rhetorical revival that took place during the past twenty-five years: the theoretical, historical, and practical revitalization of rhetoric after 1989. Yet, as one of those who could take part in this ground-breaking and important process, I have to acknowledge that we have missed a crucial perspective shift in teaching rhetoric, in the rhetorical part of mother-tongue education at Hungarian secondary schools. This default is discernible in the enthusiasm of our former students when they euphorically confirm the use of two-day corporate training courses in communication a few years after their final exams at school, in the increasing choice of promotional publications, websites, blogs/vlogs, and courses which pop up as novel solutions, claiming that they can "help shed stage-fright," teach persuasive communication in "ten steps," and sum up in "five principles" how we can influence others. Rhetoric as a bunch of marketable and profitable skills, even if it is often bereaved of its "antique" name and called something else, has become an important body of knowledge in the labour market and organizational culture, and a key to success in public life. Beyond the walls of the school, everyone seems to be interested in developing their communication or rhetorical competencies. The emphasis is on *beyond*, as opposed to *within* the school.

Thus, the present article is both an initiative and a proposal: in light of the above, we must see and teach rhetoric in a different way at the secondary level as well.

2. RHETORIC AS SENSITIVITY AND BEHAVIOUR

"What was then has become irrelevant; anyway, all that is capable to persuade should be considered suspicious" – it is a remark about rhetoric we can often hear from contemporary scholars and opinion leaders.

But what did invigorate this genre that began to flourish in Attica? The most important impetus was provided by the basic principle of direct democracy that decisions on issues concerning the community should be made by the entire community or a part of the same representing as many members as possible, relying on the power of the word and the public. Thus the political system of institutions in Athens realized an ideal, in a particular form, that had thrived in the culture of ancient Greece for a long time: the superiority of fine words, as opposed to brute force. Its particular character derived from the democratic idea that all free human beings are able to determine truth and define community interests when they either make laws or retaliate the violation of laws. Respect for the superiority of the word was an integral part of Greek identity and their distinction from the barbarians. Opposed parties in conflict resolution and reconciliation of differing interests had the opportunity to elaborate their standpoints coherently under identical conditions. However, persuasion not only offered a humane alternative to the overt or covert use of violence but it also tried to prevent any distinct social stratum from making crucial decisions based on its origin, wealth or, in fact, expertise. (Bolonyai, 2001, pp. 9–10).

This idea and insight should also foster rhetorical knowledge about persuasion today. Because this knowledge can displace and turn violence into a constructive force rather than become its manifestation.

Two and a half millennia after the birth of rhetoric, Jim Corder writes about persuasion as follows:

Rhetoric is love, and it must speak a commodious language, creating a world full of space and time that will hold our diversities. Most failures of communication result from some wilful or inadvertent but unloving violation of the space and time we and others live in, and most of our speaking is tribal talk. But there is more to us than that. We can learn to speak a commodious language, and we can learn to hear a commodious language. (Corder, 1985, pp. 31–32).

Consequently, here we conceive of rhetoric not as a static repository of creating persuasive – often identified as manipulative and thus suspicious – text product but as an instance of social intelligence: sensitivity and behaviour (Aczél, 2015a), which can provide for the individual the skills of adapting to a community and the abilities of self-actualization and empathy towards others. Thus it includes the ethical and cognitive skills or know-how (Booth, 2003; Struever, 1998) necessary in interpreting and influencing social situations.

The environment for rhetorical sensitivity is created by human relations and social situations that have affective as well as cognitive components. As Hart, Carlson, and Eadie (1980, p. 9) put it, "rhetorical sensitivity is a function of three forces: how one views the self during communication, how one views the other, and how willing one is to adapt self to the other." Hence, the important elements of this sensitivity are attention (observation), reflection, and sensitivity to norms and deviations: to whatever is unique, different, disparate, or identical. Rhetorical behaviour is a feature of participative, articulate, resourceful, emphatic, and active citizens who, while they strive to realize their interests, are also social beings capable to define their own goals in accordance with the enhancement of collective values. This behaviour is indispensable in the processes, debates, and cooperation that creatively nurture democracies, co-existence that fosters socialization, and understanding, remembrance, and renewal that ensure cultural continuity.

The lack of rhetorical behaviour may be also reflected, in a specific era, by the individual's lack of self-esteem and sense of being "superfluous," public gloom, and collective distrust. Therefore, learning rhetorical persuasion has a much more profound significance and role than serving momentary individual success.

3. THE SILENT CRISIS

As indicated by research findings, twenty-five years after the democratic transition or regime change, citizens' political participation levels in Central and Eastern Europe remain significantly lower than in Western European countries (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2013).

According to the so-called socialization perspective, the reason for this is the legacy of totalitarian regimes and the behaviour of generations socialized under those regimes, who avoid criticizing prominent public figures and find their security in not speaking up. This communication (or silence) has, as a code, a political "wooden language": the reference-free and empty language of officialdom and disguise (cf. Nowicki, Oustinoff, & Chartier, 2011). This propagandistic pseudo-language is active but it induces passivity, considering the addressees as objects. As Richard Rose (1995, p. 3) sums up, people in post-socialist countries tend to appreciate the freedom not to participate or speak up. According to the socialization perspective, it is only a matter of time and some more generations until these effects begin to fade and participative spirit slowly but steadily increases. Another approach attributes this

phenomenon to experience, that is, to everyday impressions that became internalized as experience that derives from the operation of politics, governance, and the economy, and discourages citizens from participation in public life. Because, as they believe or experience, such engagement is bound to be bad, corrupt, manipulated, and it can benefit few people. If we accept this explanation, then willingness to participate can be expected to improve with economic growth, a decrease in corruption, and conflicts reaching proportionate numbers and reasonable contents. Analysts tend to assume the experience perspective when they interpret the typically Central and Eastern European distrust and passivity in relation to public life, and define an agenda for improvement on that basis.

However, it should be noted that the levels of political activity and public engagement are also low in global terms – it is particularly interesting in light of the optimistic predictions of the 1980s and 1990s that envisioned the coming of a more democratic, participatory culture in the transition generated by the Internet (Kiss & Boda, 2005, p. 13). Decreasing levels of civic participation may lead to the erosion of the social, political, and moral fabric of nation states (Rutten & Soetaert, 2013), and the need for socializing skills which can put an end to these processes. To highlight this problem as simply as possible: people are not keen to participate in public life if they do not have the knowledge to do so. If they lack the competencies needed to represent their own or their communities' opinion, to understand and listen to arguments from others, and to define goals and potential solutions. If they are terrified to express their thoughts to others because they form their beliefs based on unfounded judgments, and are afraid of articulating their opinion but mainly of the reactions of others.

Hence, here we can (also) speak of a language or communication pedagogy that supports participants in not only the communicative management of social situations but also in interpreting those situations and their roles, and the emergence of a meta-discourse too. They can clarify the meanings of (democratic) participative skill, community literacy (Flower, 2008), and rhetorical literacy.

Nevertheless, none of the evaluative/investigative perspectives for tendencies of decay in democratic participation touches upon the existence of communicative competencies, skills related to community-awareness, and rhetorical sensitivity. Generally, it can be concluded that, irrespective of the perspective assumed in the study of the unborn or vulnerable participatory culture, researchers fail to include the rhetorical aspect. As Fontana, Nederman, and Remer (2004, p. 2) highlight, it is

striking to see that "Given the emphasis on the discursive and historical dimensions of democracy, it is surprising that commentators have almost universally failed to consider the potential contributions of the history of rhetorical theory and practice to the understanding of democratic processes."

Thus, in the analysis of any event or the dynamics of being democratic, studies revealing the level of rhetorical literacy, the nature of rhetorical practices, the character and effectiveness of rhetorical and communication education should also be represented.

Such studies are also needed because a number of research projects carried out in the spheres of social and business life and in different cultures prove that there is a positive correlation between self-esteem, trust, life satisfaction, and communicative, persuasive, and conflict management skills. Individuals with good communicative and persuasive skills are capable to increase their social capital and act in order to ensure, for themselves and others, fulfilment and well-being. Hence, the link between social/individual mood and rhetorical education/literacy is deeper and more complex as it was formerly held and taught.

As Roderick Hart (1993, p. 102) concludes, teachers of communication and rhetoric "peddle freedom." They educate citizens who keep the space of dialogue open and make responsible, constructive contributions to social discourses. Accordingly, we can link rhetorical education to the key competencies and major development areas of national and local curricula, as an essential element of education for responsibility, family life, and democracy.

However, the role of rhetoric in politics and democracy has long been considered ambiguous. On the one hand, it is obvious that rhetoric provides a system of thinking and expression that is crucial for understanding others, the ability to argue and speak in public. Yet rhetoric, when seen as a tool of political prevarication, disguise, and manipulation, is also interpreted as the opposite of truth, a surface structure or façade that has to be demolished in order to enable rational deliberation (Habermas, 1984). Democratic suspicion (Dryzek, 2010) is still alive despite the fact that good speech has been considered a gift of authenticity since antiquity.

Martha Nussbaum (2012, p. 172) designates the humanities in general as the essential knowledge area for our age. These are the fields of literacy that can provide the opportunity for people living in a culture explained through economic growth within a technological framework to see others as human beings, not simply as objects, to remain curious (critical inquirers) in the age of Big Data, and be able to argue and

assess for common goals. The degradation of this group of knowledge and abilities, of the humanities and the arts is what Nussbaum (2012, p. 1) calls "the silent crisis." In her opinion, the application of Socratic pedagogical principles, the development of self-awareness and sympathy for others, inquiry and argumentation, imagination and creativity, and willingness to debate may offer an escape route from this crisis.

We could dismiss all of the above as idealism. However, there is no pedagogy that could be viable without the ideas and visions concerning humans and humanity. Along these lines, rhetoric is necessary to man, and "is unnecessary only if man is unnecessary" (Johnstone, 2007, p. 25).

4. RHETORICAL CITIZENSHIP

In light of the above, we can conceive rhetoric as an intelligence, a kind of sensitivity and (linguistic) behaviour that enables us to face and manage, in a communicative way, difficult situations. The foundation, source, and medium of rhetorical intelligence are all created in human relations and social situations, in both rational and emotional terms (Darwin, 2003, p. 23). The important elements of this intelligence are attention (observation), reflection, and situational sensitivity to uniqueness, difference, dissimilarity, and identity. In sum, rhetoric can also be called practical sensitivity which is rooted in a given situation and turns that into a fundamentally social world (Burke, 1969, p. 39; Laclau, 2014, p. 438).

The past twenty-five years of Hungarian rhetorical education marked self-assurance (assertiveness) as a criterion for the speaker in rhetorical communication. It is time to replace this concept and related interpretations with the idea of the communicator with confidence in self and others: a critically thinking, community-minded, and participative person who bears herself, articulates her standpoint and eagerly shares the common space of communication with others.

Accordingly, the result of rhetorical practice and education will be personality itself rather than the "fine speech" following structuralist/belletristic principles. It will be the engaged, articulate, resourceful, and compassionate person who considers communication a mode of social existence rather than a tool (Fleming, 1998, pp. 172–73). This individual is a subject or personality who is also a collective creature; thus the output of his or her rhetorical intelligence is never self-actualization only, but a responsible existence within the community. A criterion for all this is that we conceive rhetoric as a form of behaviour rather than a tool. Therefore the education of a rhetorical citizen requires an educational method and vocabulary that help

students (and their teachers) identify, interpret, analyze, and utilize their own rhetorical experiences, events, and situations.

Ancient and contemporary rhetoricians seem to agree (cf. Lanham, 1976, pp. 2–3) that rhetorical citizens and their behaviour should meet the following expectations. They should:

- start to learn persuasive speech early. – Children’s resourcefulness may be developed through family discussions and setting high standards for communication too. The exploration of family communication patterns (Fitzpatrick & Ritchie, 2006) can be an important foundation for developing an individual style of communication. The "mirrored classroom" represented in teaching methods, the communicative nature of study-based and action-centred classroom activities (storytelling, debate, dramatization) can ensure the continuous socialization of rhetorical behaviour.
 - be good observers of the world. – Rhetoric requires an "absolute hearing" of social situations: sensitivity to and curiosity towards whatever happens or can happen. Thus attention in preparing for persuasion is not routine-like or polite. Instead, it is tireless, analytical and constructive, constantly making meaning.
 - be interested in public life and grasp the facets of an issue or affair what may concern more people, others.
 - love the word: enjoy the potentials offered by language, and learn to "translate" one style to the other, like verbal play, and recognize whenever someone tries to use them as a means of deception.
 - learn to seize the moment, develop their abilities to improvise.
 - stretch their memory to develop their comprehension too. They should also rely on their observations and perceptions – images, moods, and intensity – in evocation. Memory was one of the essential means of oracy in antiquity, authors put great emphasis on mnemonics (Quintilian, 2002, 11.2.11-13). At that time vision and visualization had a much more important role in memory-training than centuries later or have even today. This training in imagination may lead us closer to the acquisition of multimodal-visual skills for rhetoric that are greatly required by digital literacy.
 - recognize that their behaviour is a performance. They should develop and make expressive their gestures and mimics; make their appearance and expression controlled and controllable.
 - familiarize themselves with the sayings, proverbs, and wisdoms of their culture.
 - enjoy the intellectual community of smarter people.
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As the prominent Hungarian speech therapist Imre Montágh (1996, p. 125) briefly summarized, "The good rhetor is an excellent observer with an advanced ability to grasp the gist, good at inferring, skilled in memorizing, quick to associate, and capable to express in a concise and vivid way that is comprehensible for all." In addition, Montágh emphasized the mastery of language use and rich vocabulary (based on literary erudition), the power of commitment that makes us authentic and uninhibited, control for ourselves, and compassion for others.

5. THE ROAD TO RHETORICA

One of the main challenges of teaching rhetoric is whether we can reconfigure the educational program so that it could assume the process approach rather than remain focused on the product and procedure. In other words, do we accept that the communicative-pragmatic sensitivity and behaviour which manifest in speaking constitute a much better measure of rhetorical proficiency than individual speech artifacts?

If we do, then invention have to be reclaimed for rhetoric from Petrus Ramus, and rhetorical education should be started with the development of critical thinking and rhetorical analysis. Only then we can create and shape the rhetorical space attached to context and situation, to be followed by the instruction and practice of debate as a form of behaviour in dialogical communication.

These three phases can also be grasped through the conceptual triad of (1) thinking, (2) creation, and (3) encounter. Thus first, we teach students open, exploratory inquiry, analysis, and the bold formulation of statements; second, the creative-productive processes of articulation, expression and speaking; and third, we develop the skills required to participate in encounters that emerge in conflicts and disagreement, and can induce changes.

5.1. Rhetorical criticism for critical thinking

The aim of the first phase of the process is to clarify the nature of issues, topics, and stances, and to develop critical thinking (Bowell & Kemp, 2002) and analysis.

The analytical method used in encouraging critical thinking is critical rhetoric, which is also an important procedure in research-centred education. The basic principle of this method is seeing humans as the creators of rhetoric, language as the medium for rhetoric, and communication as the purpose of rhetoric, respectively

(Black, 1965; Foss, 2009). Reasonably, rhetorical analysis can be applied to advertisement reels, video narratives at community sharing sites, and comments to online contents or interviews, news and scientific lectures as well as typical public speeches (tributes, ceremonial speeches, parliamentary contributions, or political campaigns). The procedure of rhetorical analysis can be applied in the following dimensions:

1. Explore the meaning and functions of the situation and speech acts. – Basic questions: What is the situation? Who is the communicator, and what is his intention?
2. Examine the issue, topic or idea: account for perspectives, ideologies and approaches. – Basic questions: What is it all about? What is it that the studied communication does or does not tell us? On what kind of clichés, beliefs, presuppositions, or frames of reference does it rely? What is its basic underlying thought and core idea?
3. Analyse reasoning and proofs. – Basic questions: What does the communicator claim, and what does he uses to justify his claim? What logic or stories does he use to assert his stance?
4. Study the structure of the communication. – Basic questions: What kind of speech elements are included, in what order, and with what effect the text artefact or communication is constructed?
5. Discuss expressive power: observe the code, vocabulary, imagery, and aural elements. – Basic questions: In which individual or group register the communication "sounds"? What kind of rhetorical devices (tropes, figures of speech, repetitions, or omissions) does it apply?
6. Analyse the mode of performance: elaborate the communicator-rhetor's role construction, an array of possible roles, and dramaturgy. – Basic questions: Who does the communicator think his audience consist? What kind of dramaturgical, ritual elements and repetitions are reflected in the communication? What means are applied to maintain roles and situations?
7. Examine the medium. – Basic question: How does the communication relate, in terms of the treatment of time, space, and code, to the mode of mediation?

The process of rhetorical criticism begins with description, continues with analysis, is summarized through interpretation, and ends in evaluation. In each of these study areas, it is essential to raise questions precisely and openly, and to reveal

one's own personal relations (Adamikné Jászó, 2011, 2013; Hart & Daughton, 2005; Stoner & Perkins, 2016). Rhetorical analysis is also a rhetorical act, a specific explorative-assertive and argumentative way of writing. The constant elements of critical analysis are (a) setting the problem, (b) formulating the basic question, (c) describing the selected rhetorical act and artefact, (d) presenting the method and aspects of analysis, (e) summarizing the results of analysis, answering the basic question, and (f) indicating the further challenges of analysis (Foss, 2009, pp. 9–21).

Rhetorical criticism as the facilitator of analytical skills is complemented by the acquisition of rhetorical invention as a process. In the present conception of teaching rhetoric, argumentation is considered not a part of text construction or expression, but an element of attention and way of thinking whose nature is defined by the dynamics of raising questions and making claims. This view is based on the distinction that argumentation can be interpreted as the construction of arguments, as a product; a rule of constructing arguments, as a procedure; or the counter position of arguments, as a process (Aczél, 2003; Wenzel, 1992).

Depending on the aspect assumed in its description, argumentation can have several definitions. On one hand, when we think of arguments as a set of statements, argumentation can be considered an outcome or product. This approach may be attributed primarily to logic, since it studies the abstract relations between specific statements. On the other hand, if argumentation is described from its practical point of view, then we can see a process where participants pose arguments for their own or against each other's stances. This method is applied in the approach assumed by rhetoric and dialectic. Rhetoric explores how effective the orator is in persuading his audience through his speech. In contrast, dialectic examines the interaction of two participants in the argumentation. Throughout the analysis it focuses on how the debating parties exchange specific arguments, and whether they comply with the rules predetermined by the given situation. (Forgács, 2015, p. 1094).

Therefore, the argument is described, when seen as a result, by logic, as a procedure, by dialectic, and as a process, by rhetoric, respectively. Again, that is why the process-centred approach should replace the product-centred approach, focusing on content description and typology, in rhetorical education.

One of the possible modes of process-like argumentation and education (i.e. the one preparing for interaction) can be grasped through the following steps:

1. Recognize or select the phenomenon or problem/challenge. – In a favourable case, the problem is not fictional, it is not related to imaginary roles or interactions but real collective or individual situations. Problems may belong to the scope of ethical consideration because the potential of their solution always has a stake and responsibility. The problem requires that the "audience," both within and beyond the classroom walls, should be taken into account.
 2. Survey the audience. – It is a fundamental principle of rhetorical invention that the speaker should think of addressees as at least equal human beings with decision-making opportunities, as personalities. It is essential because it enables us to understand and familiarize ourselves with the contingency and rhetorical risk that characterize social situations and interactions, so that the expression of our own thoughts could become an open process rooted in respect for others and fostering self-awareness.
 3. Teach to question. – Students should be able to distinguish general, open/closed, and suggestive types of questions, identify and filter clichés and fallacies that emerge in asking questions.
 4. Articulate the topic. – Here the premise(s) should be constructed, preferably not as a proposed theme (e.g. "the situation of the young") but as a whole sentence or statement (e.g. "The situation of the young has changed by now."), which also reflects pragmatical relations. When articulating statements, the forms of linguistic expression chosen should be as neutral as possible.
 5. Examine topic statements, based on whether they are evaluative or recommendation claims. – Articulate exploratory questions about the evaluative or recommendation claims in order to clarify the scope and significance of communication/argumentation opportunities, their social validity and benefits.
 6. Explore the potential refutations of and alternatives to topic statements, and examine the degree of disputability. – There is no use in working with undisputable claims in rhetorical education.
 7. Define concepts related to the statement, but note that differing opinions may involve conceptual differences.
 8. Articulate the stance related to the statement, based on its function as an evaluation or a recommendation.
 9. Create the logical framework, a system of arguments for the given stance: gather, sort, and arrange arguments and reasons (using statistical data, laws, rules, stories, beliefs, and topoi). – Stephen Toulmin (1958, p. 87) compares the created logical
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framework to an "organism" that has an anatomical structure and a physiological structure. This is the organism that stems from the initial statement of an unsettled problem and keeps growing until the final presentation of a conclusion.

10. Review the logical framework in terms of the conceptual system and logical-rhetorical relationships.

When finishing these ten steps, students have not yet completed text artefacts either on paper or in their minds. Instead, they can see their own mental maps, the organism of thinking, drafted in the form of claims, relations, concepts, and questions.

5.2. Rhetorical speaking for creation

The second phase of education for rhetorical behaviour consists speaking as a creative act.

In the culture of digital "new media," a number of alternatives to school-based education are available. Hundreds of thousands of people enjoy scientific courses, short and flash talks, and several weeks long online courses of renown training institutions, which all serve as information sources generated through sharing knowledge and experience. These alternative sites combine experiential knowledge acquisition with the characteristics of rhetorical behaviour: resourcefulness, vivid description, simplicity, the use of narratives, palpability, and contrasts. For example, the scientific and informative talks of TED.com are always based on some problem that concerns many people, a particular point of view, insightful descriptions, precise differentiation, disciplined content filtering, time management, and the aim to mobilize (make people think and raise awareness). That is why they seem more comprehensible and colourful, and leave a deeper impression in their audience than school classes do.

Speakers who consider the addressee a subject-like, thinking human being similar to themselves, not as an object, possess the properties of modesty, high-level presence in the situation, attention, and self-reflection. Thus speaking uses genre as a recurrent unit of typical encounters and experiences, and infers it from the mental preparation conducted in the first phase. The dichotomy of evaluation and recommendation gives rise to the classical triad of speech genres: fact speech that evaluates, considers, confirms, and judges; action speech that recommends, initiates, discourages or encourages; and value speech that induces empathy, engages, identifies, or alienates. Actually, these three speech genres are three modes or linguistic-pragmatic-aesthetic

categories of rhetorical behaviour and encounter. The present renaming of these genres does not aim to produce forced neologism. In fact, the classical descriptions translated from Latin, namely, "legal/judicial" (*genus iudiciale*), "deliberative" (*genus deliberativum*), and "demonstrative" (*genus demonstrativum*) do not convey interactional intentions or speech functions, but particular locations which very rarely occur in their pure form in mixed and complex social situations. Moreover, legal speech connotes a courtroom, deliberative speech connotes committee rooms with closed doors, and demonstrative speech connotes ceremonies, respectively: situations that are not only unfamiliar for secondary-school students, but are not necessarily desirable in their future either. In contrast, they can experience praise or blame, orders, consideration and promises, fascinating or animating discoveries, and transformative interactions. Hence, the circumscription of speech genres is significant as an identifier of communicative events, as both analytical and creative knowledge, rather than a genre distinction.

The instruction of structuring principles for speaking is suited to the social situation, goals, and the intended effect to be generated in and in cooperation with the addressee. It depends on the imaginability of collective discovery and the potential processes of an attitudinal change. In this sense, parts of the speech are not content-related but, for both the communicator and the addressee, stimulating units that draw and maintain attention, engage the audience (introduction, narrative), enable emotional attachment (digression), encourage causal and analytical thinking (proof and refutation), demand participation (enthymeme), generate the joy of structure (conclusion), foster imagination (tropes), record what has been heard (figures of speech), and elevate the situation to an event. The good speech is a building where you can easily find your way around, which makes you feel at home, and can be visited from time to time – because it is based on the holistic logic of oral cultures (Ong, 1982). Thus rhetorical communication also makes use of visual-spatial intelligence (Gardner, 1983).

In light of the above, the cognitive framework created in the critical preparation should be embedded into the dynamic and interactive process of speaking. It should be easy to communicate, follow, and receive – these requirements do not really (if at all) match the virtues of rationality and logical closure. As Jorge Luis Borges (2000, p. 31) wrote in his essay *The Metaphor*:

Because, as I understand it, anything suggested is far more effective than anything laid down. Perhaps the human mind has the tendency to deny a statement. Remember what Emerson said: arguments convince nobody. They convince nobody because they are presented as arguments. Then we look at them, we weigh them, we turn them over, and we decide against them. But when something is merely said or – better still – hinted at, there is a kind of hospitality in our imagination. We are ready to accept it. (Borges, 2000, p. 31).

The doctrinaire imposition of rationality and objectivity is alien to rhetoric: not because it aims to manipulate, but because it concerns specific human relations rather than universal principles.

5.3. Rhetorical debate for encounter

The third phase in rhetorical education is teaching debate as an encounter. In accordance with the suggestion by Ankersmit (2003, p. 20), disagreement is a creative source for all human relations and communication. There can be a strong sense of security in a relationship or community where parties are governed by identical opinions or the fear of debate, but their ability to change is bound to be weak. Although they may seem to be ideal, debate-free relations and societies are more vulnerable and exposed than communities that are ready for debate.

Debate generates knowledge, shapes experience, facilitates inquiring, critical thinking and attention techniques, and may foster a participatory culture of engagement. Debate is a communication genre which allows the parties to match, counter pose, and (in the agreement phase) reconcile their stances in order to reach a decision. Debate is a conflict by nature, but as such it is never threatening, coercive, or destructive. Disagreement in debate is not impoliteness or harshness, but an opportunity to seek new perspectives – it is the most efficient way of making decisions. Thus it can be considered an intellectual struggle that has a stake but enables preparation through an all-round approach, allows us to prepare thoughtfully, gaining experience in argumentation, and having a responsible attitude towards the other.

The parties to a debate represent disparate stances. Therefore, on the one hand, both parties are forced – by the very presence of the other – to scrutinize their own stances in order to filter inconsistencies. So they encourage each other to behave in a self-controlled and attentive way. On the other hand, a debate between these parties does not mean that they disagree. Accepting the other's point may also lead to the

extension of our own beliefs, without giving up our conviction. Thus debaters are not petty squabblers, but observant, restrained, and responsible communicators. A decision made during the debate usually derives from the community which provides the context for the debate. Consideration in good decision-making is based on the effectiveness of the parties in:

- exploring and analyzing the subject matter,
- reasoning, recounting proofs,
- constructing their argument, and
- refuting the points proposed by the other party.

There are several models for debating competitions which are fruitfully applicable in secondary school classroom-based instruction with appropriate preparation, among them the US Public Forum Debate or the widespread and enjoyable British Parliamentary Debate. Both formats have clearly defined methods, concepts, and rules that can be easily adapted to specific linguistic and cultural features. Hence, there is no point in further elaborating them here. A point that should be emphasized, however, is that debate can also foster growth in skills needed for cooperation and consensus.

Maxine Hairston (1974, pp. 210–211) describes the process of dialogical debate, based on Carl Rogers's insights, as follows. The debater should:

- give a brief, objective statement of the issue under discussion.
- summarize, in impartial, precise language and emphasizing values, the differing opinions of the opponent/audience and his own opinion on that issue. This summary demonstrates that he respects the opinion of the other(s), and did his best to understand the case, intents, and reasons for the opposition.
- present his own side of the issue, listing its foundational values and motives.
- compare the two (or more) positions and highlight their common ground, outlining how his position could alter or complement that/those of his opponent(s).
- propose, based on all of the above, a solution to the debated issue, the initial problem.

The prevalence of this model does not depend on practising only. It depends on developing an attitude to debate that focuses on curiosity, open-mindedness, the

opportunity to learn, and a friendly as well as forthcoming attitude. It does not imply some kind of a false sense of security but, much more, commitment and confidence.

6. CONCLUSION

The three-tiered objective of inculcating thinking, creation, and encounter also describes the process of rhetorical education. If we take this road, the result of teaching rhetoric will not be the text artefact but sensitivity, intelligence, and interaction skill that ensure the foundations for the rhetorical citizen – it will be a complex competence that opens up the opportunity to participate in community and social life or public affairs, to adopt the form of behaviour based on "confidence in self and others," critical thinking, and creative presence.

Understanding rhetoric as a process requires innovative pedagogical methods, tasks, textbooks – and the opportunity that exist specifically in public education only: an ongoing integration and sustenance of this process, its application in our everyday life, and testing within a protective sphere.

Rhetorical education and the construction of the rhetorical space together with students, the birth of thoughts and the discovery of interactions through language and communication offers an elevating experience for the teacher too. As Jay Heinrichs wittily remarks, "Besides all these practical tools, rhetoric offers a grander, metaphysical payoff: it jolts you into a fresh new perspective on the human condition. After it awakens you to the argument all around, the world will never seem the same." (Heinrichs, 2007, p. 6)

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Poučavanje retorike: prijedlog za osuvremenjivanje retoričkog obrazovanja u mađarskom i srednjoeuropskom okruženju

Sažetak

Retoričko obrazovanje suočava se s izazovima društva virtualnog znanja. Nastava koja uključuje razvoj vještina je neizbježna, no trebalo bi učiniti kvalitetnijim i osnažiti izravno poučavanje licem u lice. To je posebno važno u srednjoeuropskom kontekstu unutar kojeg je povijest poučavanja retorike narušena poslije Drugoga svjetskog rata. Ovaj rad ocrtava nove ciljeve u poučavanju retorike i predlaže reformu obrazovnog programa retorike na srednjoškolskoj razini.

Temelji se na pretpostavci da retoriku ne treba doživljavati i poučavati kao alat kojim se služimo pri oblikovanju teksta, već kao ponašanje osjetljivo za ljudsko djelovanje. Stoga retoričko obrazovanje ne treba biti usmjereno isključivo na proizvodnju govora, već na stvaranje retoričkoga građanstva. Obrazovanje s takvim ciljem ne odbacuje klasične retoričke temelje. Dapače, ono crpi dinamične kapacitete mentalne sposobnosti stare dvije tisuće godina.

U radu se iznosi detaljan obrazovni proces u tri faze pomoću kojeg se može istovremeno razvijati retorička osjetljivost u učionici i unaprjeđivati sama retorika.

Ključne riječi: retorička osjetljivost, retoričko građanstvo, kritičko mišljenje, kreativnost, debata

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Katahretičnost politike ili o tropima postmarksizma

Sažetak

Za razliku od tradicionalnih tematiziranja odnosa retorike i politike, uglavnom zaokupljenih uporabom retoričkih sredstava u političkom diskursu, u ovom se radu propituje mogućnost promatranja retoričkih mehanizama (prvenstveno tropa – metafore, metonimije i katahreze) kao strukturnih obrazaca konstitutivnih za politiku samu, ili barem za njezinu konceptualizaciju u određenom teorijskom korpusu. Takvo razmatranje potaknuto je posljednjom objavljenom knjigom Ernesta Laclaua *The rhetorical foundations of society* (2014), u kojoj Laclau dorađuje svoju teoriju hegemonije i u samo središte svoje političke teorije dovodi spomenute trope. U prvom dijelu rada ukratko se izlaže pregled toga razvojnog puta te utjecaj koji je pritom na Laclaua ostvaren iz polja drugih disciplina, prvenstveno književne teorije. U drugom se dijelu rada pak Laclauov retorički/tropološki model politike i društvenog uspoređuje s reprezentativnim elementima političke teorije Jacquesa Rancièrea izloženim u studiji *Nesuglasnost. Politika i filozofija* (1995/2015). Tom usporedbom istovremeno se nastoji provjeriti šira primjenjivost Laclauova retoričkog modela, koji je u središtu interesa ovog rada, ali i dodatno istražiti kako se takvo tropološko određenje politike gradi na raskrižjima politike i književnosti, odnosno političke i književne teorije, te pokazati da ispreplitanje tih domena u opusima ovdje tematiziranih autora nije slučajno. Konačno, s obzirom na status prototipnog primjera koji Laclauu pridaju studije koje nastoje ocrtati do sada nejasno određeno polje postmarksističkih teorija te dodirne točke između njega, Rancièrea i drugih teoretičara koje je pokazala usporedba, u radu se postavlja pitanje mogućnosti da se spomenuto ispreplitanje književne i političke teorije te tropološko poimanje društva/politike promatraju kao distinktivna obilježja toga teorijskog korpusa.

Ključne riječi: tropi, politika, retorika, hegemonija, postmarksizam

1. UVOD

Povezanost politike i retorike uočavala se i proučavala usporedno već sa samim počecima sustavnijeg izučavanja potonje, te je stoga nesumnjivo bliže tome da se doživljava samorazumljivom nego da se smatra novinom. No tradicionalno se istraživanje te drevne veze glavninom fokusiralo na primjenu retoričkih sredstava u (tradicionalno shvaćenom) političkom prostoru, odnosno, pojednostavljeno rečeno, mahom na uporabu retoričkih figura i drugih sredstava u političkim govorima, tekstovima i inim vidovima političkog diskursa, usmjerenih efektnijem prenošenju poruke i postizanju željenog učinka (najčešće uvjeravanja). Iako je iznimaka bilo i ranije, tek se takozvani jezični obrat u okvirima suvremenih humanističkih i društvenih znanosti pokazao ključnim impulsom za promjenu perspektive i konceptualizaciju jezika, ne više kao (transparentnog) sredstva prijenosa informacija u inače izvanjezičnoj političkoj stvarnosti, nego kao poprišta odvijanja politike *par excellence* i najvećeg uloga u političkoj borbi¹, a kod mnogih teoretičara i kao modela za konceptualizaciju ostalih pojava. Naslanjajući se na tu (uglavnom) poststrukturalističku paralaksu, no ne ulazeći u njezin historijat i detaljnije razlaganje, u ovom radu – baveći se katahrezom, metaforom i metonimijom – neće biti riječi o uporabi retoričkih sredstava u političkom diskursu, već o pitanju kako se u retoričkim mehanizmima, strukturalno gledano, može prepoznati ono konstitutivno politike/političkog.

Točnije, potaknuti posljednjom objavljenom knjigom argentinskoga političkog teoretičara Ernesta Laclaua *The rhetorical foundations of society* (2014), u prvom će se dijelu rada nastojati prikazati kako su se u samom središtu njegove političke teorije, na kraju njezina razvoja, našli tropi poput metafore, metonimije i katahreze. U drugom će pak dijelu pozornost biti usmjerena na to kako se takvo tropološko poimanje politike izgrađuje na raskrižjima književne i političke teorije, dovodeći Laclaua time u vezu s drugim teoretičarima čiji se opus također smješta na raskrižje tih polja, te na pitanje može li se takvo poimanje politike smatrati jednim od distinktivnih obilježja maglovitog korpusa koji se često naziva postmarksističkom

¹ Michel Foucault (1971/1994: 117) ponajbolje je to sažeo tvrdnjom kako "diskurs (...) nije tek ono što očituje (ili skriva) želju; on je i predmet želje. Jer diskurs – kao što nas povijest neprestano podučava – nije tek ono što izražava borbe i sisteme vladavine, već ono zbog čega i pomoću čega se vodi borba, moć koje se valja dočepati."

teorijom². Nastojeći ostati u okvirima zadanih propozicija, u tom propitivanju rad je ograničen na ocrtavanje paralela između ključnih segmenata Laclauova tropološkog određenja politike te političkoteorijskih razmatranja Jacquesa Rancièrea, no pokušavajući pritom ipak upozoriti i na mnogo šire implikacije.

2. TEORIJA HEGEMONIJE LACLAUA I MOUFFE

Ernesto Laclau postao je čuveno ime u domeni suvremene političke, ali i književne teorije prije svega zahvaljujući kapitalnoj studiji koju potpisuje u suautorstvu s teoretičarkom Chantal Mouffe, naslovljenoj *Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics* (1985/2014)³, koja se nerijetko smatra prototipnim primjerom razmjerno maglovitog, nejasno omeđenog pojma postmarksističke teorije. U prvom dijelu te studije Laclau i Mouffe podvrgavaju marksističke klasike – od Rose Luxemburg, preko ortodoksije Druge internacionale, trockizma i lenjinizma, pa do kasnijih autora kao što su Gramsci i Althusser – dekonstrukcijskom čitanju⁴ kojim istovremeno nastoje provesti ideju "razvoja određenih intuicija i diskurzivnih oblika

² Odrednica "postmarksistički" prvi se put i pojavljuje u uvodu prvog izdanja *Hegemony and socialist strategy* Laclaua i Mouffe, u kojem navode kako "u ovom trenutku trebamo izjaviti vrlo otvoreno da se nalazimo na postmarksističkom terenu." (Laclau i Mouffe, 1985/2014: 24) U predgovoru drugog izdanja knjige iz 2001. napominju pak da oni nisu "izmislili tu oznaku – ona se samo marginalno pojavljuje (ne kao oznaka) u uvodu naše knjige." No budući da je "postala poopćena" u ocjenjivanju njihovog djela, naglašavaju da joj se ne protive "sve dok je valjano shvaćena: kao proces reaproprijacije jedne intelektualne tradicije, kao i odlaska izvan nje." (Laclau i Mouffe, 1985/2014: ix) Za to poopćavanje vjerojatno je prvi zaslužan Stuart Sim sa svojim predgovorom zborniku *Post-Marxism: A reader* (Sim, 1998), u kojem je prvi put pokušao definirati postmarksizam kao koherentnu kategoriju. Taj pokušaj razradio je kasnije u studiji *Post-Marxism: An intellectual history* (Sim, 2000), a potom mu se pridružila i nekolicina drugih autora kao što su Goldstein (2005), Tormey i Townshend (2006), Bowman (2007), Therborn (2008) i Breckman (2013). Iako na prvi pogled taj monografski niz može sugerirati kako se radi o zadovoljavajuće istraženom teorijskom fenomenu, problem je u tome što se navedene studije najvećim dijelom ne nadovezuju jedna na drugu, već svaka određenju postmarksizma pristupa iznova, pri čemu su u mnogočemu suglasne, ali isto tako nerijetko ulaze i u proturječja. Nadalje, većina nabrojanih studija nakon vrlo općenitog inicijalnog određenja postmarksizma prelazi na heteroklitno nizanje kratkih pregleda opusa odabranih predstavnika, bez isticanja poveznica među njima, a jedna od stavki koja se beziznimno ponavlja u svakoj studiji, osim razmjerno privilegirane uloge dodijeljene Laclauu, jest i tvrdnja o eluzivnosti određenja postmarksizma i maglovitosti granica toga teorijskog korpusa.

³ Studija je ovdje čitana u svom trećem izdanju, iz 2014. godine. Detaljnije podatke vidjeti u popisu referencija.

⁴ Laclau i Mouffe (1985/2014: xxiii) sami navode da se radi o "kritici i dekonstrukciji različitih diskurzivnih površina klasičnog marksizma", a taj je izbor termina indikativan glede utjecaja koji je na njih ostvario Jacques Derrida, što je pak još jedna važna dimenzija rasprave o definiranju postmarksističkih teorija.

konstituiranih unutar marksizma te inhibicije ili eliminacije nekih drugih" (Laclau i Mouffe, 1985/2014: xxiv), kao i ocrtati genealogiju koncepta hegemonije koji zauzima središnje mjesto u njihovoj političkoj teoriji izloženoj u drugom dijelu knjige. Drugim riječima, izgrađujući svoj koncept hegemonije, Laclau i Mouffe nastoje reaktivacijom sedimentiranih slojeva marksističke tradicije⁵ "pokazati izvornu kontingenciju sinteze koju su marksističke kategorije pokušale uspostaviti", ukazati na to da je "polje marksističke teoretizacije bilo mnogo ambivalentnije i raznolikije od monolitnog transvestita kojeg marksizam-lenjinizam predstavlja kao historiju marksizma" (Laclau i Mouffe, 1985/2014: viii-ix), te na temelju tih ambivalencija i raznolikosti ponuditi alternativu. Zbog toga marksističkim klasicima s kojima diskutiraju nominalno ne pristupaju izvana, s neke zasebno postojeće suprotstavljene pozicije, nego najčešće čitajući ih ukazuju na njihove unutarnje nedosljednosti, logičku nekoherentnost, kontradikcije i druge slabe točke. No takvo je čitanje ipak primjetno određeno i drugim, (uvjetno rečeno) nemarksističkim elementima njihove heterogene teorijske pozadine te se stoga ne pokušava predstaviti kao bistrenje neke nove, autentičnije marksističke ortodoksije (kako je to, primjerice, prethodno nastojao Althusserov teorijski projekt čiji je Laclau inicijalno bio pobornik).

Središnja meta kritike Laclaua i Mouffe marksistički je ekonomizam, tj. oštro odvajanje baze i nadgradnje te determinacija svega bazom/ekonomskim u krajnjoj instanci, pa samim time i mehanicističko poimanje trajne, objektivno predodređene klasne borbe u okvirima marksističke ortodoksije, kao i ontološko privilegiranje koncepta klase uopće. Zbog toga središnji pojam njihove političke teorije – hegemonija – iako izravno izvedena iz korpusa koji kritički obrađuju, poprima strukturalno bitno drukčiju ulogu. Pojam hegemonije, danas vjerojatno najpoznatiji iz Gramscievih teorijskih spisa i kasnijeg razvoja na britanskoj marksističkoj sceni te u okvirima kulturalnih studija, inicijalno se pojavio u okvirima ruske socijaldemokracije, za koju je označavao preuzimanje od strane radničke klase određenih funkcija, koje joj teorijski nisu bile namijenjene, a sve uslijed slabe razvijenosti ruske buržoazije⁶. U kasnijem je razvoju ruske marksističke teorije (npr. kod Trockog i Lenjina) taj pojam doživio modifikacije, no uvijek je – kako to efektno ilustriraju Laclau i Mouffe (1985/2014: 41) – desaussureovski rečeno, ostao stvar iz

⁵ Implicitna referenca na Husserla u gornjoj sintagmi nije slučajnost, budući da se Laclau u svojim kasnijim radovima vrlo često utječe spomenutoj Husserlovoj opreci između sedimentacije i (re)aktivacije. Usp. npr. Laclau, 2014: 3, 68, 122 itd.

⁶ O genezi pojma hegemonije u ruskoj socijaldemokraciji te daljnjem razvoju uporabe u tamošnjim krugovima i teorijskim strujanjima vidjeti Laclau i Mouffe, 1985/2014: 39–45.

reda govora (*parole*), dok su klasni odnosi predstavljali činjenicu jezika (*langue*). Takav odnos nije posve nadiđen ni kod Gramscia, kod kojeg promišljanje ideologije te (posljedično) dinamičnost i kontingencija oblikovanja konkretnih političkih subjekata (kolektivnih volja, historijskih blokova) doživljavaju znatan pomak i u odnosu na trockističku ili lenjinističku perspektivu, no i dalje u konačnoj instanci ostaju vezani uz klasu kao jedan jedinstveni ujedinjujući princip. Laclau i Mouffe (1985/2014: 59) sažimaju to tvrdnjom da "unutarnja esencijalistička jezgra, koja ostaje prisutna u Gramsciovoj misli, postavlja granice dekonstruktivnoj logici hegemonije."

Nasuprot takvom priznavanju unaprijed zadanih strukturnih okvira, Laclau i Mouffe ne vjeruju ni u kakve hegemonijskoj vezi pretpostojeće objektivne društvene odnose, odnosno ne smatraju da uopće postoji *društvo* kao objektivan i samoodređujući totalitet koji bi mogao biti validan objekt nekog diskursa⁷. Ono što se uobičajeno percipira takvim za njih je zapravo prostor stalne naddeterminacije svakog elementa svakim, odnosno polje ukrštenih i međuovisnih diskursa⁸. Ti su pak diskursi tek polupropusnim granicama omeđeni u odnosu na okolno polje diskurzivnosti koje, kao spremnik "viška značenja", polisemijom podriva njihovu stabilnost, uzrokujući tako nemogućnost zatvaranja i potpune stabilizacije elemenata. Posljedična neodlučivost ono je na čemu Laclau i Mouffe (1985/2014: xi) eksplicitno zahvaljuju Derridau⁹, napominjući kako bi se i čitava teorija hegemonije mogla opisati kao "teorija odluka donesenih na neodlučivom terenu."

⁷ Usp. Laclau i Mouffe, 1985/2014: 97. Neki su teoretičari takvo otpisivanje društva shvatili razmjerno pogrešno pa ga poistovjetili s negacijama koncepta društva u neokonzervativnom diskursu à la Thatcher ili Reagan; usp. npr. Beilharz (1994: 16). Takve su usporedbe ipak prilično promašene, budući da se ne radi tek o drugoj strani novčića tačerizma, istom otpisivanju društva u potpunosti, samo iz drugih pobuda, nego se radi o preispitivanju koncepta društva kao objektivne, zaokružene, izvandiskurzivne cjeline, koja se potom zamjenjuje konceptom društvenog. Drugim riječima, Laclau i Mouffe ne dovode u pitanje postojanje šire društvene zajednice i ne minoriziraju njezinu važnost u korist užih organskih zajednica i individualizma kako je to činio tačerizam; dapače, u svojoj studiji nude nacrt široke radikalno demokratske zajednice i plediraju za nju. Ono što kritiziraju jest bilo koji oblik fundacionalnog shvaćanja takve zajednice; njezino pozitivno utemeljenje bilo u kakvom transcendentnom ishodištu, bilo u materijalistički određenoj bazi.

⁸ Svojom su definicijom diskursa, oslonjenom prvenstveno na pravilnost disperzije elemenata, a ne nekakav izvanjski ishodišni princip, Laclau i Mouffe vrlo bliski Foucaultu (usp. Foucault, 1969/2002: 29). No za razliku od njega, podjelu na diskurzivno i nediskurzivno ne smatraju validnom, odnosno ne smatraju da postoji nešto apsolutno izvanjsko diskursu, a ta je razlika u izravnoj svezi i sa stavovima o nepostojanju društva kao izvandiskurzivnog fenomena i totaliteta. Usp. Laclau i Mouffe, 1985/2014: 92–93.

⁹ Nemogućnost zaokruživanja i stabilizacije diskursa, odnosno neodlučivost tamo gdje se nekad pretpostavljala čvrsta strukturna determiniranost, višak značenja koji nastaje uslijed inicijalnog manjka –

To "donošenje odluke", odnosno privremena stabilizacija značenja događa se u trenucima previranja i posljedične rekonfiguracije diskursa formiranjem lanca ekvivalencije koji uzduž antagonističkog rasjeda u polju društvenog ujedinjuje prethodno strukturno diferencirane pozicije. To povezivanje u lanac ekvivalencije događa se u vidu simboličkog nadsvođenja pomoću praznog označitelja koji se tom prilikom zaposjeda te mu se povjerava uloga predstavljanja cijelog ekvivalencijskog (hegemonijskog) bloka, premda nije u potpunosti identičan nijednom njegovom članu niti se na njega može svesti. Pritom takav prethodno prazan označitelj postaje čvorišna točka¹⁰ nove privremene stabilizacije diferencijalnih pozicija u diskursu, suplementarni reprezent odsutnog središta/totaliteta koji privremeno sprječava daljnje isklizavanje značenja, a da on sam ničim nije nužno predodređen za tu ulogu. Drugim riječima, u slučaju političkih subjekata, hegemonijska artikulacija uvijek je artikulacija u kojoj neki politički subjekt, "neka partikularna društvena snaga preuzima reprezentaciju totaliteta, s kojim je korjenito nesumjerljiva" (Laclau i Mouffe, 1985/2014: x), što već samo po sebi u igru uvodi tropološki moment, pri čemu je identitet tog subjekta produkt artikulacije, a ne njoj prethodan i zadan nekim izvandiskurzivnim uvjetima ili objektivnim zakonima povijesti.

Za Laclaua i Mouffe politička (hegemonijska) artikulacija stoga je središnji moment kojim bi se trebala baviti politička teorija, neodvojiv od neodlučnosti i kontingencije. Kao što napominju, "da društvena objektivnost, svojim unutarnjim zakonima, određuje sva postojeća strukturna uređenja (...), tada ne bi bilo prostora za kontingentne hegemonijske reartikulacije – niti, doista, za politiku kao autonomnu aktivnost." (Laclau i Mouffe, 1985/2014: x). Odnosno:

Društvo nikada ne uspijeva biti identično sebi, budući da je svaka čvorišna točka konstituirana unutar intertekstualnosti koja ju preplavljuje. Praksa artikulacije, stoga, sastoji se od konstrukcije čvorišnih točaka koje djelomično stabiliziraju značenje; a

odsutnosti središta, nepostojanja transcendentalnog označitelja: sve to moguće je kod Derridaa pratiti od najranijih radova. Usp. npr. pregledno izložene osnovne postavke na koje se oslanjaju i Laclau i Mouffe u njegovom tekstu "Struktura, znak i igra u diskurzu humanističkih znanosti" (Derrida, 1967/2007) te njihove postavke o naddeterminiranosti i višku značenja u Laclau i Mouffe, 1985/2014: 97–98.

¹⁰ Pojam čvorišne točke (engl. *nodal point*) Laclau i Mouffe preuzimaju od Lacana, po uzoru na njegov prošivni bod (fr. *point de capiton*); usp. Laclau i Mouffe, 1985/2014: xi te Lacan, 1956/1993: 268. S obzirom na to da je prošivni bod bio jednom od tema rasprava između Derridaa i Lacana, a Laclau i Mouffe upravo od njih dvojice (uz Foucaulta, kao trećeg) crpe najviše za svoju teoriju diskursa, ona se ujedno može gledati i kao pokušaj pomirenja ili nalaženja kompromisa između tih dvaju autora.

djelomična narav tih fiksacija proizlazi iz otvorenosti društvenog, rezultata, sa svoje strane, stalnog preplavlivanja svakog diskursa beskonačnošću polja diskurzivnosti.

Svaka je društvena praksa, stoga – u nekoj od svojih dimenzija – artikulatorna. Budući da nije unutarnji moment samo-određenog totaliteta, ne može biti tek izraz nečega već postojećeg, ne može biti u potpunosti podvedena pod princip ponavljanja; naprotiv, uvijek se sastoji od konstrukcije novih razlika. (Laclau i Mouffe, 1985/2014: 100)

Već takvom afirmacijom opetovanih političkih (re)artikulacija i odbacivanjem objektivnih temelja društva, kod kojih naglašeno podcrtavaju nestabilnost značenja i preplavlivanje višeznačnošću, Laclau i Mouffe svoju političku teoriju implicitno postavljaju na tropološke temelje, odnosno dovode na retorički teren, a na pojedinim mjestima u studiji čak i eksplicitno ističu da se prisutnosti kontingentnog u nužnome očituju kao metaforizacije, simbolizacije ili paradoksi te dovode u pitanje doslovnu narav svake nužnosti. Drugim riječima, odbacujući postojanje nužnosti kao nekog izvanjskog, utemeljujućeg principa, izjednačuju taj koncept s okamenjivanjem izvorno figurativnog značenja, čime utiru temelj daljnjim promišljanjima retoričkih temelja društva kojima će se u svojim kasnijim samostalnim studijama pozabaviti Laclau.

3. TROPOLOŠKA NARAV POLITIKE

Započet smjer istraživanja Laclau je nastavio u više svojih studija, pa tako i u člancima u konačnici okupljenima u već spomenutoj knjizi *The rhetorical foundations of society* (2014) koji, iako preuzeti iz različitih okruženja i izgrađeni oko različitih primarnih pitanja, u načelu obrađuju istu temu – pitanje kako se u samom središtu diskurzivnog poimanja društvenog, kakvo su on i Mouffe inicijalno ocrtali u svojoj zajedničkoj studiji, nalaze tropi poput metafore, metonimije i katahreze¹¹. Istražujući tu važnost

¹¹ Povezivanje Laclauova istraživanja metafore, metonimije i katahreze kao "retoričkih temelja društva" s ranijom studijom o hegemoniji u koautorstvu s Mouffe nije tek proizvoljna interpretacija osovljena na istost autora; osim što u člancima okupljenima u svojoj zadnjoj knjizi Laclau također eksplicitno problematizira pitanje hegemonijske artikulacije, i u njezinom uvodu eksplicitno naglašava identične općenite crte svoga istraživačkog projekta kao i u uvodu studije *Hegemony and socialist strategy* – ocrtavanje nove političke ontologije primjerene postmarksističkom i poststrukturalističkom vremenu, pokušaj očuvanja marksističke misli bez pretvaranja u dogmu, nastojanje na reaktivaciji sedimentiranih slojeva marksističke tradicije i propitivanje mogućih alternativnih pravaca razvoja itd. (Usp. Laclau, 2014: 1–4) Također, *Hegemony and socialist strategy* i *The rhetorical foundations of society* nisu jedine dvije knjige u kojima Laclau svoju teoriju hegemonije izlaže koristeći se retoričkim pojmovima; potonja je prvo mjesto na kojem to čini posve sustavno, no između prve i nje slično možemo uočiti i u njegovim poglavljima u

tropa za funkcioniranje politike, Laclau sa spomenutom knjigom čini još izraženiji korak prema prostoru ispreplitanja političke teorije s drugim disciplinama, nastojeći pokazati "neke od mnogih stavki koje hegemonijski pristup politici može rasvijetliti [na drugim poljima], istovremeno pokazujući produktivnost koju te reference iz različitih konteksta mogu imati u razumijevanju političkog." (Laclau, 2014: 8) Osobito to vrijedi za područje književne teorije, vjerojatno najzastupljenije u njoj, zbog čega gotovo da bi se na cijelu knjigu moglo prenijeti njegovo (retoričko) pitanje s početka jednog od tekstova – "zašto bi jedan politički teoretičar, baveći se ponajviše ulogom hegemonijske logike u strukturiranju političkih prostora, bio zainteresiran za djela prominentnog književnog teoretičara kao što je Paul de Man?" (Laclau, 2014: 79) Odgovor koji Laclau nudi upućuje na to da su se u okvirima književne teorije već neko vrijeme postavljala pitanja i odvijala promišljanja potencijalno plodonosna za njegovu teoriju hegemonijske artikulacije, često i uz eksplicitnu svijest o njihovim političkim implikacijama (kao što je to slučaj s de Manom)¹².

U istraživanjima koja se prvenstveno i neposredno tiču odnosa metafore, metonimije, katahreze i hegemonijske artikulacije, Laclau se – uz autore na koje se referirao još u *Hegemony and socialist strategy* – tako ponajviše oslanja na tekstove Ferdinanda de Saussurea¹³, Romana Jakobsona¹⁴, Gérarda Genettea¹⁵ i Paula de Mana¹⁶. Osvrćući se na poznata Genetteova i de Manova čitanja Proustova ciklusa *U traganju za izgubljenim vremenom*, Laclau ukazuje na to da su ta dva teoretičara u svojim tekstovima pokazala ne samo proturječnost Proustova zalaganja za metaforu kao figuru superioranju od metonimije, s činjenicom da su njegove metafore

knjizi *Kontingencija, hegemonija, univerzalnost* (usp. Butler, Laclau i Žižek, 2000/2007) te u njegovoj studiji *On populist reason* (Laclau, 2005/2007).

¹² Konceptualizacija (moderne) književnosti kao gotovo imanentno političke kod premoćnog broja teoretičara, koji se navode kao predstavnici postmarksističke misli, kao i njezine implikacije na političku teoriju tih autora, široka su zasebna tema koju ćemo ostaviti za neko drugo istraživanje, ovdje je dodirujući još jednom tek na izdvojenom Rancièreovu primjeru nešto kasnije u tekstu. No riječ je o problematici koju Laclau ima u vidu, što možemo pretpostaviti s obzirom na njegovu eksplicitnu tvrdnju da je de Man i sam svjestan političkih implikacija svojih književnoteorijskih istraživanja (usp. Laclau, 2014: 80), kao i s obzirom na njegovo poopćavanje literarnosti kao fenomena koji "probija granice bilo koje specijalizirane discipline" te čija analiza "uključuje nešto poput proučavanja iskrivljujućih učinaka koje reprezentacija ostvaruje na svakoj referenciji – učinaka koji su stoga konstitutivni za svako iskustvo" (Laclau, 2014: 79), čemu ćemo se vratiti u nastavku teksta.

¹³ Usp. de Saussure, 1916/2000.

¹⁴ Usp. Jakobson, 1990/2008.

¹⁵ Usp. Genette, 1970/2000.

¹⁶ Usp. tekst "Semiotics and rhetoric" u de Man, 1979.

neodvojive od metonimijske okoline¹⁷, nego i to da se na općenitoj razini te figure ne mogu diskretno odvojiti, budući da su kontigvitet i analogija načela koja zapadaju jedno u drugo, te upravo ispreplitanje tih dviju figura osigurava koherentnost Proustovu tekstu¹⁸. Osim toga, Laclau (2014: 57) upozorava da je uporaba pojma metafore i metonimije kod tih autora "ponešto idiosinkratička, budući da prelazi granice onoga što im kanonska retorika propisuje" te upućuje na Genetteovu (1970/2000: 345) tezu kako se radi "o prirodi semantičkog odnosa, a ne o obliku figure" i podsjeća da je tako proširene termine koristio i Proust.

Pitanje koje slijedom toga Laclaua zanima jest može li se, ako već odnosi u temeljima metafore i metonimije prekoračuju njihove granice u tradicionalnoj retorici, tvrditi da su oni ukorijenjeni u signifikaciji kao takvoj, odnosno "ne bi li se označavanje moglo promatrati kao poopćena retorika. Drugim riječima, može li se 'retoričnost' promatrati ne kao povreda, nego kao ono konstitutivno (u transcendentalnom smislu) označavanja." (Laclau, 2014: 58)¹⁹ Ukoliko je retoričnost doista konstitutivna za označavanje, retoričke transgresije ne bi smjele biti ograničene na poredak označenog, tj. kod Genettea spomenuti semantički odnos, već bi se morale protezati i na označitelje. Da to doista stoji, Laclau zaključuje okrećući se Jakobsonu. Naime, u svom poznatom tekstu *Dva aspekta jezika i dva tipa afazijskih smetnji* [1956] (usp. Jakobson, 1990/2008) Jakobson ne samo da metaforu i metonimiju – shvaćene također generički, šire od okvira u tradicionalnoj retorici – povezuje s temeljnim osima (paradigmatskom i sintagmatskom, tj. selekcijskom i kombinacijskom) i temeljnim mehanizmima jezika, nego ta dva načela širi i na općenitije područje. Napominjući da "/n/aizmjenična prevlast jednoga ili drugog od tih dvaju procesa nije ograničena na verbalnu umjetnost", te da se isto "osciliranje pojavljuje i u drugim, nejezičnim znakovnim sustavima", (Jakobson, 1990/2008: 172) kao primjere nudi pristupe u slikarstvu, filmsku montažu, ali i rad snova; redom primjere kod kojih se odnosi sličnosti i/ili bliskosti ostvaruju (i) na razini označitelja. Konačno, potvrdu tome

¹⁷ Primjerice, Genette (1970/2000: 343) već na samom početku svog teksta piše: "Kod Prousta su vrlo rijetka ta munjevita približavanja što ih sugerira jedna jedina riječ, kojima klasična retorika isključivo daje naziv metafore. Kao da za njega analoški odnos uvijek mora biti ojačan (iako često nesvjesno) osloncem na jedan objektivniji i sigurniji odnos; odnos što ga u kontinuitetu prostora – prostora svijeta, prostora teksta – održavaju bliske stvari i povezane riječi."

¹⁸ "Jedino presijecanje jednog s drugim može izuzeti predmet opisa, i sam opis, od 'slučajnosti vremena', to jest svake slučajnosti; samo križanje metonimijske potke i metaforičkog lanca osigurava koherentnost, 'nužnu' koherentnost *teksta*." (Genette, 1970/2000: 347)

¹⁹ Radi se o pitanju bliskom onom o mogućnosti kontinuiteta gramatike i retorike koje postavlja de Man u već spomenutom tekstu. Usp. de Man, 1979: 6.

moгуće je pronaći već u de Saussureovu *Tečaju opće lingvistike* (1916/2000), kada opisujući asocijativne odnose u jeziku, odgovarajuće Jakobsonovoj metaforičkoj/seleksijskoj osi, piše:

Skupine koje su se oblikovale mentalnom asocijacijom ne ograničavaju se na to da približe riječi koje pokazuju nešto zajedničko; duh shvaća i prirodu odnosa koji ih u svakom pojedinom slučaju povezuje i tako stvara toliko asocijativnih nizova koliko ima različitih odnosa. (...) asocijacija može počivati i na samoj analogiji označenika (*enseignement, instruction, apprentissage, éducation* itd.) ili, naprotiv, samo na zajedništvu akustičkih slika (npr. *enseignement* i *justement*.) Dakle, postoji čas dvostruko zajedništvo smisla i oblika, a čas samo zajedništvo oblika ili smisla. Jedna riječ može uvijek izazvati sve ono što se s njom može povezati na jedan ili drugi način. (de Saussure, 1916/2000: 194)

Osim što dokazuju da se principi metafore i metonimije ne ograničavaju na razinu označenog, nego djeluju i na razini označitelja, ti Jakobsonovi i de Saussureovi primjeri pokazuju još jednom da su analogija i kontigvitet principi koji se preklapaju i zalaze jedan u drugi, te istovremeno podrivaju urednu diferencijalnu logiku jezičnog sistema koju svojim osima uspostavljaju. Najuočljivija je razlika ta što je takva transgresija kod metonimije jasno vidljiva, dok kod metafore imamo osjećaj da analogija posve ignorira strukturalne diferencijacije. Vodeći računa o njihovoj povezanosti koju je izložio, Laclau (2014: 62) stoga zaključuje da bi se metafora mogla nazvati "telosom metonimije, onim trenutkom u kojem je prekoračenje pravila kombinacije doseglo točku s koje više nema povratka: novi entitet koji je nastao navodi nas da zaboravimo transgresivne prakse na kojima je utemeljen. No bez tih u biti metonimijskih transgresivnih praksi novi metaforički entitet ne bi mogao nastati."

Ipak, da bi se retoričke transgresije smatrale konstitutivnima za signifikaciju kao takvu, nužna je okolina u kojoj ne postoji "nulta razina" figurativnog, odnosno sustav koji nije zatvoren i stabilan. I dok strukturalisti, potiskujući svijest o dijakroniji i propitivanje središta sustava na margine svojih analiza, implicitno polaze od takvih sustava stabilnih i savršeno recipročnih binarnih opozicija, poststrukturalistička perspektiva (naročito Derridaova, o čemu je bilo riječi u prethodnom odlomku; usp. npr. Laclau, 2014: 4, 7) u Laclauovo viđenje diskursa ugradila je svijest o problemima uzrokovanim odsutnošću središta te korjenitom nemogućnosti da se ono ili granice sistema izravno označe. Potreba za suplementarnim označavanjem tog dvoga otvara prostor praznim označiteljima; označiteljima koji stoje za samu nemogućnost nužnog

središta/totaliteta sistema²⁰. Laclauovim riječima, s obzirom na "nemogućnost postizanja bilo kakvog zatvaranja znakovnog sustava bez predstavljanja nepredstavljivog", "kada se jednom u potpunosti prihvati središnjost katahreze, retoričnost postaje uvjet označavanja i, posljedično, objektiviteta." (Laclau, 2014: 66) Stavljajući, dakle, u središte svoje tropološke teorije diskursa katahrezu, tu tradicionalno zanemarivanu, nejasno definiranu pa i često osporavanu figuru "prisilnog imenovanja", Laclau se pridružuje teoretičarima kao što su Derrida, de Man i Foucault, koji je smatraju "temeljem jezika, držeći da se jezični znak načelno konstituira oko praznog ili odsutnog označenog." (Biti, 2000: 248)²¹

S obzirom na to da, kako je spomenuto, Laclau ne razlikuje diskurzivne prakse od nediskurzivnih, te smatra da "nema nikakvog oštrog razdvajanja između označavanja i djelovanja" (Laclau, 2014: 66), opća retoričnost po njemu prožima čitavo tkanje društvenog života, a razvoj njegova shvaćanja diskursa izravno je implementiran i u njegovu političku teoriju. Hegemonijsku (re)artikulaciju tako počinje opisivati kao metonimijsku transgresiju prethodno razdvojenih diferencijalnih pozicija u nekom sistemu, izazvanu njegovom destabilizacijom (nužnim) viškom društvenog značenja/označavanja koji nije mogao apsorbirati. Pritom se inicijalno metonimijsko prekoračenje vremenom pretvara u metaforički lanac ekvivalencije organiziran nasuprot rasjedne linije antagonizma u društvenom polju, odnosno hegemonijski blok ujedinjen simboličkim nadsvodivanjem od onog aktera koji se zbog početno povoljnije pozicije nameće ostalima te podvaja svoju ulogu, bivajući istovremeno i jedna od karika lanca, i ono što prisvajajući određeni prazni označitelj metaforički stoji za odsutnu, nemoguću univerzalnost.

Vrijedi spomenuti kako Laclau (2014: 68) naglašava da su takve rekonfiguracije društvenog tkiva razmjerno neučestale i ograničenog dosega; u svojoj krajnjoj mjeri, u kojoj bi podrazumijevale organiziranje čitavoga društvenog polja u svega dva duga, antagonistički postavljena lanca ekvivalencija događaju se vrlo rijetko, dok su nešto

²⁰ Uzroke pojavljivanju praznih označitelja i njihovu vezu s politikom/političkim Laclau je razmatrao već u tekstu "Why do empty signifiers matter to politics" objavljenom u knjizi *Emancipation(s)* (1996). Ta su razmatranja svojevrsan razvoj njegovog istraživanja hegemonije uslijed intenzivnijeg bavljenja poststrukturalističkim teorijama diskursa, koje je u konačnici rezultiralo njegovim retoričkim/tropološkim viđenjem politike.

²¹ "To uvodi u lanac beskonačnog dometanja (Derrida) izazivajući u značenjskoj dimenziji 'posvemašnju slučajnost' jezika (de Man). Svi se jezični konstrukti ispostavljaju katahrestičnima usprkos 'prirodnosti' kojom se zaodijevaju. Tzv. pravo značenje pokazuje se mitom što ga u različitim epistemama utemeljuju različite figure da bi ustanovile istost u različitosti i povukle nužne granice izrecivog, vidljivog i mislivog. (Foucault)" (Biti, 2000: 248)

češće u opsegom ograničenijim, a scenarijem heterogenijim situacijama. No većinu vremena društvo je ipak organizirano kao stabilan, tj. privremeno stabiliziran sustav diferencijalnih pozicija. Koristeći se već spomenutom husserlovskom oprekom, Laclau (isto) će reći da je "društveno ekvivalent nataloženom poretku, dok se političko tiče momenta reaktivacije." No važno je naglasiti kako "nataloženi poredak", tj. diferencijalni sustav stabiliziran u nekom historijskom odsječku, nije izjednačiv s objektivnom stvarnosti, odnosno apsolutnom ničicom figuralnosti – radi se o sustavu koji je također organiziran oko praznog označitelja, suplementarnog predstavljanja nepredstavljive biti, odsutnog središta, a kontingencija prividno "neutralnog", "prirodnog" rasporeda momenata u takvom sistemu na vidjelo izlazi u trenutku njegove destabilizacije.

Utoliko, katahretičnost se na više načina potvrđuje kao neizbježan, čak (paradoksalno) središnji fenomen pri proučavanju društvenog i političkog pa se iz te perspektive čini da je Laclau i nedovoljno naglašava. S jedne strane, stabilnost privremeno stabiliziranog sistema ovisi o suplementarnom, neodgovarajućem, dakle, katahretičnom predstavljanju središta. S druge strane, ta se stabilnost narušava zahtjevom onoga što u njemu nije (odgovarajuće) predstavljeno, što postojeći sustav označitelja ne može imenovati, te stoga rekonfiguracijom tog sustava teži nasilnom, katahretičkom imenovanju²². Umjesto dodatne elaboracije tog središnjeg položaja katahretičnosti, Laclau na jednom mjestu pokušava na tragu tradicionalnije definicije katahreze odvojiti "pravu metonimiju" od "katahretičke metonimije" (usp. Laclau, 2014: 90) te odrediti koja bi od tih figura više odgovarala opisivanju hegemonijske artikulacije. Međutim, brzo zaključuje da se takvi pokušaji razgraničavanja urušavaju u nemogućnosti striktnog odvajanja doslovnog i figuralnog, odnosno u paradoksu radikalne heterogenosti koju odlikuje nestabilan ekvilibrijum heterogenosti i kontigviteta (čije bi pak konačno pretezanje na jednu stranu naprosto poništilo

²² Poveznica između katahreze i političkog kod Laclaua može se uočiti i ako se u obzir uzme (ponešto neuobičajena) definicija katahreze prema Igoru Smirnovu (1984: 67), koji smatra da se tim pojmom može obuhvatiti "svaka strukturna tvorevina zasnovana na proturječju", odnosno da je to "oznaka onih (specifično avangardnih) postupaka izgradnje teksta koji otkrivaju proturječnost unutar cjeline, izdvajajući jedan od njenih sastavnih dijelova kao poseban i pokazujući da cjelina nije jednaka sumi njenih dijelova, ili pak demonstrirajući kako se ona sastoji iz heterogenih jedinica." No zanimljivo je Smirnovljevo izričito suprotstavljanje katahreze metonimiji i sinegdohi, za koje smatra da afirmiraju mogućnost uzajamne reprezentacije dijela i cjeline. Smirnov pritom očito u vidu nema poststrukturalistička poimanja katahreze, koja ukazuju na to da je ta reprezentacija zaobilazna (Laclau bi rekao hegemonijske naravi).

mogućnost figure), a koja se ponovno pokazuje i kao uvjet hegemonijske (političke) artikulacije.

4. TROPOLOŠKI MODEL KAO POVEZNICA POSTMARKSISTA? PRIMJER JACQUESA RANCIÈREA

Premda ukratko sažeta Laclauova ideja retoričkih temelja društva, tropološke teorije politike, odnosno postavljanja metafore, metonimije i katahreze u središte njezina razmatranja može zvučati osebujno, njezinom elaboracijom ukazuju se brojne dodirne točke s drugim interesima srodnim teoretičarima, te bi se stoga moglo reći da je takav razvoj teorije hegemonije uočljivijim učinio njezine sličnosti s nekim komplementarnim pristupima politici/političkom. U ovom radu ograničit ćemo se na provedbu takve usporedbe s političkom teorijom Jacquesa Rancièrea, tj. najvećim dijelom s njegovim viđenjem politike izloženim u studiji *Nesuglasnost. Politika i filozofija* (1995/2015).

Iako Laclau i Rancièrea nisu teoretičari koje se često dovodi u vezu niti su se u svojim radovima opširnije referirali jedan na drugoga²³, neke njihove zajedničke značajke sugeriraju da bi usporedba mogla biti plodonosna i u široj perspektivi. Obojica su, naime, unatoč distanciranju od marksističke etikete i ortodoksije u svojim najpoznatijim djelima, teoretičari izvorno marksističke provenijencije. Rancièrea je čak jedan od mlađih suautora studije *Kako čitati Kapital* (1968/1975) svoga mentora Louisa Althussera, s kojim se nešto kasnije teorijski razišao (premda ga ne odbacivši potpuno)²⁴, a kojeg Laclau – unatoč kritičkom odnosu prema njemu – eksplicitno

²³ S obzirom na postmarksistički kontekst u okviru kojeg dovodimo spomenutu dvojicu teoretičara u međudnos, valja napomenuti kako se nijedna dosadašnja studija o postmarksizmu ne bavi Rancièream, pa tako ni usporedbom njegova opusa s Laclauovim, a takva usporedba izostaje i u drugim studijama koje zasijecaju slično polje. Što se njihovih radova tiče, Rancièrea se nigdje izravno ne referira na Laclaua, dok se Laclau u svojoj studiji *On populist reason* vrlo kratko i lapidarno dotiče Rancièrea, upućujući sličnost njihovih teorijskih projekata. Pritom Rancièreov opus naziva najvažnijim suvremenim pokušajem da se promišlja koncept naroda, no zamjera mu dvije osnovne stvari – poistovjećivanje politike s emancipacijskom politikom te činjenje socioloških ustupaka tamo gdje ih najavljuje ne činiti (v. Laclau, 2007: 244–248). Spomenute zamjerke najvećim su dijelom neutemeljene te ukazuju na razmjerno površno čitanje Rancièrea, na koje je dijelom odgovor i usporedba koju donosimo u ovom radu, no za detaljniju raspravu o tome ovdje nemamo dovoljno prostora.

²⁴ Iako je Rancièreovo polemiziranje s Althusserovim postavkama – u najmanju ruku implicitno – moguće uočiti u čitavom nizu njegovih studija, najsvetavniju i najeksplicitniju kritiku Althussera ponudio je u knjizi *La Leçon d'Althusser* [1975] (usp. Rancièrea, 2011), ujedno i svom prvom opsežnijem samostalnom djelu koje je zaokružilo prekid suradnje s nekadašnjim učiteljem.

imenuje kao jednog od autora koji su na njega najviše utjecali prilikom razrade teorije hegemonije (usp. Laclau, 2014: 4). Nadalje, i Rancière i Laclau podjednako su u svojim djelima kritični prema liberalnom poimanju politike, kao i prema različitim (uvjetno rečeno) neomarksističkim pokušajima revitalizacije marksističke ortodoksije; Laclau se spram tih polova više puta i eksplicitno određivao (pritom i skovavši pojam *postmarksistički*), dok je kod Rancièrea to razvidno nešto implicitnije²⁵. Konačno, uzmemo li u obzir Laclauove kasnije interese i djela, za obojicu teoretičara možemo reći da im se interes, osim političke teorije, uvelike kretao i u pravcu književne teorije te da supostojanje tih interesa nije bilo slučajno.

Ne ulazeći u detaljnije izlaganje Rancièreeve političke teorije, pozornost će biti usmjerena samo na neke ključne točke studije *Nesuglasnost* koje nastavljaju popis sličnosti s Laclauom. Za početak, već sam koncept *nesuglasnosti* (fr. *mésentente*), kao izvorišne situacije političke filozofije prema Rancièreu, opisuje govornu situaciju "u kojoj sugovornici istodobno razumiju i ne razumiju što kažu drugi. Nesuglasnost ne označava sukob između onog tko kaže bijelo i onoga tko kaže crno. Ona je sukob između onoga tko kaže bijelo i onoga tko kaže bijelo, ali ne misli na istu stvar ili ne shvaća što drugi kaže o istoj stvari kada govori o bijelosti." (Rancière, 1995/2015: 9–10) Takva je situacija moguća zahvaljujući nemogućnosti da se otkloni polisemija, odnosno zahvaljujući već spomenutom derridaovskom inicijalnom manjku središta zbog kojeg uvijek postoji neiskorjenjivi višak. Situacija je to usporediva s Laclauovom konceptualizacijom privremene stabilizacije diskursa vezivanjem nevezanih elemenata, odnosno suprotstavljanju ekvivalencijskih lanaca oko linija antagonizama u polju društvenog, uzrokovanih nesumjerljivo različitim "popunjavanjem" praznog označitelja.

Dinamika nesuglasnosti koja se događa između krajnosti pokušaja da se svakom izrazu odredi njegovo "pravo" značenje i potpunog rasapa mogućnosti komunikacije smješta se na terenu "gdje se filozofija susreće s poezijom, politikom i mudrošću čestitih trgovaca", u situaciji u kojoj diskursi moraju preuzimati riječi drugih kako bi i sami rekli nešto drugo (Rancière, 1995/2015: 11). Radi se o poznatom suodnosu brikolera i inženjera, u kojem se potonji pokazuje kao mit prvoga, te se svaki diskurs pokazuje kao brikolaž dostupnih elemenata koji nemaju svoje jedinstveno porijeklo i

²⁵ Primjerice, već u predgovoru spomenute studije Rancière odbacuje sputavanje politike od marksizma, koji ju je "učinio izrazom ili maskom društvenih odnosa", ali isto tako i njezinu liberalnu pacifikaciju i pretvaranje u sredstvo koje "osigurava komunikaciju između velikih klasičnih doktrina i uobičajenih oblika legitimacije takozvanih liberalnih i demokratskih država", te progovara o potrebi njezine obnove. Usp. Rancière, 1995/2015: 7–8.

namjenu²⁶, ali i o posljedičnoj katahretičnosti – "prisilnom" imenovanju "neodgovarajućim" imenom onoga što nema drugog imena.

Analognu situaciju možemo uočiti i kada Rancière elaboraciju ishodišnog koncepta nesuglasnosti nastavi promišljajući politiku, za koju smatra da joj se srž preklapa s temeljnim sporom koji se u određenoj zajednici "odnosi na zbroj dijelova čak i prije nego se počne odnositi na njihova 'prava'" (Rancière, 1995/2015: 20), odnosno da uopće "/p/olitike ima kada ima i dijela bez udjela..." (Rancière, 1995/2015: 21) Naime, po njemu se nepravda, tj. "ono krivo" u zajednici događa pri svakom pokušaju da se pobroje njezini dijelovi, budući da svako takvo prebrojavanje nužno završava krivim brojem. Razlog je tome s jedne strane i tradicionalno tematizirana nejednakost onoga vlastitog pripadnog različitim sastavnim dijelovima neke zajednice, ali s druge strane i nejednakost dijelova sa sobom samima (usp. Rancière, 1995/2015: 27) te postojanje onih dijelova zajednice koji nemaju ništa vlastito pa su tako istovremeno izjednačeni sa zajednicom u cjelini (s univerzalnim s kojim su nesumjerljivi), kao i lišeni mogućnosti vlastite specifične reprezentacije.

Zbog toga Rancière (1995/2015: 34), nasuprot uvriježenim pojmovima, "skup procesa pomoću kojih se izvodi okupljanje i pridobivanje kolektiviteta, organizaciju moći, distribuciju mjesta i funkcija i legitimacijske sustave te distribucije" naziva *policijom*, dijametralno je suprotstavljajući politici. S druge strane, politikom smatra one rijetke momente u kojima se događa

... raskid s osjetilnom konfiguracijom u kojoj se definiraju dijelovi i udjeli ili njihova odsutnost uz pomoć pretpostavke da njihovog mjesta po definiciji nema: mjesto dijela bez udjela. Taj se rascjep manifestira u nizu činova koji preobličuju prostor u kojem se definiraju dijelovi, udjeli i odsutnosti udjela. Politička aktivnost koja premješta tijelo s nekog mjesta koje mu je doznačeno ili mijenja namjenu nekog mjesta; ona čini da se vidi ono što se nije moglo, da se čuje neki diskurs koji je prije bio čut kao buka. (Rancière, 1995/2015: 36)

Mogućnost tako shvaćene politike počiva ponovno, kao i kod Laclaua, na "odsutnosti utemeljenja, u čistoj kontingenciji svakog društvenog poretka." (Rancière, 1995/2015: 25) Budući da nema "nikakva božanskog zakona" (Rancière, 1995/2015:

²⁶ Usp. ponovno s tekstom "Struktura, znak i igra u diskurzu humanističkih znanosti" (Derrida, 1967/2007).

25) niti je društveni poredak utemeljen u prirodi²⁷, jedino što na raspolaganju ostaje za zaliječiti boljku kontingencije i stabilizirati poredak jest "laž koja izmišlja neku prirodu društvenog kako bi zajednici dao neki *arche*." (Rancière, 1995/2015: 25) No prije nego je takav poredak efektivno stabiliziran, prije nego se u njemu može propisivati i pokoravati propisima, potrebno je da su svima njima ti propisi i obveza pokoravanja razumljivi. Ta elementarna jednakost jezika/u jeziku, koji prethodi svakom poretku i uvijek ga prerasta, neizbježna je pukotina u svakom poretku. Politika se, budući da nema svoj konkretan sadržaj, ništa vlastito, događa uvijek kao upisivanje takve jednakosti u obliku spora "u srcu policijskog poretka" (Rancière, 1995/2015: 37) i određena je isključivo tom formom, a ne objektom ili mjestom prakticiranja²⁸, kao transgresija koja nastaje u dodiru policije i jednakosti. Naizmjenična dinamika političke transgresije u odnosu na uspostavljeni diferencijalni sustav, u biti tropološkog kretanja (s obzirom na strukturno poopćavanje koje je izveo Laclau), te policijskog uspostavljanja novog poretka katahretičnim postupcima imenovanja dijela bez udjela i suplementarnog reprezentiranja odsutnog *archea*²⁹, prevedivi su, dakle, na jezik Laclauova tropološkog/retoričkog poimanja politike i društva, u odnosu na koje se pokazuju komplementarnima.

Tijesna povezanost Rancièreove političke teorije s estetikom, a time i s tematikom zanimljivom književnoj teoriji proizlazi iz njegovog stava o politici kao srazu oko postojanja zajedničke scene, a onda i zauzimanju pozicija na njoj (usp. Rancière, 1995/2015: 33), odnosno iz doživljavanja politike i političke subjektivacije

²⁷ Opća kontingentnost društvenog poretka podrazumijeva kod Rancièrea, dakako, baš kao i kod Laclaua, i nepostojanje unaprijed danih subjekata neovisnih o uspostavljenom poretku u nekom trenutku. Također, za razliku od althusserijanskog pogleda na subjektivaciju kao isključivo podjarmljivanje uspostavljenom sustavu/ideologiji, kod Rancièrea ona, kao i kod Laclaua, dolazi u dvostrukom vidu – s jedne strane policija je ona koja doznačuje dionicima zajednice ime, mjesto i zadatak; s druge strane politika je – kao trgnuće iz nekog dodijeljenog mjesta – subjektivacija kao stvar proizvodnje neke nove instancije i mogućnosti njezinog iskazivanja koje nije bilo moguće u prethodnoj konfiguraciji polja. Te dvije strane Rancière nastoji odvojiti pojmovima *identifikacije* i *subjektivacije*. Usp. Rancière, 1995/2015: 35, 40, 42.

²⁸ Isto se, dakako, može reći i za policiju; Rancière (1995/2015: 36–37) napominje da policija može biti "manje dobra i bolja", odnosno čak i "blaga i ljubazna" – iako je primarna asocijacija na njezin strukturni opis najčešće neki vid autoritarnijih, pa čak i totalitarnijih institucija i djelovanja, ne radi se o tome. Policija je naprosto određena svojom funkcijom konfiguracije dijelova i određivanjem udjela u zajednici, te se kao takva ne može svesti ni samo na državne aparate.

²⁹ Iako, takvo katahretično kretanje na drugoj je strani nužno i za politiku. Rancière (1995/2015: 39) upozorava kako, "da bi politika postojala, apolitična praznina jednakosti bilo koga s bilo kim mora proizvesti prazninu političkog obilježja kao što je to sloboda atenskog *demosa*."

kao razvrgavanja i prekrajanja odnosa "između načina *djelovanja, bivanja i kazivanja* koji definiraju osjetilnu organizaciju zajednice..." (Rancière, 1995/2015: 44), koji u određenoj konstelaciji održava policija. Drugim riječima, politička subjektivacija tiče se za Rancièrea prije svega mogućnosti da se neki dio zajednice, kojem je to prethodno bilo onemogućeno, učini vidljivim/predstavljivim, odnosno da se transformira postojeći režim i prostor osjetilnog³⁰.

Na tom tragu leži i Rancièreova (1995/2015: 41) tvrdnja da je "/m/oderna politička životinja (...) prije svega literarna životinja koja je uhvaćena u krug koji razvrgava odnose između poretka riječi i poretka tijela koji su određivali mjesto svakoga", kao i druge paralele koje vuče između poezije/književnosti i (naročito moderne) politike upravo u svezi odvajanja riječi od neke prethodno zadane reprezentacijske uloge. Sukladno tome, kada u svojoj poznatoj studiji *Politique de la littérature* (2007/2008) progovara o naslovnoj sintagmi, navodi kako politika književnosti "podrazumeva, dakle, da književnost kao književnost učestvuje u preraspodeli prostora i vremena, vidljivog i nevidljivog, govora i buke. Ona utiče na odnos između praksi, između oblika vidljivosti i između načina kazivanja koji deli jedan ili više zajedničkih svetova." (Rancière, 2007/2008: 8)³¹

Važan preduvjet politike književnosti shvaćene na taj način autonomija je književnosti kao institucije, odnosno postojanje određenog svojstva koje ju omogućuje. Rancière (kao i npr. Jakobson mnogo prije njega) to svojstvo naziva literarnošću, a određuje ga vrlo jednostavno kao "radikalnu demokraciju pisma [ili "slova"; u izvorniku stoji *de la lettre*] koja je svakome na dohvat ruke", odnosno kao "jednakost tema i oblika u izražavanju" (Rancière, 2007/2008: 17)³². Ta radikalna

³⁰ O tome opširnije usp. u Rancière, 2015: 58–59.

³¹ Rancière (2007/2008: 7) stoga naglašava da "/p/olitika književnosti nije politika pisaca. Ona se ne odnosi na njihovo lično učešće u političkim ili društvenim borbama njihovog doba. Ona se ne odnosi ni na način na koji pisci u svojim delima predstavljaju društvene strukture, političke pokrete ili različite identitete. Pod izrazom 'politika književnosti' podrazumeva se da se književnost bavi politikom ostajući književnost." Zanimljivo je spomenuti još i to da usporediv fenomen toj promjeni perspektive u najširem smislu mnogo prije Rancièrea istražuju ruski formalisti; prije svega Šklovski, a onda i Jakobson i Tinjanov. Radi se, dakako, o čuvenom konceptu *očuđenja*, koje Šklovski smatra konstitutivnom odlikom književnosti kao takve, no usporedno s time ističe i njegovu političku dimenziju, što se učestalo previđa. Usp. glede toga Šklovski, 1917/1999, kao i Glavaš, 2017.

³² Nalik Rancièreovoj demokraciji svima dostupnog slova jest, među ostalim, i Nancyev koncept "književnog komunizma" (usp. Nancy, 2004: 33, 48). Njime se Nancy – još jedan teoretičar kojeg ne bi bilo pogrešno nazvati postmarksističkim – referira na "razdjelovljenu književnost" (Nancy, 2004: 37), pismo koje afirmirajući ekvivalenciju, narušavajući uzuse (pri)kazivanja te iscrpljujući se pri stremljenju vlastitim granicama ne samo da implicira jednu osobitu "etiku, politiku diskursa i pisma" te priziva

demokracija slova u modernoj književnosti³³, odnosno sloboda od različitih kriterija doličnosti i režima reprezentacije, djeluje kao specifičan slučaj one opće jednakosti koja prethodi svakom poretku i u njemu ostaje kao paradoksalna pukotina nakon njegove uspostave te preduvjet i srž politike u srcu policije. Utoliko bi se moderna institucija književnosti (kao i drugih umjetnosti) pokazala povlaštenim terenom razumijevanja djelovanja, ali i prakticiranja rancièreovski shvaćene politike, premda vrijedi imati na umu da i ona ima svoju policiju³⁴. Uzmemo li pak u obzir da Jakobson, mnogo prije Rancièrea, istu literarnost definira kao projekciju načela ekvivalencije s osi selekcije (metafore) na os kombinacije (metonimije), a da Laclau – kao što je već rečeno – diskretnost i hijerarhijsku ulančanost diferencijalnih jedinica na osi kombinacije (odnosno metonimije) smatra odlikom privremeno stabiliziranog društvenog poretka (dakle, onim što Rancière naziva policijom) – tada postaje razvidno da su koncepti literarnosti i političnosti bliski i u njegovom viđenju stvari; odnosno, u suprotnom pravcu, da Rancièreova definicija literarnosti počiva na

transformacije temeljnih odnosa u koje je uključeno, nego Nancy u njemu prepoznaje i idealan prostor izlaganja dioništva u suverenitetu svoje razdjelovljene zajednice. Opširnija elaboracija tog Nancyeva koncepta izlazila bi iz okvira ovog rada, no ovu kratku bilješku navodimo kao još jedan primjer, zorniji od Laclauova i Rancièreova, kako odbacivanje objektivnih temelja diskursa i društva, u korist njegovog katahretičnog kvaziutemeljenja, ne podrazumijeva i odbacivanje pojma zajednice i njezinog promišljanja, nego se dapače uklapa u određen tip suvremenoga komunitarističkog diskursa.

³³ Književnost kao autonomna institucija, kako naglašava i sam Rancière (2007/2008: 8), nije transhistorijski pojam, već razmjerno moderan fenomen. Nastanak takvog fenomena u izravnoj je (dvosmjernoj) vezi s historijskim kontekstom u kojem je nastao, što uključuje i uspon jednog od triju tzv. režima identifikacije. (usp. Rancière, 2000/2004: 21–22) Promjene tih režima, odnosno historijskih okolnosti općenito, osjetile su se i na polju politike – usp. osnovne strukturne razlike moderne i stare politike prema Rancière, 1995/2015: 59. Slično i Laclau i Mouffe smatraju moderno doba u politici, tj. (metonimijski uzeto) Francusku revoluciju i promjene koje su uslijedile, preduvjetom "punog" funkcioniranja teorije hegemonije.

³⁴ I Chantal Mouffe, u svojoj studiji *Agonistics* (2013: 91) naglašava da "iz perspektive teorije hegemonije umjetničke prakse igraju ulogu u konstituciji i održavanju danoga simboličkog poretka, ili u njegovom osporavanju, te zbog toga nužno imaju političku dimenziju. Političko se, sa svoje strane, tiče uspostave simboličkog poretka društvenih odnosa, i u tome počiva njegova estetička dimenzija."

Tome vrijedi dodati da bi pri širenju ovog istraživanja na ovom mjestu svakako trebalo pozornost obratiti i na srodna pitanja književnosti kao specifične, povlaštene institucije u odnosu na političko/politiku kod drugih autora koji se daju povezati s postmarksističkim kontekstom. Primjerice, na Deleuzeove studije o književnosti na koje se Rancière izravno oslanja, na bliska Kristevina istraživanja, na zanimljivo pozicioniranje književnosti u položaj na rasponu između rancièreovski rečeno politike i policije kod Balibara i Machereya, ili pak na čuvenu Derridaovu definiciju književnosti kao "institucije koja omogućuje da se kaže sve" (Derrida, 1989/1992: 36), u dvojakom smislu totaliteta i nelimitiranosti (bilo što). Dakako, popis se tu ne iscrpljuje, no čak i navedena imena bila bi prevelik zalogaj za zadržavanje ovog rada unutar zadanih propozicija, stoga to ostaje zadatak nekim budućim istraživanjima.

tropološkoj transgresiji nalik onoj koju Laclau promatra na djelu u središtu političke (tj. hegemonijske) (re)artikulacije. Tome, konačno, vrijedi dodati i da, naglašavajući nužnost interakcije književne i političke teorije koju je uočio razvijajući svoju tropološku perspektivu politike, Laclau (2014: 79) eksplicitno navodi kako "shvaćena na tako širokoj razini općenitosti, literarnost književnog teksta probija granice bilo koje specijalizirane discipline te analiza nje uključuje nešto poput proučavanja iskrivljujućih učinaka koje reprezentacija ostvaruje na bilo kojoj referenci – učinaka koji stoga postaju konstitutivni za bilo koje iskustvo."

5. PITANJA ZA DALJNJE ISTRAŽIVANJE

Paralele koje ovaj rad povlači između Rancièreove političke teorije kakva je izložena u *Nesuglasnosti* te Laclauova tropološkog viđenja politike i društva velikim bi se dijelom mogle povući i u odnosu na Laclauovu raniju fazu razvoja teorije hegemonije u suautorstvu s Chantal Mouffe. Ipak, teorijsko kretanje koje je poduzeo u svojoj kasnijoj fazi nesumnjivo je dodatno elaboriralo njegovu teoriju hegemonije, ali i snažno naglasilo njezino nužno oslanjanje na utjecaje drugih autora i disciplina, i više nego implicitno prisutno od samih početaka, čime je ujedno usporedba s Rancièreom olakšana osvjetljivanjem dodatnih dodirnih točaka. Ta pak mogućnost povezivanja otvara nam širok prostor za daljnje istraživanje i preispisivanje odnosa između politike i književnosti, kao i između književne i političke teorije; odnosa koji su u ovim i brojnim drugim smjerovima proučavani već razmjerno dugo od ovdje spomenutih i mnogih drugih autora, no svejedno nisu još ni približno iscrpljeni kao istraživačka tema. Povezivanje dvaju pristupa koji su se prethodno razmjerno rijetko dovodili u vezu premda, kako smo nastojali pokazati, za to svakako postoji temelj, nudi nova gledišta i potiče čitanje na nov način ne samo svakog od tih autora (tako ih produktivno dopunjujući) nego i bogate mreže referenci na koju se oni pozivaju, a koja se jednim svojim dijelom i preklapa te tako osvjetljava s više strana.

Međutim, implikacije ove usporedbe nisu nužno ograničene samo na kretanje između Laclaua i Rancièrea te rasvjetljavanje njihovih doprinosa političkoj i književnoj teoriji. Spomenuta bogata mreža referenci, kao i pozicioniranost teorijskim stavovima i gledištima u blizini nekih drugih teoretičara i izravne sličnosti s njima, temelj su postavljanju pitanja može li se takav tropološki pristup društvu/društvenom/zajednici i politici, vrlo usko isprepleten s književnom teorijom, smatrati i važnim distinktivnim obilježjem već spomenutog korpusa postmarksističke teorije. Daljnje istraživanje na

tom tragu moglo bi sugerirati odgovore na neka do sada često postavljana te i dalje otvorena pitanja vezana za taj korpus, pri čemu bi razmatranje suodnosa fenomena literarnosti i političnosti/politike moglo poslužiti kao središnja os takvog propitivanja. Ono bi u najmanju ruku pomoglo remapiranju tog nejasno određenoga postmarksističkog polja, ucrtavanju novih distinktivnih crta i poveznica, ali i uključivanju suvremenijih autora koji su u dosadašnjim studijama tog polja ostajali po strani (kao što je to bio slučaj i s Rancièream, čija je sličnost s "prototipnim primjerom" postmarksističke teorije pokazana u ovom radu) te skretanju pozornosti na bliske i utjecajne ideje u djelima nekih klasika koje se, često sasvim neopravdano, prikazuje plošno i stavlja u neke posve druge ladice (ovdje su to primjerice ruski formalisti, osobito opsežnije citirani Jakobson te rubno spomenuti Šklovski i Tinjanov)³⁵.

Sve to ipak je zadatak koji uvelike premašuje mogućnosti jednoga ovakvog rada te stoga mora pričekati nastavak ovog istraživanja. U međuvremenu, ovaj rad – nastojeći ne biti tek pregledom nekih dosadašnjih teorijskih dosega Laclaua i Rancièrea te najavom nekih budućih istraživanja na postmarksističkom teorijskom polju – ipak i kao samostalna cjelina pokazuje da se istraživanje retoričkog na političkom polju ne mora svesti na puko "heteroklitno nabranje oblika" (Laclau, 2014: 60) primijećenih na površini, već se može orijentirati i dubljim strukturama povezanima s temeljnom naravi funkcioniranja jezika i politike kao takvih.

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³⁵ Opsežnije istraživanje ovdje tek naznačenih paralela s ruskim formalistima autor ovih redaka donosi u tekstu u međuvremenu nastalom te objavljenom povodom stogodišnjice Oktobarske revolucije te čuvenog teksta Šklovskog *Umjetnost kao postupak*; usp. Glavaš, 2017.

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Catachrestic politics: On the tropes of post-Marxism

Summary

Unlike traditional inquiries and discussions about the relations between rhetoric and politics, which are predominantly concerned with the employment of rhetorical devices in the political discourse, this paper explores the possibility of perceiving the rhetorical mechanisms (primarily tropes, i. e. metaphor, metonymy and catachresis) as structural patterns constitutive for politics itself, or at least for its conceptualization in the certain corpus of political theory. In doing so, the paper strongly relies on the Ernesto Laclau's last published book, titled *The rhetorical foundations of society* (2014), in which he furtherly develops his theory of hegemony, while establishing the mentioned tropes as the very centre of his political theory.

In its first part, the paper presents a concise overview of that theoretical development, with an emphasis on the most relevant influences obtained on Laclau from the fields of other disciplines, primarily literary theory. In the second part of the paper Laclau's rhetorical/tropological model of the politics and the social is compared with some of the most representative elements of Jacques Rancière's political theory, especially those that were presented in his book *Disagreement. Politics and philosophy* (1995/2015). The comparison is intended not only to verify broader applicability of Laclau's rhetorical model (being the nodal point of this research), but also to additionally explicate the way in which such tropological conception of the politics (necessarily) bases itself on the crossroads between literature and politics, or literary and political theory. Moreover, it tries to establish and emphasize the fact that such interweaving of those domains in the oeuvres of certain authors is far from being coincidental.

Finally, considering that most of the studies that are trying to define currently vaguely delineated field of post-Marxism perceive Laclau as its most representative example, the paper questions the possibility that the common points between him and Rancière, along with other mentioned and related theorists, may be a signal that such interweaving of literary and political theory, alongside with tropological conception of politics and social, could function as one of the distinctive features of that respective field.

Key words: tropes, politics, rhetoric, hegemony, post-Marxism

Prikaz

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Hrvatska

3. europska konferencija o argumentaciji – ECA 2019. Groeningen, Nizozemska, od 24. do 27. lipnja 2019. godine

Europska konferencija o argumentaciji (ECA) nastala je kao inicijativa europskih teoretičara argumentacije koja bi svake druge godine, na različitim mjestima u Europi, okupljala stručnjake iz područja argumentacije, retorike, komunikacijskih znanosti, filozofije, lingvistike i srodnih disciplina, s ciljem razmjene iskustava, znanja kao i predstavljanja novih ideja i pristupa širokom području argumentacije. Nakon vrlo uspješnih konferencija u Lisabonu i Fribourgu, treća ECA održala se u nizozemskom gradu Groeningenu od 24. do 27. lipnja 2019. Središnja tema, a ujedno i svojevrsni podnaslov konferencije bio je *Razlozi neslaganja / Reason to dissent* pa je već u pozivu autorima predloženo da prijavljuju teme koje se bave osobitostima neslaganja, načinima kritiziranja, prigovorima i razilaženjima, razrješavanjima kontroverznih pitanja i konfliktnim situacijama te kroz prizmu raznih bilo normativnih bilo deskriptivnih pristupa argumentaciji daju doprinos argumentaciji u javnom diskursu (sudskom, političkom, znanstvenom...).

Naravno, osim izlaganja vezanih uz središnju temu konferencije, nešto više od 200 teoretičara argumentacije predstavljalo je svoje radove iz područja neformalne logike, normativne pragmatike, pragmadijalektike, analize diskursa, stilistike, retorike, vizualne i multimodalne argumentacije.

Svaki od tri dana konferencije započeo je plenarnim predavanjem jednog od pozvanih predavača. Redovna profesorica Deanna Kuhn sa Sveučilišta Columbia u New Yorku održala je predavanje pod nazivom *Kritičko mišljenje kao diskurs / Critical thinking as discourse*, u kojem je govorila o važnosti kritičkog mišljenja u dijaloškim formama kada je anticipiranje prigovora i njihovih pobijanja dio pripreme argumentacije. Predstavila je pristup kritičkom mišljenju koji ujedinjuje različite

aspekte te discipline, od teorijskog konstrukta preko mjerljivosti sposobnosti, do pedagoških i edukacijskih benefita.

Druga pozvana predavačica bila je redovna profesorica Katie Atkinson sa Sveučilišta u Liverpoolu, koja je održala predavanje pod nazivom *Neslaganje je potrebno: argumentacija za umjetnu inteligenciju i njezina primjena u pravu* / *Dissent needed: Argumentation for AI and law applications*. Već iz samog naslova jasno je kako se predavačica osvrnula na razvoj tehnologija i umjetne inteligencije koji se sve češće primjenjuju u područjima koja zahtijevaju kritičko mišljenje ljudi pri donošenju odluka. Jedno od takvih područja jest pravo i sudstvo pa je iznijela rezultate rada iz područja računalne argumentacije, koje se razvija s ciljem da asistira ljudima u procesu donošenja odluka.

Treća predavačica bila je profesorica emerita Ruth Amossy sa Sveučilišta u Tel Avivu, koja je govorila o polemičkom diskursu naslanjajući se na svoju knjigu *Isprika za polemiku* iz 2014. / *Apologie de la polémique*. U predavanju pod nazivom *Revizija Isprike za polemiku: o 'uvjetima radosti' kojima se omogućava suživot u neslaganju* / *Revisiting Apologie de la polémique: About some 'felicity conditions' allowing for coexistence in dissent* govorila je o uvjetima i ograničenjima takozvanog koegzistiranja u neslaganju. Svoje teorijske postavke obrazložila je primjerima relativno aktualnih nasilnih prosvjeda Žutih prsluka u Parizu te načinima razrješavanja konflikta u Francuskoj kroz polemiku predsjednika Macrona i prosvjednika.

Kao što je spomenuto, na konferenciji je sudjelovalo 200-tinjak stručnjaka iz područja argumentacije koji su svoja predavanja izlagali ili kao tzv. uobičajeno izlaganje ili kao dugo izlaganje koje je uključivalo i unaprijed pripremljen komentar na prethodno izlaganje putem kojeg se iznose eventualne prednosti i/ili nedostaci predstavljenih istraživanja. Uz izlaganja, podijeljena u sedam paralelnih sesija, tijekom konferencije održana su i dva pozvana panela.

Prvi panel organizirao je Fabio Paglieri sa Sveučilišta u Rimu pod nazivom *Nove perspektive u javnome diskursu: doprinos Europske mreže za analizu argumentacije i političkog diskursa* / *New perspectives on public discourse: Contributions from the European Network for Argumentation and Public Policy Analysis (APPLY)*, na kojem se predstavila europska COST akcija usmjerena na analizu i evaluaciju argumentacije u raspravama Europskog parlamenta. Predstavljeni su ciljevi projekta kojima se želi dati doprinos kvalitetnijoj razini rasprava i procesa donošenja odluka u europskom političkom diskursu u pitanjima klimatskih promjena i energetske politike.

Drugi panel organizirao je Jan Albert van Laar sa suradnicima sa Sveučilišta u Groeningenu pod nazivom *Manipulacija javnim mnijenjem: analiza kontroverzi vezanih uz imigrante / Manipulating public opinion: Analyzing controversies about immigration*. Na panelu se pokušalo utvrditi postoji li manipulacija javnog mnijenja kada je u pitanju migrantska politika te kako spoznaje iz teorije argumentacije mogu pridonijeti raskrinkavanju i razrješavanju kontroverzi vezanih uz pitanja imigranata.

Oba panela pokazala su kako argumentacijski stručnjaci mogu dati doprinos u rješavanju najvažnijih aktualnih pitanja (klimatske promjene i imigrantska politika) te kako se spoznaje iz područja argumentacije mogu i moraju primijeniti u javnome diskursu ako se želi poboljšati kvaliteta javnih rasprava, a time i kvaliteta odluka koje utječu na život suvremenog čovjeka.

Osim izlaganja i stručnih panela, veliku pozornost izazvao je i "zabavni" panel pod nazivom *Koji je od Platonovih dijaloga najvažniji za retoriku i argumentaciju?*, u kojem su sudjelovali Jean Wagemans (braneći Platonov dijalog *Menon*), Michael Hoppman (braneći dijalog *Gorgija*), Mike Philips Andreson (braneći dijalog *Fedar*) i Scott Aikin (braneći dijalog *Država*). Nakon nedoumica treba li publika glasovanjem izreći vlastiti stav o važnosti Platonovih dijaloga ili glasovati za najbolju "obranu", pobjednikom je proglašen Michael Hoppman i Platonov dijalog *Gorgija*.

Na konferenciji je predstavljen velik broj zanimljivih ideja, inicijativa, kvalitetnih izlaganja i širok spektar različitih pristupa argumentaciji. A uz stručan dio konferencije, organizatori su se pobrinuli i za raznovrstan društveni program: od razgledavanja grada uz stručnu pratnju do domjenaka, prijema i svečanih večera.

Na ECA konferenciji dodjeljuje se i Nagrada Frans van Eemeren za najbolji studentski rad, koju je ove godine za svoj rad *Strukturalne razlike između praktičnih i kognitivnih presumpcija / Structural differences between practical and cognitive presumptions* dobio Petar Bodlović, doktorski student na Sveučilištu u Groeningenu, inače podrijetlom iz Hrvatske.

Od hrvatskih izlagača na konferenciji je sudjelovala Gabrijela Kišiček s radom pod nazivom *Auditivni argumenti: važnost zvuka u argumentativnom diskursu (empirijsko istraživanje) / Auditory arguments: Importance of sound in an argumentative discourse (An empirical study)*.

Konferenciji je, tradicionalno, prethodila i *ECA Summer School* (koju su ove godine zajednički organizirali APPLY COST akcija i ECA konferencija), a održala se u Leidenu od 20. do 22. lipnja. Ljetna škola argumentacije namijenjena je uglavnom doktorskim studentima koji se bave ili argumentacijom ili srodnim područjem, a s

ciljem da se upoznaju s različitim pristupima argumentaciji. Upravo zbog toga izabrani su predavači koji su svaki iz svoje perspektive podučavali argumentaciju: Steve Oswald je dao lingvistički pristup, Henrike Jennsen (ujedno i organizatorica škole) govorila je o pragmatodijalektičkom pristupu, Dale Hample predavao je s retoričkog stajališta, a Catarina Dutilh Novaes s epistemološkog aspekta.

I ljetna škola i sama konferencija bile su iznimno uspješne, a sudionici zadovoljni. Predsjednik Organizacijskog odbora konferencije ECA 2019, docent Jan Albert van Laar zahvalio je svima na angažmanu, a palicu organizacije prepustio Fabiu Paglieriu, koji će organizirati konferenciju ECA 2021 u Rimu.

UPUTE AUTORIMA

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